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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation challenges the idea that the United States “home front” in 
World War II escaped the violence and disorder visited upon overseas cities by 
military forces. It examines American “liberty ports”— from San Francisco and 
Los Angeles to New York and Boston— where millions of GIs and other Allied 
servicemen took leave and liberty. Emboldened by the privilege of their uniforms 
and near immunity from civilian laws and authorities, these troops caroused, 
fought with locals, rioted in the streets, and assaulted women. A near constant 
presence in many large ports and transportation hubs, servicemen effectively 
occupied entire urban districts, routinely provoking civil-military conflicts. Though 
many historians imagine that most troops spent the war abroad, in fact many of 
them remained stateside for the duration. Before the spring of 1944, when 
preparations for D-Day accelerated, 65-75% of all soldiers were stationed 
domestically. 25% of the U.S. Army’s forces never left the country at all. Friendly 
invasions and other occupations by troops not only impacted places such as 
Britain, France, Germany, Australia, and Japan; they fundamentally reshaped 
American cities and civilian life as well. 
 
 ix 
To solve a number of manpower and training problems, U.S. military 
officials encouraged and inculcated in their recruits an aggressive, heterosexual 
masculinity that mocked civilian life as effeminate and weak. Many GIs embraced 
this vision of soldiering and took advantage of the military’s lenient stance toward 
“blowing off steam” in boom towns and liberty ports. Fist fights with civilian men, 
pursuing and cornering women, and rampant drunkenness went mostly 
unpunished as the Armed Forces struggled to mobilize for a two-front war. 
Nearby women faced many dangers, but they also found ingenious ways of 
defending themselves. Meanwhile, local politicians and businesses struggled to 
protest the militarization of their neighborhoods, even while doing their part for 
the war effort. This wartime militarization of civilian American life is a crucial but 
almost entirely forgotten factor in the rise of the military as a key institution of 
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Introduction: Reimaging the American Home Front 
On August 14th, 1945 American troops stationed throughout the Pacific Rim—in 
places like Manila, Chungking, and Okinawa—huddled around shortwave radios 
as President Truman announced the surrender of Japan and the end of a brutal 
and merciless island hopping campaign. Soldiers and sailors celebrated by firing 
bright, orange tracers in the air and careening through the streets in jeeps, wild 
with euphoria that they would no longer face a deadly invasion of the Japanese 
mainland. Other troops formed conga lines and jubilantly sang “Don’t Fence Me 
In.” The impromptu fireworks shows, joyriding, and celebrations, however, quickly 
turned violent. In one Pacific “liberty port,” where troops took furloughs and leave, 
some ten thousand uniformed men poured into the downtown streets as local 
civilians and police watched from their now stranded cars and sidewalk corners. 
The city crackled with the near constant barrage of firecrackers like “a battery of 
machine guns.” Quickly running out of booze, troops hurled bottles and bricks 
through department store display windows, looting alcohol, jewelry, and other 
merchandise. Drunken rioters overturned cars, set them ablaze, or transformed 
them into battering rams to crash through shop fronts. Some climbed atop their 
vehicles and reenacted the Mount Suribachi flag raising. Civilians and GIs 
brawled in the street, as longstanding tensions between the occupiers and the 
occupied boiled over into violence. Soldiers and sailors also cornered women, 
tearing their dresses, kissing them forcibly, and sometimes beating their escorts. 




street.” Men were “kissing, and practically raping, everybody.” At least six rapes 
did occur. Rivalries between the services also led to one marine savagely 
beating an Army private with his bare fists, leaving him to die on the sidewalk. 
The chaos lasted for two more nights before military and civilian 
authorities conceded that the situation “appeared to be getting out of hand.” A 
combination of MPs and local police formed a phalanx and slowly cleared the 
streets. Hospital workers struggled to cope with the enormous number of injuries 
and cases of alcohol poisoning. Three days of “peace riots” brought at least 
eleven deaths, over a thousand injuries, and tens of thousands of dollars of 
property damage. When the police failed to investigate the numerous victims of 
rapes, one incredulous health director asked, “What do they think we examined 
at the hospital last night—ghosts?” In the following months, city and military 
officials launched an investigation, but no one was charged or court-martialed. 
The Grand Jury scrutinizing the riots argued that “when large numbers of young 
men realize that they are freed from war they are prone to celebrate 
overzealously.” The Army’s intelligence summary admitted that the conduct of 
personnel “was generally riotous” and that “women were assaulted,” but 
dismissed the situation as a “temporary emergency.” The mayor, when asked 
about the riot and unremittent levels of crime “gazed off into space” and merely 
responded that the police and Navy “did a good job when they took over.”1 
                                                     
1 Sources differ over whether eleven or thirteen people died. For the previous two paragraphs see 
“Victory Reports Around the World: U.S. Fighting Men Lead Wild Celebrations at Japs’ Surrender 




This was San Francisco at the outbreak of peace. New York, Boston, Los 
Angeles, and Washington, D.C. also endured elevated incidents of drunkenness, 
sexual assault, and riots committed in celebration of the end of World War II. Yet 
scholars have overlooked the status of stateside ports as important military hubs, 
continuing to imagine that carousing and violence by servicemen only really 
occurred abroad. Troop crime plagued American cities throughout the war, and 
civilians—especially women—lived with many of the same dangers and fears felt 
by the residents of occupied cities overseas. Women’s groups, businesses, 
politicians, and police struggled to come to terms with servicemen’s impact on 
their cities and frequently protested and fought the military to regain local control. 
But soldiers proved stubbornly immune to effective oversight from civilian 
authorities, and sometimes even military ones.2   
This dissertation recovers the long forgotten history of American “liberty 
ports”—cities in the continental United States that were profoundly impacted by 
military mobilization, because they became destinations for millions of sailors and 
                                                     
14, 1945, 6; “Riots End Liberty for 100,000 in Navy,” NYT, August 16, 1945, 6; “Riots and Looting 
Mark Bay City’s Celebration,” LAT, August 15, 1945, 1; “Photo Caption to Waves Pillow-Fight,” 
Life, August 27, 1945, 24; “Navy Clears Bay City Streets Following Riot,” LAT, August 16, 1945, 
8; LAT, August 15, 1945, 1; “‘Peace’ Rioting,” SFC, August 17, 1945, 1, 6; “The People” SFC, 
This World magazine insert, August 19 1945, 5; For death of Army private and Army report see 
“Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 86,” August 18, 1945, 319.1 (Weekly Intelligence Summary) 
9th SC., Administrative Division: Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1941-1945, 
box 78, RG 389 (Provost Marshal General), NACP; Grand Jury quote is taken from Brooke L. 
Blower, “V-J Day, 1945, Times Square,” 85, in Brooke L. Blower and Mark P. Bradley, eds., The 
Familiar Made Strange: American Icons and Artifacts after the Transnational Turn (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2015); Health director and mayor quoted in Gary Kamiya, “S.F. 
Whitewash Covered Up ‘Peace Riots’ at End of WWII,” SF Gate, August 22, 2015, 
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-whitewash-covered-up-peace-riots-at-6458585.php.  





soldiers. It explores a handful of the most important hubs for troops—cities like 
New York, Boston, Norfolk, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles—focusing 
on the relationships and conflicts that developed between servicemen, civilians, 
and the authorities charged with policing them. An analysis of these urban 
centers overturns the common view of the home front as a protected place, 
unscathed by the violence embroiling the rest of the globe. Indeed, soldiers 
effectively occupied many American cities. Sixteen million men served in the 
military, passing through towns near training camps, cities along transit lines, and 
embarkation ports at the coasts. During the war over three million servicemen 
moved through New York alone. Though many historians imagine that most 
troops spent the war abroad, in fact many of them remained stateside. Before the 
spring of 1944, when preparations for D-Day accelerated, 65-75% of all soldiers 
were stationed domestically. 25% of the U.S. Army’s forces never left the country 
at all. Liberty ports became international zones of trade and entertainment, where 
GIs sought alcohol, sex, and other excitements during their furloughs. And these 
were not simply American spaces. The presence of Commonwealth, French, 
Dutch, and Chinese servicemen further complicated attempts by municipal and 
military officials to police nightlife and crime. An analysis of this unexamined 
history can change the way scholars understand the home front, civil-military 
relations, and World War II itself.3 
                                                     
3 For percentage of men in stationed domestically, see “Strength of the Army Reports,” 319.1 
(Weekly Intelligence Summary) 8th SC, Box 78, Administrative Division: Mail and Records 




The history of the GI most often centers on the drama of combat, 
culminating at such locations as Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Anzio, Normandy, and 
Iwo Jima. Popular histories, memoirs, and films follow a common arc: young, 
naïve, slightly scared teenagers, farmers, and factory workers join the Army and 
leave home for exotic and dangerous locales abroad, where they soon endure 
their first harrowing experiences of combat, quickly form bonds across ethnic and 
geographic lines, and eventually become a cohesive unit of hardened, 
resourceful veterans. In this narrative, the soldier’s arc mirrors that of the nation 
as a whole: a young, rising America stumbles at first, but soon rises to overcome 
its supposed prewar isolation to offer liberation, leadership, and democracy 
across the globe. The “good war” account necessarily locates troops outside the 
U.S., where they stand as liberators and saviors for a world broken by the horrors 
of fascism and imperialism—our boys in uniform become a new light to an old 
world in need of an American Century.4 
                                                     
Chester Wardlow, United States Army in World War II: The Technical Services, The 
Transportation Corps: Movements, Training, and Supply (Washington D.C.: Center of Military 
History, United States Army, 1990), 100, 332; For total troop numbers see Michael Adams, The 
Best War Ever (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 70. 
4 For examples of this type of combat history, see Stephen E. Ambrose, Band of Brothers, 506th 
Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2001); Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the 
Bulge to the Surrender of Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); Robert Leckie, 
Delivered from Evil: The Saga of World War II (New York: Harper and Row, 1987); Tom Brokaw, 
The Greatest Generation (New York: Random House, 2001). Films have also been critical in 
defining the usual history of the combat soldier. For the most influential films, see Sands of Iwo 
Jima, dir. Allan Dwan (1949; Republic Pictures) and Saving Private Ryan, dir. Steven Spielberg 
(1998, Amblin Entertainment). For works that cut against this romantic narrative of the combat 
soldier see John Ellis, Sharp End: The Fighting Man in World War II (New York: Scribners, 1980); 
Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990); D. Clayton James and Anne Sharp Wells, From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day: 
The American Armed Forces in World War II (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995); William I. Hitchcock, 




The public is understandably drawn to making the combat soldier the 
central figure in wartime histories. Anyone who has read a memoir like Eugene 
Sledge’s With the Old Breed recognizes that extolling the sacrifices of 
servicemen is not meaningless pabulum or mere government propaganda. 
Those who fought and those who died deserve to be remembered. To truly 
understand the experience of the vast majority of troops, however, the combat 
soldier’s story can only reveal so much. Estimates vary on how many troops 
actually saw combat—one military study estimated that fewer than 10% did—but 
less than half were ever in a combat zone. Far more spent the war in the service 
of logistics and transportation, or a vast bureaucracy that managed huge swaths 
of new property, paychecks, and the healthcare of millions. Service personnel 
outnumbered combat troops 27 to 1 according to one estimate. But all dealt with 
the daily privations and annoyances of a regimented life. Since few could realize 
their identity as military men by storming a beach or flanking along a hedgerow, 
many did so instead by exercising the privilege of the uniform while taking leave. 
Carousing in bars, cornering and chasing women, and beating up the guy not in 
uniform quickly emerged as a compelling marker of what it meant to be a soldier. 
                                                     
Free Press, 2008). For histories that examine and challenge the “good war” myth see Studs 
Terkel, “The Good War”: An Oral History of World War II (New York: The New Press, 1984); 
Adams, The Best War Ever; Emily S. Rosenberg, A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in 
American Memory (Durham” Duke University Press, 2003); John Bodnar, The “Good War” in 




Indeed, servicemen used the direct and stark contrast of civilian life to accept 
and lionize their status as military men.5 
 A number of recent studies have revealed the enormous disruptions 
caused by such GI carousing abroad from Australia, China, and Okinawa to 
Britain, France, and Germany. Rape, assaults, petty crime, and casual violence 
became all too common hallmarks of American liberations and occupations. In 
Commonwealth nations, the phrase “overpaid, oversexed, and over here” served 
as a shorthand for explaining GI behavior. By 1942, for example, Brisbane 
played host to a growing contingent of American personnel, which soon erupted 
into conflicts between Yanks and Australian troops vying over women and the 
town’s increasingly scarce goods such as cigarettes. “The Australians had 
grievances and they had very solid reasons to be aggrieved,” recalled one 
                                                     
5 For combat troop numbers and service to combat personnel ratio see Adams, The Best War 
Ever, 70, 97. For a selection of the most influential combat memoirs see Eugene B. Sledge, With 
the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa (New York: Presidio Press, 1981); Robert Leckie, Helmet 
for my Pillow: From Parris Island to the Pacific (New York: Random House, 1957); Chuck Tatum, 
Red Blood, Black Sand: Fighting Alongside John Basilone from Boot Camp to Iwo Jima (New 
York: Berkley Caliber, 2012). Histories of American GIs initially portrayed servicemen as 
fundamentally ordinary and somewhat provincial men transformed by the war into heroic and 
romantic vanguards of the American Century. When the home front did receive attention, these 
histories emphasized a vision of patriotic women and families sacrificing and working as they 
waited for noble soldiers to return victorious. This good war narrative faced mounting criticism in 
the 1980s, with Studs Terkel and Paul Fussell producing popular works that challenged this 
entrenched mythology. Soldier memoirs like Eugene B. Sledge’s With the Old Breed partly set the 
stage for these criticisms, as veterans were given more authority to criticize their own actions. 
See Sledge’s With the Old Breed. See the aforementioned Terkel, “The Good War” and Fussell, 
Wartime. Academic works include Adams, The Best War Ever and Bodnar, The “Good War”. 
Historians such as John Dower developed these criticisms, demonstrating that combat was 
characterized by brutality and moral ambiguity for all sides, American included. See Dower’s 
influential War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1986). Also see the early works by Saburo Ienaga like The Pacific War, 1931-1945: A Critical 
Perspective on Japan’s Role in World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). Mark Selden’s 
work was also critical in challenging the established view of the atomic bombings. See for 
example, edited with Kyoko I. Selden, Atomic Bomb: Voices From Hiroshima and Nagasaki 




officer, “The Yanks had everything—the girls, the canteens and all the rest of it—
and our blokes were completely ostracized in their own city.” Tensions eventually 
boiled over in November, leading to the two-day Battle of Brisbane in which the 
city’s blackout restrictions had to be lifted just to restore order. In Sydney, women 
stepped out into the darkened streets wielding “hatpins, bag needles, spike files, 
penknives, cayenne peppers, scissors, or weighted torches” as they watched for 
“any brown-out Casanova who makes a nuisance of himself.” In Britain, 
Americans caused similar disturbances from London’s Piccadilly Circus—where 
Yanks raced to find the women called “Piccadilly Commandos” for some “vicious 
debauchery”—to smaller coastal towns like Weymouth used as staging grounds 
for the D-Day invasion. Across the channel in France, troops arrived as liberators 
and armed tourists, but also as persistent threats to local women and civilians. 
And in China, the Philippines, Okinawa, and Japan, servicemen thirsting for sex 
and drink provoked recurring conflicts that threatened both local and international 
relations well into the postwar era.6 
                                                     
6 For Battle of Brisbane see Peter A. Thompson and Robert Macklin, The Battle of Brisbane: 
Australians and the Yanks at War (Canberra, Australia: BWM Books, 2000); For Sydney quote 
see “Sydney Girls Arm: To Deal With ‘Romeos,’” The Cairns Post, May 8, 1942, 1. Blower also 
discusses this in Blower, “V-J Day, 1945, Times Square,” 74; For Piccadilly quotes see Neil 
Tweedie, “How our Piccadilly Commandos had the GIs Surrounded,” The Telegraph, November 
1, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1501961/How-our-Piccadilly-Commandos-had-
the-GIs-surrounded.html; For “armed tourists” in France see Mary Louise Roberts, What Soldiers 
Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2013); Several works have been particularly influential in driving scholars to examine the 
consequences of America’s military presence abroad. See Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches & 
Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics (London: Pandora, 1989); Katherine H.S. 
Moon, Sex Among Allies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and Beth Bailey and 
David Farber, The First Strange Place (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994). Also 
see David Reynolds, Rich Relations: The American Occupation of Britain, 1942-1945 (New York: 




The American home front, understandably, has long been regarded as 
separate and shielded from these overseas stories.  Historians, of course, have 
taken stock of a number of conflicts in the wartime United States. Japanese 
internment, race riots, and a wide variety of labor disputes mark the most visible 
signs of a turbulent age. Women moved into the defense plants in 
                                                     
GIs in Wartime Britain (London: Collins & Brown, 1992). Also see Sonya Rose, “Girls and GIs: 
Race, Sex, and Diplomacy in Second World War Britain” International History Review 19.1 (Feb. 
1997), 146-60 and Jenel Virden, Good-bye Piccadilly: British War Brides in America (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1996). For works on American soldiers in Australia and New Zealand 
see Anthony Barker and Lisa Jackson, Fleeting Attraction: A Social History of American 
Servicemen in Western Australia During the Second World War (Nedlands: University of Western 
Australia Press, 1996); Harry Bioletti, The Yanks are Coming: The American Invasion of New 
Zealand, 1942-1944 (Auckland: Century Hutchinson, 1989); Rosemary Campbell, Heroes and 
Lovers: A Question of National Identity (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1989); Michael McKernan, All 
In: Australia During the Second World War (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson, 1983); John Hammond 
Moore, Over-Sexed, Over-Paid, and Over-Here: Americans in Australia, 1941-1945 (Brisbane: 
University of Queensland Press, 1981); Daniel Potts and Annette Potts, Yanks Down Under, 
1941-1945: The American Impact on Australia (Melbourne: Oxford, 1985). For postwar Germany 
see Maria Hohn, GIs and Frauleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002) and Petra Goedde, GIs and Germans: 
Culture, Gender, and Foreign Relations, 1945-1949 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003). 
For France see Roberts, What Soldiers Do and Roberts, “The Price of Discretion: Prostitution, 
Venereal Disease, and the American Military in France, 1944-1946,” The American Historical 
Review Vol. 115, No. 4 (2010): 1002-1030. For Japan see Sarah Kovner, Occupying Power: Sex 
Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan (Palo Alto: Stanford, 2012); Mire Koikari, “Rethinking 
Gender and Power in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952,” Gender and History 11.2 
(1999). For Okinawa see David Tobaru Obermiller, “The Okinawan Struggle over Identity, 
Historical Memory, and Cultural Representation,” The Japan Foundation Newsletter, Vol. 27 No 
3-4, 12-16. For China see Zach Fredman’s gripping dissertation “From Allies to Occupiers: Living 
with the U.S. Military in Wartime China, 1941-1945,” (dissertation, Boston University, 2016). For 
the long effects of the American presence at Subic Bay in the Philippines see the documentary 
Left by the Ship, directed by Emma Rossi Landi and Alberto Vendermmiati (2010: PBS, 2011). 
For Puerto Rico see Katherine T. McCaffrey, Military Power and Popular Protest: The U.S. Navy 
in Vieques, Puerto Rico (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2002). For Trinidad see 
Harvey R. Neptune, Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). For the issue of “war brides” see Susan 
Zeiger, Entangling Alliances: Foreign War Brides and American Soldiers in the Twentieth Century 
(New York: New York University Press, 2010). Other major studies include: Hohn and Seungsook 
Moon, eds., Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War II to the Present 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); J. Robert Lilly, Taken by Force: Rape and American GIs 
in Europe During World War II (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Peter Schrijvers, The 
Crash of Ruin: American Combat Soldiers in Europe During World War II (London: MacMillan, 
2001); Schrijvers, The GI War Against Japan: American Soldiers in Asia and the Pacific During 




unprecedented numbers, finding both new levels of independence and fulfillment, 
but also workplace harassment and hazardous conditions. Popular images circle 
back again and again to notions of wartime women as Rosie the Riveter, worried 
family members, or doting lovers waiting for a sailor’s kiss or a letter from abroad. 
But almost all of these stories feature civilians amongst themselves—the home 
front exists apart the war front. Soldiers and sailors remain absent from this 
landscape, or only make brief cameos in events like the Zoot Suit Riots.7 
                                                     
7 World War II historiography is now filled not only with military and political histories of the “war 
front,” but also an extended literature on the “home front.” Scholars have used the home front to 
discuss civil rights, labor, women’s history, and governmental power. Classic home front accounts 
include the work of scholars like John Morton Blum and Richard Polenberg, who emphasized 
extensive social change, cultural shifts, the effects of government propaganda, and the 
experience of minority groups. See John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American 
Culture During World War II (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976) and Richard 
Polenberg, War and Society: The United States, 1941-1945 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 
Company, 1972). Also see Polenberg’s earlier but less influential anthology, America at War: The 
Home Front, 1941-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1968) and Geoffrey Perrett, Days of 
Sadness, Years of Triumph: The American People, 1939-1945 (New York: Coward, McCann and 
Geoghegan, 1973). Historians like Dominic Capeci and political advocates like Michi Weglyn 
stand out for making the home front part of a longer civil rights narrative. Examinations of the 
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These assumptions, however, have led to a set of misleading claims that 
Americans on the home front uniquely avoided the effects of war. “The 
continental United States had escaped the plague of war, and so it was easy 
enough for the heirs to believes that they had been anointed by God,” mused the 
writer Lewis H. Lapham in 1979. David M. Kennedy’s Freedom from Fear echoes 
Lapham’s often quoted sentiment, concluding that “beyond the war’s dead and 
wounded and their families, few Americans had been touched by the staggering 
sacrifices and unspeakable anguish that the war had visited upon millions of 
other people around the globe.” Compared to horrors like fire-bombing, the Blitz, 
and essentially anything that occurred on the Eastern Front, Americans did of 
course escape the plague of war. But civilians in American stateside ports, 
stopover cities, and boom towns shared far more experiences with those living in 
war-touched cities abroad than yet recognized.8  
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The home front has served too much a foil for the way troops behaved 
abroad. In Mary Louise Robert’s What Soldiers Do, an examination of the often 
poor behavior of American troops liberating France, the U.S. military is depicted 
as protecting “American families from the spectacle of GI promiscuity while 
leaving French families unable to escape it.” These histories often rely on the 
idea that when soldiers encountered a foreign land, they became convinced that 
pursuing and even forcing themselves on women could be justified by that 
country’s exotic traditions and loose morals. In Normandy, Roberts notes, GIs 
“made sex the defining element of French civilization,” which they ultimately 
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characterized as “primitive and oversexed.” Again and again, Roberts and other 
historians return to the idea that the military exported both servicemen and 
sexual assault, while leaving the folks back on the home front safe from the 
revelry and violence that accompanied invasions and occupations. “The US 
military protected the ‘virtuous’ American woman back home at the expense of 
the French prostitute,” Roberts explains. In reality, an American woman “back 
home” in Boston had little more legal recourse than the French woman in Le 
Havre. While valuable work has been done on uncovering the government’s and 
military’s obsessive campaign against venereal disease—and the women who 
were treated inhumanely because of it—most stories of women and troops on the 
home front center on teary eyed goodbyes and love separated by an ocean.9 
But the GI was not away at all. For many people, especially those living in 
coastal cities, the military presence exerted a huge influence on everyday life. 
Servicemen were neither absent nor a peripheral concern, but rather central 
figures who dictated the often discordant rhythms of the wartime city. Whether it 
be women taking a route home that circumvented areas well-trafficked by troops, 
business owners struggling to keep bar fights and brawls from destroying their 
establishments, or civilian men avoiding amusement zones for fear of being 
heckled or assailed, civilians of all kinds were forced to make adjustments to 
daily lives suddenly impacted by the war. 
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The following chapters tackle the problems of liberty ports from different, 
perspectives in turn. Chapter one, told from military authorities’ point of view, 
unpacks the nuts and bolts of mobilization, capturing the desperate, makeshift 
nature of the transition from peacetime to war. In 1939, the U.S. military 
confronted over twenty years of poor funding, dilapidated infrastructure, and a 
severe lack of tradition. In Washington, the Roosevelt administration battled 
regular protests and widespread skepticism about the necessity of a draft. 
Mobilization barely lurched forward as the first selectees arrived in half-
constructed camps. Bewildered and resentful of Army regulars, their 
commanders, and FDR himself, morale plummeted so quickly that officers feared 
their men might mutiny. The standard tactics to produce group cohesion and 
esprit de corps proved futile, so military officials began to come to terms with the 
physical, intellectual, and morale limitations of those who made up the draft pool 
and sought instead to build loyalty to the armed forces and buck up troops by 
inculcating a new kind of martial masculinity that emphasized physical 
aggression and sexual prowess. This barracks culture celebrated obscenities, 
virility, and a rough, aggressive heterosexuality. Draftees came to identify civilian 
life as effeminate and impotent. Some officials worried about the growing 
animosity towards civilians that became baked into this worldview as men made 
forays back into the civilian world to hit the local boom towns near their camps 
and forts, get drunk, and chase girls. Complaints from local communities soon 




this form of swaggering masculinity because it yielded a renascent morale and 
camaraderie among their troops. Facing a dire two-front war, the concerns of 
civilians would be set aside.  
This new barracks culture and unofficial code of conduct made soldiers 
and sailors less likely to respect civil or military authority while on leave. Chapter 
two explores the experience of being in uniform from servicemen’s points of view 
as they pursued vices, often with impunity, in embarkation ports and while on 
furlough. Rapidly expanding networks of railways and shipping routes propelled 
enormous numbers of men into lively hubs and liberty ports where they clamored 
for “dangerous fun.” Emerging from train stations, taxis, subway cars, and nearby 
wharfs, sailors and soldiers discovered exotic cities with an almost infinite 
selection of pleasures and amusements far from where they grew up. Men 
swarmed taverns, saloons, peep shows, and dance halls in search of alcohol and 
women. Civilian men—contradictorily seen as both epicene weaklings and as 
sexual threats—made easy targets for bullying and street fights. Small fist fights 
regularly blew up into riots and brawls that police forces struggled to put down. 
The most common targets, however, were girls and women who endured wolf-
whistles, aggressive advances, sexual assault, and even occasionally murder at 
the hands of soldiers, sailors, and marines.10 
                                                     





Initial attempts to strictly enforce the military’s legal code caused a number 
of unanticipated problems. Brigs filled with a seemingly endless stream of drunk 
and disorderly men. Some troops discovered that committing enough petty 
crimes might result in dishonorable discharge, and regarded that as a possible 
escape from the military, potential death abroad, and an opportunity to pick up 
lucrative defense work that offered better wages than soldiering. Recognizing this 
perverse incentive and an ongoing manpower crisis, military leaders mostly gave 
up on enforcing good behavior. Civilian police soon learned that they, too, held 
no real authority to arrest or try servicemen for crimes committed in port, even 
when a civilian was the victim. The Armed Forces, in a series of explicit and 
understood agreements, placed men in uniform outside the jurisdiction of civilian 
law. Command essentially granted military men extraterritorial and extralegal 
privileges, even as their pursuit of vice and good times taxed the infrastructure of 
liberty ports and the welfare of their inhabitants. Military Police and Shore Patrol 
proved little more effective than municipal cops. Troops openly despised both 
forces, regularly rebuffing their instructions and even attacking MPs and SPs. All 
of this culminated in the San Francisco Peace Day Riots and other V-J Day 
celebrations across the country, during which troops openly rioted and assaulted 
civilians in the streets. 
Chapter three turns to women’s complicated motives and strategies when 
interacting with men in uniform. The large numbers of American, Commonwealth, 




problems for local women, and many frequently complained about servicemen’s 
aggressive demeanor. Even as women directly protested to the military that they 
were forced to “run the gauntlet,” they found ways to negotiate the dangers of life 
in port. Some devised tactics for navigating the city, others fought back, shared 
strategies for avoiding street harassment, and petitioned to civil and military 
officials (while attempting to avoid actually criticizing the war effort). Yet others 
dated servicemen, lusted after them, or fell in love. Servicemen’s wives explored 
strategies for maintaining their marriages while preemptively identifying the new 
men who might pose a threat. Women lived contradictory romantic lives—troops 
were both highly visible predators and their most available chance at a 
relationship, or protection from other men in uniform. Romance novels, advice 
columns, and diaries brimmed with discussions of how to pick “the right 
soldier”—the one who would take you somewhere exciting like Coney Island, but 
wouldn’t get “wolfish.” A reliable escort could guarantee a relatively safe passage 
through the city and even a fun night out. Too often though, women discovered 
escorts and dates could turn rough, coercive, and violent. Finally, some women 
found ways to take advantage of the predictable whims and weaknesses of 
troops. A whole range of girls and women actively ran scams, hold-up schemes, 
and robberies specifically targeting inebriated sailors and soldiers lured in by the 
promise of a good time.   
Chapter four investigates how the presence of servicemen militarized 




red-light districts, undercut urban renewal attempts, and transformed 
neighborhoods and areas like Boston’s Scollay Square and New York’s Coney 
Island into military bastions. This chapter also explores reactions and strategies 
pursued by civilian businesses, urban reformers, and municipal authorities. For 
some, particularly businesses in the liquor trade, the military presence brought 
money and opportunity. Local businessmen sought to exploit this new customer 
base, catering to the liberty economy with vice-filled venues and services. Yet 
proprietors walked a tight rope—selling liquor and hosting establishments for 
potential "pick ups" was lucrative, but these activities also invited scrutiny from 
the Army-Navy boards that sometimes banned troops from such locations. Local 
politicians meanwhile fielded protests from women, civilian men, business 
groups, and religious figures concerned about the breakdown of order, and they 
struggled to appease their constituents while maintaining cordial relations with 
the military officials stationed in their midst. For park officials like Robert Moses, 
police chiefs, and mayors like Fiorello La Guardia, the war resulted in an 
aggrandizement of military control of the city. The military seized this opportunity, 
declaring a wide legal purview that made troops essentially immune from civilian 
oversight, while also making a significant number of civilians subject to military 
law. This chapter therefore details the strategies these officials pursued as the 
military annexed city property, legal power, and introduced lax policing 
standards.  In the end, however, municipal authorities held little power to stop or 




World War II cemented the rapid amalgamation of federal power, which 
had first gained a foothold in World War I. Bursting with new agencies, raking in 
more taxes, and making greater demands upon citizens, the federal government 
became a leviathan that demanded a reorientation of civilian life towards serving 
the demands of the state. While couched in soothing intonations and the 
comforting setting of fireside chats, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
consistently promoted the idea that civilians ought to serve and support a 
widespread militarization of American life. This rise of executive authority, 
government bureaucracy, and military power is well chronicled.11 
Yet Americans did not experience the expansion of federal and military 
authority solely through taxes, propaganda, war bonds, and labor restrictions. 
Many also encountered it in the form of sailors and soldiers commandeering the 
everyday places where they lived their lives. Their streets, bars, parks, and trains 
regularly filled with such “friendly invasions,” as one writer put it in 1944. This 
visceral, embodied military presence prompted bitter conflicts over who should 
                                                     
11 Two key works stand out on the amalgamation of federal and military power during wartime 
and the consequences for those on the home front. For World War I see Christopher Capozzola’s 
Uncle Sam Wants You: World War I and the Making of Modern American Citizen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008). For World War II see James T. Sparrow’s Warfare State: World War II 
Americans and the Age of Big Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For 
additional works on how the war affected federal power and citizenship see Fred J. Cook, The 
Warfare State (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1962); Allan Winkler, The Politics of 
Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1978); Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: 
Knopf, 1995); Eric Foner, The Story of American Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, 1999); Robert Westbrook, Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations in World 
War II (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2004); Paul A.C. Koistinen, Arsenal of World War 





control public space, who held jurisdiction over servicemen, and what sacrifices 
could be tolerated in service of the war. As once dominant municipal authorities 
increasingly buckled to ascendant Army and Navy authorities, the war drove a 
vast amalgamation of military power in American life. While these conflicts 
unfolded, women navigated the perilous streets, alleyways, and train cars, 
attempting to sort the decent men from the wolves. But the story of liberty ports 
also reveals the limits of that ballooning military authority. The American GI 
remained a recalcitrant individual unwilling to abide the demands of civilian 





                                                     
12 “Friendly invasions” from Alexander Feinberg, “Soldiers Tour City in Vain for Rooms,” NYT 




Chapter One: Making the Military Man 
By the end of World War II, over sixteen million Americans would serve in the 
Armed Forces throughout a massive global network of ports, cities, towns, bases, 
and encampments. In early 1939, however, approximately 330,000 troops mostly 
waited in docked ships and decaying World War I cantonments as the Phoney 
War became real across the oceans. The U.S. may not have been the isolationist 
slumbering giant depicted by many histories, but its military—particularly the 
ground forces—had suffered a serious decline in numbers, infrastructure, and 
tradition since the Great War.13 
While scholars have previously examined this story of the draft and 
training, they have yet to analyze how military mobilization planted the seeds of 
conflict between servicemen, civilians, and women on the home front. The draft, 
military buildup, and training system played a major role in fostering the chronic 
poor morale, policing, and discipline that stretched across the services. Years of 
underfunding and makeshift repairs left the military far behind in its preparations 
as it scrambled to muster an Army. Lacking an efficient training infrastructure 
and, at times, mutinous troops, military authorities channeled the draftees’ anger 
and aggression towards civilian centers. The sexually aggressive masculinity 
inculcated amongst draftees devalued the lives and welfare of civilians. Troops 
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found that performing this masculinity became the most readily available way to 
demonstrate the superiority and privilege being a GI while trapped in a military 
system they despised. Their first adventures outside the training camp taught 
servicemen how to act when they ultimately reached liberty ports. San 
Francisco’s Peace Day Riots were born in the initial excursions and carousing 
that military men learned in the barracks and in the towns adjacent to training 
centers.14 
Fighting for Conscription 
Among the world’s great powers, the U.S. was perhaps the least prepared 
to fight. Despite the conflagration engulfing Asia, Africa, and Europe, proponents 
of a peacetime draft faced political infighting, protests, and a general sense that 
the American public would never support a program that stole young men away 
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from their families and workplaces. Sensing the lukewarm, if not hostile attitudes 
of many Americans towards mass conscription, President Roosevelt announced 
his support for “universal government service for every young person” on June 
18, 1940. Rather than explicitly calling for a draft, the President compared the 
proposal to the Civilian Conservation Corps while praising the value of 
“discipline” and fostering “a toughness of moral and physical fiber” in American 
youth. Opponents of conscription and FDR seized upon his attempt to disguise 
the draft as another New Deal program, with Alf Landon—Roosevelt’s opponent 
in 1936—noting the use of “weasel words” that obscured the call for “compulsory 
military training.”15 
Roosevelt’s proposal soon took shape as the Burke-Wadsworth Act, also 
known as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940. The bill called for the 
registration of over fifty million men between the ages of eighteen to sixty-four. 
The Army would be allowed to select—Selective Service officials despised the 
term “draft”—up to 900,000 men aged twenty-one to thirty-five who would serve 
no more than one year during peacetime. It was a small step towards building a 
viable armed forces. Military leaders and the Roosevelt administration privately 
confided that years of poor funding, a non-existent munitions industry, and 
mismanagement had left the U.S. Army behind countries like Spain, Belgium, 
and Switzerland. Key military figures like General John J. Pershing—leader of 
the World War One Expeditionary Forces—mounted a public offensive and sold 
                                                     




Burke-Wadsworth as a measure that would “promote democracy by bringing 
together young men from all walks of life” and “might well be the determining 
factor in keeping us out of war.” Army officials also reported the abject failure to 
recruit men voluntarily to either the National Guard or regular Army, almost 
begging the Senate Military Affairs Committee to push Burke-Wadsworth 
through.16 
Pershing’s comments—statist language clad in an appeal to democratic 
virtue—attempted to stymie the two major criticisms of compulsory military 
service: First, that it would bring the U.S. closer to war, and second, that it would 
foster anti-democratic or fascistic ideas amongst American youth. In May 1940, 
three hundred City College of New York students, anticipating the push towards 
a draft, protested a ROTC demonstration with signs proclaiming “To Hell With 
War.” Following the introduction of the Burke-Wadsworth bill, religious 
organizations mobilized to denounce the draft not only for its failure to exempt 
priests and members of religious orders, but also because they believed it 
threatened the fundamental values of the nation. Methodist leaders protested 
directly to Senators on the Military Affairs Committee, while also releasing fiery 
statements to the major papers. Boston’s Methodist Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam 
and other church leaders declared that the conscription bill was an “un-American 
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and an undemocratic proposal, springing like a mushroom from swamps of 
unjustifiably hysterical fear. It constitutes a weak, unintelligent proposal to take 
up slack in unemployment, and by its folly is doomed to defeat real democracy 
and tends to prepare the way for war.” The draft—rather than a pragmatic 
antidote to decades of chronically low military funding and manpower—was seen 
as “an insidious infection of the free life of a democratic people [that] apes 
totalitarian conscription.” Oxnam concluded by insisting that if Congress passed 
the draft, they would end the American tradition of individual liberty by resorting 
“to the Nazi and Fascist forms which brought totalitarian Europe to its present 
tragedy.” Catholic bishops and archbishops joined the Methodists, proclaiming 
that emergencies should not be used to justify totalitarian measures. Assailing 
the administration’s claims about the necessity of preparation, the bishops 
warned that the supposed danger posed by the situation in Europe did not justify 
the draft. A California conference of churches similarly condemned Burke-
Wadsworth because it failed to meet the “basic principles of democracy.”17 
 Students, mothers, and other concerned citizens soon took to the streets 
throughout the country to stop the passage of Burke-Wadsworth. These protests 
often employed theatrical methods designed to create a public spectacle worthy 
of press coverage. In late July, three people dressed as mummies marched 
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through downtown Boston with messages proclaiming “Don’t Be a Mummy, 
Speak for Peace,” scrawled on their bed-sheet costumes. In Los Angeles, the 
American Peace Crusade paraded with placards denouncing conscription, while 
two students posed as a newly married couple flanked by two grieving mothers. 
Some 1200 protestors crowded into Turner’s, a boxing and wrestling arena in 
D.C., to hear “speakers throw verbal lefts and rights at the Burke-Wadsworth 
conscription measure” and call for Capitol Hill marches and vigils. The next day, 
D.C. police dispersed several hundred protestors, fighting and arresting leaders 
like Methodist Rev. Owen Knox. The Democratic and Republican offices in New 
York were surrounded by picket lines filled with youth carrying signs that 
exclaimed “Conscription is a Blitzkrieg against democracy.” Congress saw a 
thousand protestors sing “Ain’t Gonna Study War No More.” One member of the 
Peace Mobilization Society began screaming “American conscription is American 
fascism” from the House gallery before being removed. Three thousand 
members of the National Maritime Union violently protested in New York City, but 
not before publishing a resolution that framed compulsory conscription as a 
fascistic measure backed by a Big Business clique. Socialist presidential 
candidate Norman Thomas agreed that peacetime conscription embodied 
totalitarianism, telling the House Military Committee that the draft was “Hitlerism 
without Hitler.” Others wrote to their papers to register their disdain for both the 
draft and Roosevelt’s desire to support Britain. “We are not at war with anybody,” 




Germany and is being attacked. This Nation has gone stark-mad through fear 
engendered by President Roosevelt.” The U.S. ought to stay out of “Europe’s 
power wars” and advocates of preparation for war “must have a guilty conscience 
to be shrieking about the Hun goblins.”18 
Perhaps the most notable protest featured 200 angry mothers, a waste 
paper dummy, and a maple tree. On August 22nd, in the sweltering heart of 
D.C.’s summer, “a fleet of taxicabs drew up near the Capitol steps and began 
disgorging loads of grim faced women.” Startled police watched as the women 
dragged “what appeared to be a man on the end of a rope,” an effigy of Senator 
Claude Pepper (D-FL), one of the key proponents of the draft. The day before, 
Pepper had, according to the Chicago Daily Tribune, told mothers assembled to 
protest the draft legislation to “go home and mind their own business.” One 
hundred yards from their taxicabs the protesters found a maple tree, swung the 
rope over a branch, and began hauling the man up into the air, chanting “We’re 
hanging Claude Pepper to a sour apple tree, so our sons and husbands live on 
and be free.” As a crowd of nearly 500 assembled to heartily applaud the 
hanging, police arrived and declared, “You women can’t do this here.” A chorus 
of women replied, “Who’s going to stop us?” The Congress of American 
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Mothers—a group that claimed 10,000 members nationwide—had organized this 
vivid protest against conscription. Police and passerby who attempted to stop the 
spectacle faced insults and defiance from the assembled women. As debate 
continued in the House and Senate, six women in widow’s veils watched from 
gallery as a silent warning about the potential consequences of passing Burke-
Wadsworth.19 
 The draft’s proponents faced stiff opposition, with legislative sessions 
sometimes devolving into petty recriminations and insults. At an August 6th 
session, pro-draft Senator Sherman Minton (D-IN) accused anti-draft Senator 
Rush D. Holt Sr. (D-WV) of coming from a “slacker family” that lacked patriotism 
and courage. Holt replied by charging that “Senator Minton is not in shape to be 
on the floor,” and defending his claim that he would always be opposed “to this 
alien doctrine of conscription, and the conscription program, which did not come 
from America, but came from foreign shores, and was incubated in the banks 
and law firms of New York City on Wall Street.” Outbursts from spectators led to 
threats of clearing the galleries while Senator Holt was reprimanded for his 
language. Tensions also grew in the House where FDR’s allies limited debate on 
Burke-Wadsworth to two days in spite of vigorous protests from Republicans. On 
                                                     




September 5, hostilities worsened as two congressmen engaged in a fistfight on 
the House floor.20 
 To counter the public backlash, protests, and political opposition, the 
draft’s proponents mobilized to make their case in the press while also taking 
advantage of the dire situation in Europe. Roosevelt called in powerful 
Republicans like New York City Mayor Fiorello La Guardia to speak in favor of 
Burke-Wadsworth, as well as prominent industrialists such as Owen D. Young. 
Educators from the National Education Association issued statements in favor of 
integrating compulsory military training into schools and colleges, although they 
disapproved of a full year of military service. Prominent journalists like Walter 
Lippmann published in support of conscription. Writing in the Los Angeles Times, 
Lippmann assailed Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) for criticizing the value of training 
and conscription: “These Senators are in flight from the realities and are taking 
refuge in sheer wishfulness….If the emergency demands this much military 
power which we do not possess, the overshadowing concern of responsible 
statesmen ought to be to think up ways of hastening the process of developing 
this force.” Chief of Staff George C. Marshall likewise understood that without a 
peacetime draft, the Army would remain unable to counter German or Japanese 
aggression. A week before France fell to Axis forces, Marshall spoke on both the 
complacency that existed in the United States as well as the challenges ahead, 
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making a subtle call for the draft: “We have been accustomed to liberty, but after 
the next few days nobody knows or can say what kind of world we shall be living 
in.” Leaders like General Pershing and Chief of Staff Marshall were joined by 
other veterans like Colonel W.A. Graham who called universal training “not only 
wise but very necessary” especially given how long it would take to train a whole 
new army. Colonel Graham also dismissed the opposition “from religious and 
political objectors, from pacifists, cowards and Communists, from Liberty 
Leagues, and others of that ilk, and, alas, from frightened mothers, wives and 
sweethearts” while couching conscription as a fundamental American tradition 
with its roots in the 1792 Militia Act. FDR’s allies smartly passed military 
spending bills before tackling conscription, giving them the argument that men 
would be needed to use the already purchased equipment and vehicles.21 
In all likelihood, however, the deteriorating fortunes of France and Britain 
moved more officials towards passing Burke-Wadsworth. Five days before FDR 
officially called for conscription, Paris fell to the Wehrmacht. One week after the 
President’s announcement, France surrendered to Nazi Germany leaving 
Americans stunned. As various congressional committees met to discuss the 
peacetime draft, the Battle of Britain intensified. Secretary of War Henry Stimson 
seized on the dangerous setbacks in Europe in his recommendations to the 
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House Military Affairs Committee on August 1st. He warned that “in another 30 
days Great Britain may be conquered and her fleet come under enemy control. 
Across the Pacific there is a powerful Japan in sympathy with Italy and Germany. 
We’ve got to very radically revise our prejudices about our first line of defense.” 
The appeal quieted some of the objections to an unprecedented peacetime 
mobilization of men, and the administration continued to gather support. By 
September the Luftwaffe began bombing London. One supporter of conscription 
noted that each day of the London Blitz bought Burke-Wadsworth “a vote or two 
in the House or Senate.”22 
 On September 14, 1940, the House and Senate approved Burke-
Wadsworth by a 2 to 1 margin. Protests, nevertheless, continued. Peace 
Mobilization League members picketed outside the White House, urging the 
President to veto the measure. The “anticonscriptionist” wing of the Senate held 
a public post-mortem led by Senator Burton Wheeler (D-MT) who warned that 
military training would poison American boys. “You mothers of America,” 
proclaimed Wheeler, “they say to you they will take your sons and train them to 
be young brutes. They will teach them that the Ten Commandments are wrong. 
You will have a country of Al Capones. You will have a country where robbery 
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will run riot.” For the most part however, Americans accepted registration and the 
draft as measures justified by the looming Axis threats.23 
The morning of October 16 marked the beginning of registration-day, a 
massive undertaking that eventually saw over sixteen million men being 
processed by a million volunteer workers throughout the nation. Reports 
indicated a mostly smooth process even with the long lines and late hours for 
workers. The vast majority of men reported to their registration centers, though 
many struggled when filling out their registration card. Often, it was the first 
federal form they had ever seen. Protests at New York’s Union Theological 
Seminary and in the Southwest among Native Americans did little to disrupt the 
day. By this point most American men at least accepted the validity of 
compulsory service, with Gallup finding that 76% of boys and young men did not 
object to military service. One father of a selectee remembered the uncertainty 
and concern as he walked with his son into the local schoolhouse for registration: 
“What will happen to freedom and democracy when my son and a million like him 
are militarized?” But he soon came to see American conscription the way the 
Swiss saw their compulsory service, as a guarantor of freedom, democracy, and 
masculine honor. “My son is going to be a soldier,” the father explained, “And I 
felt a surge of pride.” Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hershey, the executive officer at 
draft headquarters, issued a radio speech declaring that “anyone who watched 
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these Americans at the places of registration must have sensed a great surging 
pride, for America’s manhood was parading through those places of registration 
today, America’s youth upon whom the Nation depends for preservation.”24 
“Over The Hill In October” 
Despite the administration’s victory with Burke-Wadsworth, the relatively 
smooth “R-Day,” and Hershey’s proclamations, military leaders understood just 
how unready they were to process and train the initial 900,000 men allocated by 
the Selective Service Act of 1940. Chief of Staff Marshall faced a wide array of 
problems as he attempted to essentially build an army from scratch. Before 
registration, the U.S. army totaled less than 170,000 regulars. The miniscule 
National Guard reserves lacked training and tradition. Marshall was likely even 
more concerned by the dearth of corps troops that specialized in skills like 
mortars, antiaircraft gunnery, logistics, and most notably tanks. The problem of 
integrating green recruits into the insular “Old Army” of professional soldiers 
loomed as well.25 
Marshall began by directly tackling these supply and training problems, as 
well as challenging the crippling traditionalism of other generals. Colleagues 
warned that he was “courting disaster,” but Marshall proceeded to reassemble 
disparate units into divisions and pushed manufacturers to deliver needed 
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equipment. He also organized a humiliating public demonstration of the Army’s 
woeful state prior to the introduction of Burke-Wadsworth, likely on purpose. In 
May 1940, Marshall mobilized seventy thousand troops for war games along a 
mock war front in Louisiana, Georgia, and Texas. Over the next few days, the 
Army’s supposedly hardened regular troops performed maneuvers through mud, 
swamps, brush, and challenging hills, moving nearly 150 miles a day as they 
pretended to assault machine gun nests, break opponent lines, and take down 
enemy aircraft. Families and the press gathered to see the spectacle, but anyone 
who watched was left with little doubt as to how poorly the military might perform 
in a real war. Over the course of a week, 12 soldiers died in accidents, almost 
400 suffered injuries and illness, and huge numbers of equipment and machinery 
failed. Later on, two flight crews totaling eleven men died when their bombers 
crashed. Civilians on porches and rooftops also witnessed the folly of generals 
unwilling to abandon cavalry. In one instance, two hundred mounted horses 
charged an armored brigade, slashing and firing at the unfazed tanks. Time 
noted, “Against Europe’s total war, the U.S. Army looked like a few nice boys 
with BB guns.” Marshall had, nevertheless, won the day. He proved that Army 
needed dedicated funding and manpower, while cavalry leaders were forced to 
confront the superiority of armored divisions. “It was a successful experiment,” he 
said, “It showed us our shortcomings, and I think it convinced Congress that the 




Henry Cabot Jr. (R-MA) echoed Marshall: “The fact remains that our Army today 
is not what it ought to be.”26  
 With the loss of France, Britain on the brink, and the draft in place, 
Marshall finally had the political capital he needed to begin the process of 
modernizing the decentralized and dilapidated Army camp system. During 
America’s violent westward expansion, the Army relied upon small, but numerous 
posts dotted throughout the countryside to project power and support cadres. 
Reliance on this system however, left only one true division. Marshall conceded 
to the Los Angeles Times that the remaining army was made up of “mere 
hodgepodges of unrelated small units.” Camps and units lacked the basic 
necessities of modern armies like artillery, firearms, logistics support, and basic 
transport. Many Representatives and Senators, however, staunchly opposed any 
attempts to modernize this outmoded camp system. Each post, camp, and fort 
provided consistent jobs, purchase orders, and men with disposable income to 
districts suffering through a depression. Congressional resistance to centralizing 
the camp system meant that training remained inefficient and commanding 
officers lacked experience with troop movements. Initial mobilization plans called 
for troops to drill and assemble in public buildings, parks, and fields within major 
cities. But with conscription proceeding quickly, Marshall and the War 
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Department pushed a crash program of expanding and building new camps and 
forts. Though he faced the ire of politicians who feared the loss of a local camp, 
Marshall began surveys of huge swaths of land.27  
Marshall, the Corps of Engineers, and the Construction Service also 
confronted a legacy of poor funding and mismanagement since World War One. 
At their height, the WWI Army cantonments could house 654,786 soldiers, but 
many of these training areas featured temporary housing that had fallen into 
some level of disrepair. From 1920 to 1938, the Construction Service suffered 
what it called “the lean years” or “the famine years.” Funding for maintenance 
and construction plummeted while a Brigadier General heading the 
Quartermaster Corps took control of the construction division. The General was 
selected on the basis of seniority, lacked an engineering background, and 
proceeded to ignore the suggestions of his more knowledgeable subordinates. 
The Army clustered some of its funds on a few new camps, but mostly focused 
on an increasingly dire battle against rot and dilapidation. Some of the Corps’ 
talented engineers resigned in disgust and left for more lucrative private sector 
work. The Army saw a brief reprieve in 1924 after troops on Governors Island 
were forced to forage driftwood from the bay to repair buildings. The Times put 
the story on the front page, and other articles emphasized the poor living 
conditions soldiers experienced. Congress appropriated more money for 
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construction and repairs, but funding collapsed once again with the Great 
Depression. From 1934 to 1936, the Construction Service received 14% of the 
appropriations they estimated they would need for adequate repairs and 
maintenance. With international tension rising, FDR agreed to authorize a 
massive spike in construction spending of $65 million. But even the backing of 
the President was not enough to break the deadlock, as the Army’s internal 
dysfunctions and turf wars surfaced. Brigadier General A. Owen Seaman—
described in the Army’s history of the Construction Service as “peppery and 
unpredictable”—refused to take the funds and called in a number of political 
favors accumulated from his nearly four-decade military career. The exasperated 
Chiefs of Staff broke protocol and chose to humiliate Brig. General Seaman by 
promoting a colonel to the head of the division. The colonel accepted the funding 
and the Construction Service started to play catchup.28 
Marshall and the Construction Service considered several factors in their 
decisions of where to purchase land and where to build the new training centers. 
The Army sought some cold weather locations in the North, but most of the new 
camps required a warmer climate, and cheap, undeveloped land. The forts and 
training areas would need space for different maneuvers, as well as access to 
water, roads, and rail. Marshall also aimed for each base to be located near a 
city that could provide recreation. Several states and their members of Congress 
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made aggressive bids to attract the incoming military dollars, though others 
strongly opposed the Army’s presence near their communities. Most of the new 
camps and major expansions took place in the South or Southwest where units 
could avoid freezing conditions, train in mixed terrain, and perform large 
maneuvers that might stretch over several states. The most important forts and 
camps clustered in the states of the former Confederacy. Fort Benning, located in 
Western Georgia, became the biggest Army base, housing 95,000 while 
spanning nearly 200,000 acres. Originally a basic training camp established a 
month before the end of World War I, Benning was built up into an infantry 
training center. Camp Shelby, another expanded World War I site, rivaled 
Benning in population (86,000) and its location in Southern Mississippi allowed 
access to the Gulf Coast and inland marches across Alabama’s coastal plain. 
Artillery boomed at the long ranges of Fort Bragg, outside Fayetteville, North 
Carolina. To the south, infantrymen trained at Fort Jackson outside Columbia, 
South Carolina. Additional training centers like Camp Hood (Texas), Camp 
Clairborne (Louisiana), Camp Blanding (Florida), and Fort Knox (Kentucky) all 
handled tens of thousands of draftees, and contributed to the expansion of the 
military throughout the South. Major installations outside Dixie included Camp 




Fort Lewis outside of Tacoma, Washington. The Navy focused on expansion of 
its Great Lakes training center near North Chicago.29 
While the land was mostly cheap, surveyors, contractors, and 
quartermasters faced a number of difficulties during construction. Some tracts 
turned out to be flooded, lacking water supply, or consisted of nothing but 
swampland. Time was short though, and Marshall ordered his engineers to push 
on. Other obstacles proved more troublesome. In 1940, the lumber market 
experienced a serious shortage, threatening to leave the Army paying exorbitant 
prices while failing to meet construction demands. The Construction Service 
managed to break this bottleneck by instituting a whole new system of 
purchasing lumber. Marshall and his subordinates likely faced an impossible 
task, but many draftees would still find themselves arriving in unfinished camps 
well into 1942.30 
 While Marshall’s much needed rebuilding program offered some cause for 
optimism, the draft’s first selectees faced poor training and a chronic lack of 
esprit de corps. Part of the problem was born out of insufficient veteran 
leadership in training camps and forts, as well as rivalries between the new guys 
and the old hands. Green troops found little help or guidance from the Army 
regulars, who often saw the “number men”—their term for draftees—as soft, 
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stubborn civilians playing soldier. One sergeant of the Old Army argued that the 
conscripted men did not “know what the Army meant to me—security and pride 
and something good….Putting on that uniform not only meant that for the first 
time in my life I had clothes I wasn’t ashamed of, but also for the first time in my 
life I was somebody.” Draftees, as the sergeant recalled, “came in bitching about 
this and that, regulations, the food, a cot instead of an innerspring mattress, 
barracks instead of private rooms.” Conscripts despised many of the regulars for 
a clannish obsession over rank, procedure, and the “cult of the uniform.” 
Regulars also tended to haze and humiliate the draftees, denying them the use 
of the Post Exchange (PX) or forcing them to dig trenches for no reason.31 
Beyond these antagonisms, most bases proved unable to process the 
new trainees or to provide the most basic equipment. Although the War 
Department initially set bold directives such as “There will be no compromise with 
quality,” deficiencies in the training process quickly emerged. With a chronic 
shortage or even absence of equipment like ammunition and mortars, draftees 
spent their days doing near endless calisthenics, close-order drills, or tedious 
manual labor, but learning little of combat or specialized skills. One senior 
training officer pinned the chronically poor instruction on the lack of experience of 
most officers: “Hell, you can’t expect an officer to be any good if he only has as 
much training at the enlisted men.” Non-commissioned officers would 
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occasionally argue and berate senior officers, disrupting the assumed hierarchy 
and command structure. Unskilled and untrained lieutenants—usually the leaders 
of platoons or companies—sometimes embarrassed themselves, losing the trust 
of their men. In one instance, a lieutenant maneuvered his men into a danger 
area during war games, leading the umpire to declare that his company had been 
destroyed by “friendly artillery.” When the lieutenant complained that “it’s our own 
artillery,” the umpire responded “It is, but your own shells will kill you if they hit 
you.” Another lieutenant repeatedly lost his way while orienteering his company 
through the woods, leading him to claim that the ground had an unusually high 
iron content. One Army colonel publically criticized these training failures, noting 
that an Illinois division “has been in camps for months, but has not had the 
services of a single military instructor.” The colonel concluded by grimly warning 
that “valor without military education only means suicide….If our boys should be 
recklessly thrown into battle with only the kind of training they have been 
receiving, they would be destroyed.” Privates largely agreed with one stating, 
“The papers are always talking about how good the morale is and how ready the 
Army is for battle. The hell it is!”32 
Marshall and the brass became alarmed at the chronic insubordination 
and mutinous behavior that spread among the selectees. Conscripts openly 
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resented the military’s hierarchy and the insularity of life in rural military camps, 
publically complaining to family, congressmen, and the press. LIFE even 
published damaging remarks from troops that captured their frustration and 
refusal to submit to military society: “To hell with Roosevelt and Marshall and the 
Army and especially this Goddamn hole,” said one draftee fed up with camp life.  
A commissioned report by Arthur Sulzberger and Hilton Railey of The New York 
Times confirmed that the enlisted man “is questioning everything from God 
Almighty to themselves.” More disturbingly, officers reported being threatened 
and sworn at by their men. Railey wrote to Army leaders that officers lived in 
“physical fear” of the soldiers they supposedly commanded. The draftees often 
displayed blatant disregard for rank when they refused to salute an officer—a 
cardinal sin in the Old Army. Failure to salute could bring hefty fines or 
punishments like a twenty mile run, leading one soldier to write to Yank that “the 
principles we are fighting for are being destroyed before our very eyes.” GIs and 
sailors also resented their superiors because of military policies on dating. Only 
officers were officially allowed to date the nurses, secretaries, and other women 
who staffed military buildings, prompting accusations from soldiers—and some 
women—that the military hierarchy was keeping women for themselves. 




laced with saltpeter as they slept. This was apparently a military conspiracy to 
lower libido, making men more compliant and docile.33 
 The draftees moved into near open rebellion in July 1941 when FDR and 
Marshall announced that the promised one year of military service would be 
extended indefinitely and that troops might be stationed outside the Western 
hemisphere. Beyond resenting the regulars, officers, and poor training 
conditions, draftees felt as though they were being asked to make great 
sacrifices while the rest of the country enjoyed the economic windfall of war 
production. Roosevelt and Marshall argued that the U.S. faced a great national 
peril, but with Pearl Harbor still four months in the future, men languishing in 
dusty camps bereft of equipment could see little reason for an extension of their 
service. Meyer Berger of The New York Times suggested that men did not 
necessarily lack the willingness to serve, but instead lacked incentive. One 
draftee wrote to Arthur Krock—also at the Times—asking why Roosevelt did not 
“tell us the details of this national peril?” Another group asked why they should 
“have to stay beyond the year prescribed in the Act when labor gets nearly 
everything it wants by strikes and violence and escapes the risks of Army 
service?” Other troops were less diplomatic, saying to LIFE, “So Roosevelt will 
get our jobs back? The hell he will! I’ve already been told that I can’t have my job 
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back.” Protest mail from draftees and civilians flooded Capitol Hill, giving anti-
interventionist forces the evidence they needed to rebuke the administration and 
military. Senator Robert Reynolds (D-NC), citing the torrent of protest letters, 
deemed Marshall’s proposal to extend the service length and area of operations 
no different from a declaration of war. Senators Wheeler and Taft claimed to be 
receiving over a thousand letters a day, many from draftees opposed to the 
extension of service. One infantry company from Camp Livingston in Louisiana 
sent a petition to the Senate declaring, “Prolongation of our service would be an 
actual breach of contract and certainly a blow to our morale. We feel that we 
have shown our patriotism for our country and now it is no more than fair that the 
other young men within our great country be asked to do their part....Many of our 
families are in dire need of help.” Fearing reprisals, these draftees asked not to 
be identified but insisted that they represented ninety percent of the camp. 
Privately, Marshall warned other generals and FDR about these negative press 
reports and how they might further exacerbate the morale crisis.34 
Platoons and companies that made public protests faced reprimands and 
reprisals from commanding officers infuriated at what they saw as mutinous 
behavior. A Fort Meade Quartermaster company instigated a small crisis after its 
Army officials learned of a telegram the men had sent to Senators Wheeler and 
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Taft. Though the draftees did not “begrudge the sacrifices we have made for our 
country” and promised to be willing to even make “the supreme sacrifice of our 
lives,” they questioned Marshall and Roosevelt’s claim that “we are in grave 
danger from aggression.” Instead, they argued that “the present emergency 
exists in the minds of war mongers in Washington and not in the actual state of 
affairs,” before going on to explicitly “condemn the acts of the administration 
leaders.” For the Army and Fort Meade’s adjutant, the telegram was a stunning 
public display of disloyalty and a violation of an Army regulation that prohibited 
“efforts to procure or influence legislation affecting the army.” One commander 
threatened draftees who protested to senators with a court martial while others 
declared they would pursue the highest limits of disciplinary action. Some men 
responded by threatening to desert, while others chalked the letters O H I O—
“Over The Hill In October,” meaning leaving or deserting the Army after a year’s 
service was complete—on walls, pieces of equipment, and vehicles. In one 
camp, a LIFE reporter found that fifty percent claimed they would desert, forty 
percent “rue[d] the day they got in the Army,” and the final ten percent wished to 
transfer to a different branch of the military. Of the 400 men interviewed, only two 
wished to stick it out in the Army. Many lamented that they struggled to manage 
outstanding debts or prevent their families from being evicted while they drained 
swamps, dug ditches, and cut grass. Railey confirmed that the vast majority of 
troops were familiar with this damaging LIFE report, and almost every man told 




administration, though weakened by the protests and in-fighting, managed to 
salvage an eighteen-month extension of service for draftees and reservists, 
though they were forced to concede a $10 monthly pay raise. Low morale 
continued to plague the draftees, leading now General Hershey to complain that 
the situation would improve “if some of the parents would just leave them alone.” 
Draftees, however, maintained that the Army’s uncaring treatment of its men left 
them few choices when deciding between serving or deserting. “I was willing to 
sacrifice one year but I can’t afford more,” one infantryman said, “You can’t even 
see your wife….One of the fellows asked for leave to go to his wife when she 
was having a baby. When they turned him down he went AWOL. What would you 
do?”35 
Expanding the Draft 
 Only the horror of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor could solve the political 
problems plaguing the military. Draftees commonly complained about lacking a 
sense of purpose while in training, but much of that evaporated as the Pacific 
fleet sank and smoldered in Hawaii. Fighting spirit was high and the old battles 
over the draft and service length were now over. Men increasingly accepted the 
Rooseveltian language of service and sacrifice for the coming total war. Draftees 
and veterans interviewed by field workers assisting folklorist Alan Lomax blended 
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nationalism with an almost savage desire for revenge. “It’s our duty as a nation to 
defend it and whip the aggressors,” one man explained. Another asserted that 
the US would have to “take over the Western Hemisphere…we’re going to have 
to police the world.” Men flocked to recruiting stations “fighting mad,” and most 
waited for hours in the cold. The Navy elected to keep its offices open 24/7 as 
lines of over 2000 volunteers snaked around city blocks. “It was the greatest 
wave of patriotism I have ever seen,” said one official. Other interviewees 
emphasized a personal desire for vengeance. Recruit Charles L. Gilley gave up 
his $100 weekly salary, put off his marriage, and signed up for likely combat duty 
in the Marines. He hoped to avenge his Marine brother Ernest, who he feared 
had already perished in the Japanese capture of Wake Island. Men fantasized 
about murdering Japanese diplomat Saburo Kurusu—“I’d a killed that son of a 
gun”—and suggested that hunting season on the Japanese had begun: “no bag 
limit, kill as many as you want.” One veteran speaking with draftees promised 
that “I’m going to fight with hate in my heart. What’s in me, what’s in my veins, 
I’m going to kill, slaughter.” The Times’ Railey argued that the selectees of 1940 
suffered from poor morale because they were “a football team in training but 
without a schedule of games.” For the moment, the military no longer needed to 




gonna come in our country. We immediately went to the marine recruiting 
headquarters.”36 
Five additional registrations took place after the first in 1940. After 1942, 
registration became a continuous process. One in ten Americans served in the 
armed forces between 1941 and 1945, with twenty percent of all men entering 
the military. Ten million men were drafted and another 6 million men and women 
volunteered. The fate of many young men would be determined by their local 
draft board. The government created 6,000 draft boards around the country, with 
World War I veterans and local eminent civilians like “judges, postmasters, and 
men of prominence” deciding who received exemptions. Some women’s 
professional groups protested the exclusion of women from these boards, but 
failed to change the policy. Beyond their failure to include women, the boards 
often took a discriminatory view towards conscientious objectors, homosexuals, 
and African Americans. One board member explained that his board had 
encountered several conscientious objectors “but we’ve always managed to talk 
them out of it.” Military authorities brought in psychiatric examiners to find and 
exclude gay men, even though many wished to serve and commanders later 
acknowledged that gay troops became critical and effective members of the 
Armed Forces. These psychiatrists’ methods lacked tact or subtlety: they simply 
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asked if the potential draftee was a homosexual, had ever had a same-sex 
sexual experience, masturbated about men, or if they liked girls. Though a trying 
act for some self-identified gay men, many simply told the draft board that they 
liked girls. In the South, African Americans rarely served on any draft boards. 
Nationwide, draft officials and military leaders regarded African Americans as 
unsuited for combat roles, often failing to draft black men.37 
Many boys feared that they would not be selected, and those with medical 
issues or physical handicaps often attempted to hide conditions that might 
disqualify them from service. Part of this desire came from a traditional sense of 
masculine duty. But men also faced community pressure, a tactic honed in WWI 
by groups like the Order of the White Feather. Any young, apparently healthy 
male civilian who remained at home could be ostracized and despised as a draft 
dodger, an especially alienating fate in small towns. Members of the public 
expressed consternation and outrage when Joe DiMaggio was rejected for poor 
eyesight. After receiving numerous complaints about athletes being declared 
unfit for service, the War Department began “taking the boxer out of the ring and 
the ball player off the diamond, regardless of his potential value to the service, to 
satisfy public opinion.” Following their mental and physical examinations—and 
the long wait for their letter—men gathered to compare draft numbers. Very few 
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attempted to flee, though one inductee threw heavy chairs and damaged a room 
before running down the street where he was tackled by “two husky nomcoms.” 
Men nevertheless often confessed to the dread of leaving their families and 
girlfriends, while also expressing the excitement of leaving local communities for 
unfamiliar big cities before shipping across the Pacific or Atlantic. The last ritual 
of leaving was the bittersweet sending off party where family and friends 
gathered for a ceremony that combined elements of the coming of age rite and a 
funeral.38 
Planners were pleased with the efficiency and seemingly democratic 
quality of draft boards. Processing, assessing, and drafting millions of men while 
avoiding disruptions became a much needed success in the U.S.’s plodding 
steps towards mobilization. Yet the new influx of manpower only exacerbated the 
poor training conditions that the initial selectees criticized. Roosevelt and the 
Chiefs of Staff now moved on to an even larger challenge of equipping, training, 
and supplying a still unprepared military lacking skilled officers and infrastructure. 
Facing this crisis of an ineffective standing army and the definitive entry of the 
U.S. into the war after Pearl Harbor, the military moved to a training system that 
aimed to rapidly indoctrinate the supposedly individualistic and recalcitrant 
American civilian into military society. Ideally, men would quickly shed their 
                                                     
38 “Plans for Army Draft Set Up in Minute Detail: Can Have Men in Uniform Month After Word 
‘Go’,” CDT, July 25, 1940, 7; Burton Lindheim, “Draft Board Drama: Behind the Numbers of the 
Army Lottery Are…,” NYT, May 18, 1941, SM14; Kennett, G.I., 8, 15-16, 31; “His Smashing Draft 




civilian loyalties, submit to military discipline, and reform themselves into fighting 
units. This conception of discipline and esprit de corps was a holdover from WWI 
and the federal government’s push to inculcate coercive voluntarism among 
civilians and soldiers alike.39 
“Their Own Particular Ordeal” 
 Arriving at induction stations, draftees readied to leave their private lives 
for training, war, and possibly death. Most were awkward, poorly dressed, and 
carrying items they would never need and would be quickly abandoned. They 
formed misshapen lines and waited for the troops trains or buses to take them to 
austere reception centers like Fort Dix in New Jersey, where they lingered days 
and sometimes weeks to be assigned to a training camp or fort, and then later, a 
unit training center. Most would also undertake specialized training in a 
subsequent location before moving to a port of embarkation. The average trainee 
made 6 to 7 moves before reaching port.40 
Arriving in camp, draftees often felt disoriented and intimidated by the rough 
conditions and unwelcoming regular troops. After days on the trains or buses, 
non-coms forced the sleep deprived men into the often muddy camp roads 
demanding that they close ranks. Watching the “calf-like marching gait” of green 
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troops, regulars would yell “Hello, suckers!” or as marine E.B. Sledge recalled, 
“You’ll be sorreee.” Others jeered that the recruits ought to “look out for the 
hook,” referring to the coming smallpox and typhoid injections. “The recruits,” 
wrote one reporter at Camp Wheeler, “look about as military as a bunch of 
sightseers at Radio City with a guide.” Draftees soon received identification tags, 
shoes, uniforms, and the aforementioned inoculations before crawling into the 
barracks. Settling into the rough cots, men found themselves “in an alien 
world.”41  
The first thing inductees noticed was the dirt. It was everywhere and ever 
present. In reception centers and camps, recruits faced an endless battle against 
dust, grime, soot, mud, and filth. At Fort Benning and other posts, troops claimed 
mud and dust somehow managed to coexist. Superior officers demanded tents 
be kept clean, but soldiers recalled that “no matter how often we swept, the 
broom could always collect a large pile of dust from that one square floor.” The 
coal fired stoves used to heat the tents created piles of ash and spread soot. 
Many stoves were installed but never actually worked. A lack of good firewood 
meant that living trees were chopped down and green wood was fed to the fire, 
producing higher levels of eye-stinging smoke and soot. Men walked through 
muddy pathways pocked with discarded paper and cigarette butts. Fort Dix 
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featured streets and fields filled with “khaki-colored mud as sticky as fly paper.” 
Latrines required near constant cleaning, though one recruit lamented that mud 
and paper quickly caked the floor leaving it unclean again. Men on K.P. (Kitchen 
Patrol or Kitchen Police) recalled the seemingly ineradicable grease that coated 
every pot and surface. Hastily constructed huts filled with the “heady scent of 
fresh pine board and tar paper,” while barrack tents howled with gusts of wind. 
Long marches took place “in scorching heat, in bitter cold, in rain or snow” and in 
the night where one man grasped the belt of the man if front of him “to keep from 
getting lost in the darkness.” Sledge recalls sleeping in extra gear to combat the 
cold. In Texas, men told of mosquitos so spoiled that they would check a GI’s 
tags for blood type before biting. Though conditions improved over the course of 
the war, many draftees arrived in camps described as “little more than great 
stretches of waste land,” places where “dried top soil blew into mouth and ears 
with every wind.” One Indiana recruit lamented the environmental hazards and 
physical exhaustion of living in a military post: “I cannot picture everything clearly 
for you for I cannot send you a box of Texas dust to pour liberally over your 
whole body. I cannot send you a long, hot road and a fine set of blisters or a pair 
of heavy G.I. shoes to be broken in.” Another recalled the “all pervading 
barrenness” and a sense that his camp existed “in a constant state of erosion.”42 
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Life in camp became defined by the fight against discomfort, loneliness, and 
boredom. Few would become combat soldiers and many never approached a 
combat zone. The vast majority suffered through what outpost soldier Ross 
Parmenter called “their own particular ordeal.” Troops “sweated and froze in 
some of the dirtiest weather, and, though they were spared danger, they did not 
have excitement and movement to offset loneliness, separation, hardship, and 
monotony.” The separation from the direct experience of combat left many men 
without “the sense that their sacrifices were justified because what they were 
doing was vital.” Continued equipment shortages left many draftees throwing 
stones instead of grenades or continuing the construction of their unfinished 
camp or fort. The training infrastructure was only truly completed by 1944, and 
Army officials later admitted that “the machine was a little wobbly when it first got 
going. The men knew it. The officers knew it. Everybody knew it.” Teaching 
improved after the Army and Navy produced some combat veterans with 
practical advice. Until then, instructors took a “pay-attention-you-fuckers” lecture 
style. Many reception and training areas simply received far too many recruits 
each day, leading to backlogs in processing, distributing, and training. At times, 
men were quarantined in the barracks for days following the outbreak of a 
disease or death of a trainee from sickness. Recruits became quite familiar with 
the phrase “hurry up and wait.” Paul Fussell, veteran and cultural critic, cited 
                                                     
the Civilian Who Went to Camp Last November to Train For National Defense,” NYT, November 




Leonard Woolf’s image of “endlessly waiting in a dirty, grey railway station 
waiting-room” as the best way to capture the “negative emptiness and desolation 
of personal and cosmic boredom” found in wartime. Many discomforts, he 
explained, were “the inevitable inconveniences of military life: overcrowding and 
a lack of privacy, tedious institutional cookery, deprivation of personality, general 
boredom.”43 
Petty injustices, “sadism thinly disguised as necessary discipline,” and 
authoritarianism combined to form what Fussell identified as “Chickenshit.” 
Troops recognized Chickenshit as any behavior that made “military life worse 
than it need be” or as some trivial, but painful demand that had contributed 
nothing to victory. Chickenshit was being forced to dig a trench for a latrine when 
the camp already had a functioning sewer system. Chickenshit was not being 
allowed to wear an overcoat “at reveille when it is freezing, but which you will be 
required to wear during the sweltering afternoon.” Chickenshit crystallized the 
stifling low-level authoritarianism baked into military training that made men 
aware of how little freedom and control they exercised over their lives. The irony 
of entering an authoritarian organization to defend the four freedoms did not go 
unnoticed. Some of the more intellectual draftees found the lack of choice 
liberating: “I was freed from even the most elementary decisions as to what to 
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wear or eat.” Most, however, found themselves confronting “the Will of the Army,” 
a force that gave a “strange power to all those in authority, so that an ignorant 
drill instructor, or an uncouth corporal, who had been made barracks chief, could 
order us around and we had to submit or be punished.” One returning veteran 
argued that training created “dictators who mold the thoughts and actions of men 
under their leadership. The trend of this kind of leadership is to create class 
distinctions by making the leader king and the followers slaves.” The Army’s 
caste system incentivized Chickenshit, while fostering an intense desire for 
personal liberty and comfort outside of the military. Quoting Napoleon, an Army 
colonel observed that “misery is the best school for a soldier.” For some men, 
misery continued far past this early training period. In 1943, soldiers at Camp 
Hood telegrammed the Military Police division claiming they were “being treated 
more like dogs instead of soldiers” and that the German POWs on site lived in far 
better conditions. Officers endlessly beat trainees and ignored one soldier 
suffering appendicitis. “Are we still in America,” asked the private, “Or are we 
over in Japan or Germany?”44 
The War Department eventually decided that having troops performing a slog 
of menial jobs like KP, cooking, operating phones, distributing mail, stoking fires, 
and sweeping streets was perhaps not the most efficient use of each unit’s 
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limited training time. In March 1941, the Department started to increase the 
number of civilians employed by the Army from 215,000 to 1,400,000. These 
civilians would step in to free up soldiers for more direct training in their specified 
duty. While this idea made sense in principle, the Army actually ended up paying 
these civilians $35 a week, whereas soldiers were only paid $30. Even though 
soldiers also received free food, clothing, and housing, the disparity in raw 
weekly salary did little to alleviate the common idea among draftees that civilians 
were managing to get rich while shirking duty. Men stuck in the Army accused 
civilians of “pseudo-patriotism,” and many draftees became disgusted with the 
money they imagined war workers might be making: “This rubs a soldier the 
wrong way. They don’t like to see civilians getting credit....We are at war, and 
everybody should do his duty, whether in the Army or not. They are getting $90 
or $100 (per week) for the work they are doing.” This pay gap became just 
another slight that made men hate both civilians and camp life even more.45 
In addition to these indignities and problems, African Americans also suffered 
mistreatment and violence fueled by the racism of white officers and civilians. 
The black press covered several notable incidents where horrible conditions 
essentially forced the soldiers to go absent without leave (AWOL). In Bastrop, 
Louisiana, several privates fled to Chicago after enduring a spate of “sadistic 
brutality” administered by white officers. A series of beatings, humiliations, and 
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rumored murders followed an incident in which a white officer and soldier 
objected to the presence of five African-American draftees taking leave in town. 
The consistently violent and demeaning handling of black troops ensured that 
they went AWOL at over twice the rate of white soldiers.46 
Besides generally receiving more violent punishments, worse living 
conditions, and disdain for the emerging Double V campaign, black draftees also 
faced the pervasive fear of interracial sex that accompanied their presence near 
civilian communities. The Afro-American reported one Birmingham man’s 
promise that “no white man down here goin’ to let his daughter sleep with a n—, 
or sit at the table with a n—, or go walkin’ with a n—. The war can go to hell, the 
world can go to hell, we can all be dead—but he ain’t goin’ to do it.” Given the 
Army’s decision to buildup training centers across the South, the numbers of 
northern African Americans drafted, and the dearth of available recreation, 
Marshall had created a powder keg. Southerners understood that the military 
influx would challenge the established white supremacist sexual order. The Afro-
American noted that the talk of white Southern men always returned to the 
“threatened rape and the sanctity of Southern womanhood.” Future incidents 
outside the South suggest reporters would have heard similar concerns if they 
had asked white men in cities like Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, or Boston. 
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Throughout the training period and the war, violent shootouts, riots, and 
lynchings were sparked by interracial sex, real and imagined. Though revoked by 
the War Department, one captain’s order went so far as to make all interracial 
sex—including consensual relationships—punishable by death.47 
All of the discomforts, injustices, and recurring boredom drove both black and 
white draftees to commit small acts of insubordination. Resistance to the 
partnered forces of authoritarianism, conformity, and Chickenshit occurred in the 
way draftees walked and the way they dressed. Europeans consistently noted 
the ragged, discordant marching style of American troops, as well as their 
disregard for a neat uniform or polished shoes. General Dwight D. Eisenhower 
noted to Marshall how American companies looked like “armed mobs,” while 
General George S. Patton attacked Bill Mauldin’s cartoon grunts for their sloppy, 
unshaven appearance. Troops also used publications like Yank to mock the 
privileges given to the upper castes of the military. One recruit wrote in to 
declare, “I’ll sweat for my country, but here is one private who is never going to 
mop any sergeant’s floor, even if it costs me six months’ confinement.” Men 
could also employ what Fussell called ‘rumor-jokes”: essentially a short story that 
undercut superiors and offered a fantasy of rebellion. One rumor-joke featured 
General Patton dressing down a man for failing to come to attention. After 
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Patton’s lengthy tirade, the man shoots back, “Run along asshole, I’m in the 
Merchant Marine.” In another telling, a major screams at a man in a dirty uniform. 
The man replies: “Fuck you, buddy. I just came in from town to fill the Coke 
machine.”48 
Men quickly learned that their best chance to rebel against the restrictions 
and order of military life came while outside the base. The most famous conflict 
between draftees and command became known as the Yoo-Hoo Affair in July 
1941. Troops traveling in supply trucks drove past a Memphis golf course and 
spotted a number of girls playing in shorts. Deciding, as the Boston Globe 
described it, to “manifest their high-spirited free-born American independence 
about the Army uniforms they wore,” the soldiers proceeded to yell lewd remarks 
and cat-call after the women. As the men continued to “yoo-hoo” and roll down 
the street, Lieutenant General Ben Lear happened to be playing on the golf 
course. Lear was a “regular of regulars,” a tough former cavalry sergeant who 
valued the rugged discipline and tradition that defined the Old Army. He resented 
the yoo-hooing soldiers’ willful disregard for the standards of conduct while in 
uniform and their treatment of the women. Lear chased the men down and 
approached them, though he did so in his golfing attire. As he confronted the 
draftees, they began mocking the General who they mistook for an elderly golfer. 
After retrieving his General’s stars, Lear found the men and punished them with a 
fifteen-mile march through ninety-seven-degree heat. Privately, the brass worried 
                                                     




that the incident epitomized the recurring discipline and morale issues facing 
many commanders.49 
Lear and the War Department soon received a deluge of civilian complaints 
after the story was publicized. The General was unrepentant, insisting that “loose 
conduct and rowdyism cannot be tolerated.” Lear believed in the dignity and 
honor of duty and the uniform—“drugstore cowboys” and undisciplined troops 
yelling at women had no place in military. But to the public, the soldiers seemed 
to be nothing more than rambunctious boys being punished, as one woman put 
it, by a “mean old general.” Others asserted it would be rude to not cat-call the 
women. One editorial asked, “How would the girls have felt if our dynamic Army 
has passed in silence? For shorts are not designed to be ignored….Young ladies 
have a right to expect the enthusiasm and loyalty of the boys who are defending 
the American way of life.” But some women maintained that “their uniform 
doesn’t give them a right to jeer and whistle at girls. They were not gentlemen to 
do so and I think they should have been punished.” On one issue, women 
interviewed by a reporter commonly agreed: “all soldiers yell at girls.” And, as 
one warned, “when there is only one or two boys calling ‘yoo-hoo’ that’s an 
entirely different matter and then a girl can’t be too careful.”50 
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Congress soon put pressure on the War Department to punish Lear, while 
House members called for an investigation. Representative Paul Kilday (D-TX) 
accused Lear of seeking “revenge rather than disciplinary action.” Lear later 
telegrammed an explanation of his decision to discipline the soldiers, further 
stating that “I am responsible also that members of the Second Army treat the 
civilian population with respect and consideration.” The War Department 
eventually closed the investigation, backed Lear, and pleaded with the public and 
Congress to avoid “further hullaballoo,” though the incident inspired as least one 
musical number and a film script titled Private Yoo-Hoo. Nevertheless, the Yoo-
Hoo Affair continued to plague Lear’s career nearly two years later, with one 
Senator delaying action on his rank unless the General retired. “I think those 
soldiers were given shameful treatment,” said Senator Bennett Clark (D-MO), 
“and I still resent it.” When Lear returned to the U.S. after his service in the 
European theater—where he played a crucial role in logistics and reinforcement 
policy—over two thousand GIs greeted him with “an earthshaking chorus of ‘yoo-
hoos.’” Lear said nothing and “looked sternly ahead.”51  
Though depicted as a fairly silly curiosity, the Yoo-Hoo Affair established a 
precedent that dissuaded military officials from appearing to punish men for 
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behaving poorly towards women and civilians. Pressure from politicians and 
civilians—driven by a sense that servicemen should be allowed a bit of fun—
incentivized military officials to ignore the growing problem of violence and 
disorder in cities located near camps and forts. Australian war correspondent 
Alan Moorehead captured the almost limitless tolerance and praise Americans 
levied on soldiers: “Every stop in the propaganda organ had been pulled out wide 
in praise of the American soldier. There was religious fervor in the phase ‘our 
boys,’ and while you could criticize everything on earth, even the most hardboiled 
columnist or politician would never dare to question the skill or courage of the 
American soldier.” Outside of camp then, troops were offered a space divorced 
from military control, where civilians countenanced increasingly aggressive 
behavior.52 
“What Rabbit Ever Slew a Wolf?” 
Despite these early conflicts, logistical problems, and training failures, 
draftees soon found themselves forging a military identity distinct from civilian 
life, though perhaps not the disciplined military identity envisioned by Command. 
Through the common hardship of basic training, troops came to see military 
service as an indication of superiority to a feminized civilian world. Draftees also 
sought a reprieve from the authoritarianism and Chickenshit that defined training. 
Leave and liberty in nearby towns and cities offered a space where men could be 
empowered and rewarded for their service, while also performing a kind of 
                                                     




swaggering, violent masculinity. These initial experiences outside of camp 
created and crystalized group bonds amongst wildly different troops, while also 
setting expectations of how they ought to behave in liberty ports.  
Camp life and basic training brought men into a world that produced its 
own language, rituals, and hardships. The training camp was initially 
uncomfortable and strange for the majority of recruits, but learning the language 
of the barracks offered a path into the military world and a way of categorizing 
and understanding the dynamics of life in the service. Whether it be “bullshitting,” 
gambling on crooked card games, or telling the dirtiest story, draftees discovered 
shared rituals of belonging. An Army study later identified the “slack times of the 
day and in the barracks at night” as the space in which men formed bonds and a 
common worldview: “It is in gossiping, carousing, smoking, and playing that 
consensus emerges as to who can talk, who has sound judgment, and who is a 
fool, who is reliable and who is untrustworthy, who gets into trouble and who 
stays out.” Men identified different characters in their units like the loudmouth 
who answered too many officers’ questions, or the brownnoser who committed 
the disgraceful sin of trying to please the officers. The goldbrick made sure to do 
as little work as possible while the sad sack—short for sad sack of shit—was 
worse because he tried, but failed to do anything of use. A Flatpeter was more 
charming, in that he was “so stupid and awkward as always to be stepping on, or 
stumbling over, his own penis.” Draftees also developed a “sociology of the 




iteration of the word “fuck.” This “Army Creole” or “Army Pidgin” allowed men of 
different regional, educational, and ethnic backgrounds to speak a common 
language and build a sense of belonging in the military. Army researchers 
concluded that “when a soldier begins to use the Army vocabulary and slang 
without deliberate choice, and when a situation automatically evokes the correct 
attitudes, he has unwittingly acquired the rules and regulations whether he knows 
it or not.” Contemporary psychologists identified the transgressive language as 
“an aggression against all those who accept the taboo-in this case the entire 
civilian environment” or as a “defiance against the matriarchy under which the 
soldier grew up.” Sociologists agreed, arguing that “the soldier was a morally 
irresponsible fellow, given to hedonistic vices and afflicted with a strong contempt 
for civilians.”53 
Draftees unable to fit into the barracks’ vision of masculinity or incapable 
of completing the training became identified as belonging to the feminized civilian 
world. Each company produced trainees labeled as “weaklings,” “shaky kids,” 
and “mama’s boys.” These men were bullied, failed to complete training 
exercises, and given a blue discharge that stripped them of veteran’s benefits 
and sent them back to the shame of civilian life. Brawny, forceful heterosexuality 
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became equated with the service itself. Soldiers even began calling those given 
undesirable discharges “blue tickets” or “blue discharges,” and these epithets 
became increasingly synonymous with boys who were “crazy,” “cowardly,” or 
“queer.” One psychiatrist argued that “sissy” draftees would be “subject to ridicule 
and ‘joshing’ which will harm the general morale and will incapacitate the 
individuals for Army duty.” An Army study concurred, explaining that “even the 
man who, without homosexuality, is so effeminate in appearance and 
mannerisms that he is inevitably destined to be the butt of all the jokes in 
company, should be excluded.” Troops uninterested in participating in the sexual 
obsession and aggression of the barracks failed to fit the mold of a true military 
man. Indeed, a good soldier was also a sexually aggressive one ready to 
demonstrate his “swaggering masculinity.” Some gay draftees nevertheless 
found ways to cope with their “heterosexualized” lives, with same-sex 
relationships and the intimate, even erotic, bonds of buddy relationships allowing 
for what psychiatrists saw as a “disguised and sublimated homosexuality.”54 
Command, in its search for some form of contagious morale and 
comradery amidst a disorganized and haphazard mobilization, quickly embraced 
this version of troop aggression and virility. Major figures in the military’s 
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leadership explicitly endorsed this vision of masculinity as an integral element of 
a recruit’s training. General Patton observed, “A man who won’t fuck, won’t fight.” 
A 1941 Navy review of “essential qualities to be instilled in the draftee” made a 
more academic case for the same idea: 
[Men] cannot, they must not, be mollycoddled, and this very 
education befits nature, induces sexual aggression, and makes the 
stern, dynamic type we associate with the armed forces. This 
sexual aggressiveness cannot be stifled. Imagine, if you can, an 
army of impotent men….The Mongol hordes, who conquered all of 
Asia and most of Europe, recognized this fact too: “He who is not 
virile is not a soldier. He who lacks virility is timid, and what rabbit 
ever slew a wolf.” 
 
The US Infantry Journal concurred: “A certain reversion to the primitive is not 
undesirable.” This “barracks culture” combined violence and heterosexual sex, 
driving men to “play rough” with women—in short, to be a “wolf.” It was Teddy 
Roosevelt’s Strenuous Life in full force. Popular films and stage musicals like The 
Fleet’s In (1942) and Iceland (1942) as well as songs like Joan Merrill’s “You 
Can’t Say No To a Soldier,” and cheesecake pin-ups all reinforced this vision of 
government approved coercive heterosexual sex. Civilian adoration of “our boys,” 
as seen in the Yoo-Hoo Affair, further insulated troops from criticism. This 
emphasis on swaggering masculinity proved a departure from World War I, 
especially when it came to gay men. During the Great War, gay men might be 
rejected from service for previous stints in prison or sanitariums, or possibly for 
physiological disorders, but not because they simply exhibited “homosexual 
personalities or tendencies.” Now with shifts in psychology and the military’s 




order that differentiated homosexuals from “normal people,” while also setting 
guidelines for identifying and rejecting gay men. Officials noted that “effeminacy 
in dress,” “feminine bodily characteristics,” and “sissy” boys would need to 
eliminated from military service, so as to maintain a high level of morale.55 
 Marshall may have harbored reservations about this emerging “wolfish” 
culture—as seen in his later private concerns about troop behavior in port and on 
transports—but he likely realized little could be done to undercut a mostly organic 
identity that helped men bond. Commanders also grew to value any kind of 
camaraderie and morale that might be developing among draftees, even if this 
camaraderie was not the highly disciplined culture envisioned by planners. The 
Army’s “brass hats” and morale branch accepted Napoleon’s injunction that 
morale far outstripped physical condition when determining battle effectiveness. 
They worried that if bad morale took hold in the barracks, it would spread like a 
contagion. “Mental dry rot,” explained a captain, “is as astonishingly infectious in 
an army camp because men live so close together.” Commanders were happy to 
tolerate roughhousing, filthy humor, pranks, and bullying of sad sacks and shaky 
                                                     
55 Patton quote from Carlo D’Este, Patton: A Genius for War (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 
925-6fn42; Navy Review quoted in John Costello, Love, Sex, and War: Changing Values, 1939-
1945 (London: Collins, 1985), 115; US Infantry Journal from Costello, 120; For shift in treatment 
of gay men see Berube, Coming Out Under Fire, 12-13, 19-20; See also Henry Elkin, “Aggressive 
and Erotic Tendencies in Army Life,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol 51, #5, March 1946, 
408-413 and Talbert Josselyn, “Sailor’s Ashore,” Collier’s, December 1, 1945, 26-33. For the 
earlier history of this wolfish masculinity, see Gail Bederman, Manliness and Civilization 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), E. Anthony Rotundo’s “Manhood in the Twentieth 
Century” in American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the 
Modern Era (New York: Basic Books, 1994), and Michael Kimmel, “Muscles, Money, and the M-F 
Test: Measuring Masculinity Between the Wars” in Manhood in America: A Cultural History 




kids if it produced group cohesion and esprit de corps. Witnessing a boisterous, 
energetic company marching down the streets of Fort Meade, an officer 
remarked, “That’s it, that’s morale. When soldiers are still full of beans after eight 
hours of drill and manoeuvres they have morale.”56 
Men who made it through training and then returned home on furloughs 
often remarked that they now felt irrevocably separate from the civilian world. 
One soldier wrote, “I found that I could not even wear one of the civilian suits 
which hung in the closet of my room; the gesture would have been painfully 
empty, and a futile retreat; in a time when reality was decked in olive drab.” War 
Department surveys of American soldiers confirm these letters and anecdotes, 
with only 17% responding that they felt more at ease among civilian men. 
Soldiers also believed that “the Army makes a man out of you” with 53% strongly 
agreeing and another 27% granting “there may be something to it.”57  
 While this creation of a military masculinity produced greater cohesion and 
morale amongst soldiers, it also drove men to see themselves as separate and 
superior to civilians. Troops reserved particular antipathy for “feather merchants” 
or civilians enjoying high wages and access to women at home. Soldiers 
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regularly and publicly complained that civilians were “concentrating on their 
individual selves instead of on winning the war.” Men with deferments for critical 
war time work were dismissed as “slackers” and likewise envied for their 
unimpeded enjoyment of the comforts of civilian life. In public, soldiers would 
harass and heckle men not in uniform, calling them “4-F bastards.”58 
Soldiers satirized civilian life as soft, luxurious, and almost foreign. “A 
Soldier’s Guide to the U.S.A.” captured the extent to which military men felt 
separated from—but also envious of—the rhythms and comforts of civilian life: 
They wear a strange kind of uniform called civilian suits….They eat 
a strange assortment of foods such milk (direct from cows), fresh 
fruit (like peaches, plums, and bananas), fresh eggs (with the shell) 
and fresh meat….These people speak a different language from 
the one in vogue over here. For instance, at the dinner table, 
instead of shouting, “Throw over that d—n salt,” they say, “Would 
you please pass the salt?”…They behave like “human beings.”59 
 
Yet, troops also feared and despised civilian men as sexual threats, with 
some becoming “the most feared enemy of all.” Marines directed their envy and 
hatred towards “Jodie…the butt of all military wrath and yet a sort of international 
hero at the same time.” Jodie, short for “Joe-the-Grinder” represented all the 4-F 
men “grinding away on top of all the women back home.” Soldiers obsessed over 
this mythical character “who could pick over our love-starved women as though 
they were Brussels sprouts.” Army psychologists (and enemy psychological 
warfare divisions) quickly noticed that the fear of “the woman left behind” haunted 
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servicemen. “Jilted G.I. Clubs”—with its theme song of “Somebody Else Is 
Taking My Place”—sprung up originally in Texas and later in other theaters to 
comfort men who received “Dear John” letters. Several camps spread “Keep ‘Em 
Happy Clubs” for soldier girlfriends, asking that they refrain from writing about 
their dates with other men in their letters. Army researchers became fascinated 
by the soldier’s obsession with sex and infidelity, noting that fears of civilian men 
“stealing” women at home drove a desire to reaffirm his own masculinity and 
sexuality when outside of camp.60 
Military affiliation effectively engendered an in group-out group mentality 
that drove soldiers to devalue civilian life and property before they even arrived in 
port. This dynamic produced disastrous results when combined with the sexual 
obsession of camp life and what would prove to be inadequate policing in places 
where troops went on liberty in unprecedented numbers. 
Women too, clearly sensed that they had social and sexual obligations to 
men in uniform. Women themselves argued that they ought to place men’s 
interests above their own. Even women’s rights advocates like Margaret Culkin 
Banning asserted that women “have as serious effect on the moral of the armed 
forces” and that “men’s happiness depends on women, even more than does 
their pleasure.” Women’s advice authors claimed that women ought to excuse 
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the misbehavior of soldiers: “Don’t forget that this whole business is a great, dull, 
dangerous, heartbreaking trial. The life of a soldier is one of deprivation and 
peril…. Feel sorry enough, at least, to understand him—and to forgive him 
completely if he fails to act with all the storybook gallantry of Bulldog 
Drummond.”61 
Before Pearl Harbor and early during the war, draftees generally lacked 
exciting locales and opportunities to meet “nice girls.” Towns near training 
centers had yet to boom, leaving men on leave with little to do but drink. One 
private lamented that “the boys here hate the Army. They have no fighting spirit 
except among themselves when they get stinking drunk.” Morale suffered 
because the towns and cities near camps lacked any “recreation infrastructure,” 
leaving men with nothing to do. The Times reported that because the camps had 
“sprung up overnight,” local communities quickly became inundated with soldiers, 
just “as army ants swarm over a crust.” The trainees at big training centers like 
Fort Knox and Fort Bragg outnumbered the citizens living in local towns 40 to 1. 
LIFE recorded soldiers’ complaints that “when they go to the nearby cities they 
are shunned by the citizens and find it impossible to meet nice girls. Since many 
of them come from good families, they resent being treated as outcasts.” Many 
ended up simply wandering “along the highways in dejected groups, eager for 
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sport and friendly civilian contact, with none to be had.” Others “clustered in 
bewildered and uncertain knots on street corners in towns overrun with their 
kind.”62 
The women who would talk to soldiers would do so “for a dollar and up.” 
Camps that lacked a lively nearby “boom town” attracted prostitutes with their 
own trailers, ready to take men away in “chippie wagons” or “brothels on wheels” 
garishly outfitted with “lush red velvet draperies and cushions.” These “machine-
age camp followers” joined the cavalcade of prostitutes, scam-artists, gamblers, 
and bootleggers waiting to cash in on the “motorized vice” boom. Red-light 
districts also flourished, with the American Social Hygiene Association 
explaining, “Pay-day for soldiers, sailors, and marines is looked to with 
anticipation by practically everyone in the racket.” Congress, reacting to reports 
of a VD epidemic, gave power to adjutants and commanding officers to identify 
brothels and crooked hotels so the FBI could intervene. A House Resolution also 
made it illegal for “trailer women” to bring any person into a vehicle. Given the 
poor state of morale and recreation, most commanders chose to ignore 
congressional pressure unless VD affected their manpower. After Pearl Harbor, 
however, Marshall prioritized building camps and forts close to cities and towns 
that might serve as a recreation area for men on liberty, partly as an effort to cut 
VD rates. The morale branch also set up seven recreation camps stretching from 
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New Orleans to Panama City, Florida along the Gulf Coast, with recreation areas 
in Georgia and the Carolinas to follow. Here, the Army offered chartered fishing 
trips, baseball games, guided walking tours of historic districts, and chaperoned 
river-boat dances with women from the YWCA. Meyer Berger—a shrewd 
journalist unafraid to report on the crimes committed by servicemen—argued the 
recreation camps had become the “perfect morale builders” and a useful counter 
to the growing flesh trade. These seven camps, however, could only host 4000 
men in total and they only operated on the weekends. Even if these camps 
operated at perfect efficiency, they would be able to serve at most 14% of the 
soldiers in the Army in 1941. Most weekends for the vast majority of men would 
be spent in the boom towns and juke joints.63 
Draftees essentially learned how to behave in liberty ports in their first 
excursions outside of basic training. Carousing with fellow soldiers constituted, 
as one GI put it, “our first step into manhood, as we termed smoking, drinking, 
and chasing girls.” Sex, liquor, and fighting also offered an escape both from 
military life and the stresses of training, while bringing raw boys into manhood. 
Most servicemen first experienced these excitements while on leave in the 
numerous “G.I. Towns” and “good-time towns” near military training camps. 
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Before their first time on liberty, new recruits participated in “bull-sessions” where 
they talked about “women and other fantasies” or listened to the stories of more 
seasoned draftees who promised the delights of liberty. One marine recalled, 
“We envied the men who were already out of boot camp and had enjoyed their 
first liberty. They told stories about fine-looking girls.” Another marine, who “knew 
all about it,” declared that the women “say straight out, ‘Come on up and get 
some, Marine….Want some pussy, Marine?’” Hearing these stories, one recruit 
remarked, “‘Man, I can just taste that pussy now.’” Walter Bernstein, then a 
soldier, captured how entire towns could become devoted to fulfilling the desires 
of draftees based at Fort Benning: “The principal industry of the small town of 
Phenix City, Alabama, is sex, and its customer is the Army….The town is at least 
eighty percent devoted to the titillation and subsequent pillage of that group it 
affectionately calls ‘Uncle Sam’s Soldier Boys.’” Before shipping out, soldiers 
might slip off to towns like Paso Robles, California where they, as one Corporal 
described it, “spent the night wallowing in what passed for vice,” getting drunk on 
“too many alleged whiskey-cokes,” and harassing waitresses.64 
Few politicians were willing to tackle this emerging problem of 
drunkenness in these towns, and the War Department, Army, and Navy all 
rejected calls for regulation of servicemen’s drinking. Only Senator Joshua Lee 
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(D-OK), allied with prohibition groups, put forth a proposal to ban liquor sales in 
and near Army camps. The various services often set up chaperoned dances in 
an attempt to offer men contact with women in a more regulated environment. 
Yet even these dances could turn rowdy, provoking protest from civilians. One 
concerned pastor from Elizabeth, Pennsylvania wrote in after learning that “2000 
to 4000 girls will be secured as dancing partners for men in the armed services.” 
The pastor objected not only because officials would not be able to verify the 
character of the women, but also because the dances might put morally 
upstanding women “into the arms of young men who are unfit for them to 
associate with.” The pastor warned the plan was “moral dynamite” because he 
knew the quality of the men in the service. Civilians organizations that planned 
chaperoned dances—and saw them as a lesser evil compared to boom town 
vice—also admitted that “there is a real problem connected with the operation of 
dances and many people have objected to them.” Other civilians filed careful 
letters of protest noting their concern over “the liquor, prostitution, and other 
harmful practices near our cantonments” and requested federal funds for 
improved recreation services. The Office of Civilian Defense, however, insisted 
that “it is expected that adjacent communities will cooperate by providing facilities 




associated offices wondered what could be done to alleviate what they called 
“the morale problem of small communities near Army camps.”65 
Carousing in good-time towns offered more than simply “smoking, 
drinking, and chasing girls.” Draftees could be a wolf and a soldier when they hit 
“the Strip.” They could be powerful, bold men worthy of respect, fear, and 
amorous adulation. Though not as important as this confirmation of militarized 
masculinity, troops also sought the opportunity to forge bonds with their fellow 
trainees. One GI acknowledged the juxtapositions and diversity he found through 
the service: “A large number of Americans I met in the Army amazed me by their 
differentness. I had not known their like before, nor have I met them since.” 
Training produced a bizarre mix of companies, and men sought opportunities that 
would bridge these gaps. Drinking and pursuing women became a kind of 
company ritual that cemented the wolfish fantasies sprung from the barracks. 
Even more critical though, men were able to “get away from the Goddamn Army.” 
No matter how many recreation halls, post dances, or USO shows commanders 
set up, draftees preferred the liquor-soaked slats of a boom town bar or a dusty 
main-street where girls could be found. Far from the control of hard-ass officers, 
                                                     
65 Edward Ryan, “Mothers Ask Safeguards for Teen-Age Draft Group: Protests May Bring 
Provisions for Schooling, Training of 18-19-Year-Olds,” TWP, October 21, 1942, 1; “M.G. 
Dickinson to Archie Edwards,” February 20, 1941, “C.D. Giauque to Frank Bane,” March 3, 1941, 
“Frank Bane to C.D. Giauque,” March 12, 1941, and “Johnathan Daniels to Lewis Polster,” March 
20, 1942, 250, Box 86, National Headquarters: General Correspondence, 1940-1942, 250 to 250, 
RG 171 Records of the Office of Civilian Defense, NACP; “A Few of the Many Things All America 
Does for the Men in Uniform through War Camp Community Service,” (No date, before April 30, 
1941), 250 National United Through Apr. 30, 1941, Box 86, National Headquarters: General 





away from the Chickenshit, and outside the mud-strewn camps that functioned 
as cities separate from the rest of the world, men found a reprieve from military 
oversight. Away from the eyes of commanders and officers, “the soldier 
characteristically felt supremely ‘free’ and sought to release his impulses and 
feelings,” explained an Army sociologist.66 
The Army and Navy, however, understood and tolerated this idea of 
“blowing off steam” to different degrees. Initially, the Army believed it would face 
greater levels of troop crime, compared to the Navy. Americans saw the Navy as 
more prestigious and desirable with ample opportunity for travel and adventure. 
Naval recruiters quickly capitalized on this perception with the slogan “Choose 
While You Can.” The Navy also “predrafted” preferred candidates into their cadet 
programs while poaching others from Army recruitment lines. The Navy did not 
even take drafted men until late 1943, relying instead on the wealth of volunteers. 
As such, the Navy’s manpower pool was understood to be more fit, educated, 
young, skilled, and morally upright. A similar dynamic allowed the Marines and 
Army Air Forces (AAF) to select the best candidates. In contrast, the Army lacked 
the prestige and romance of the Naval service, the bravery of the Marines, or the 
adventure of the AAF. The Army’s subsequent analysis acknowledged that the 
other three services “had the character of hand-picked organizations.” Infantry 
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draftees suffered from poor fitness and deficient education compared to their rival 
branch. Infantrymen were shorter, lighter, less intelligent, and less educated 
compared to other Army services. The Army’s own postwar study opened by 
admitting that the ground forces suffered from an “inferior quality of the human 
raw material.” The Army also received the bulk of draftees who already suffered 
from venereal disease or had committed a felony. Lobbying by the American 
Prison Association pushed the War Department to accept former prisoners. This 
decision by Selective Service to let in drunks, criminals, and those with STDs did 
little to dispel the popular view of the Army as “a haven of misfits.” Two months 
before Pearl Harbor, the Chicago Daily Tribune passed on reports of 
“mollycoddled” soldiers in New York who exhibited poor discipline, spent their 
time loitering in the streets, and “seemed definitely inferior to the enlisted 
personnel of the navy.” Army officials, accordingly, faced far fewer illusions about 
the moral sobriety of their recruits. And yet, both branches would quickly discover 
that these expected differences in behavior disappeared as Army and Navymen 
took leave and liberty in stateside ports. They also learned the potential pitfalls of 
the wolfish behavior that men developed in the barracks and in boom towns.67 
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Chapter Two: Taking Liberty 
By 1942, troops filled the streets, ports, buses, and train stations of liberty ports, 
while army bases and expanded naval yards brought a military presence into the 
everyday lives of civilians. This liberty port network, and the U.S.’s emerging two-
front war, required a massive support structure and manpower. Because most 
depictions of the war ignore this network so far from the combat zones, many fail 
to realize that the vast majority of American men in uniform were stationed in the 
United States throughout the war. Many of the sixteen million total servicemen 
would make their way through liberty ports multiple times for leave and liberty. 
Millions of Allied sailors and soldiers likewise passed through American ports, 
seeking various delights. This statistical reality undercuts the idea that poor 
behavior was caused by combat stress or as a response to brutal conditions. 
Indeed, the majority of men never saw combat. Troops acted poorly far before 
they ever fired a bullet or a shell at the enemy.68 
The military housed soldiers and sailors in and around the city, creating 
new camps and ports of embarkation while refurbishing old ones and setting up 
floating cities of liberty ships and freighters in coastal harbors. Bases like Fort 
Hamilton near Bay Ridge and Dyker Heights in Brooklyn and Roosevelt Base on 
Terminal Island in Los Angeles gave soldiers immediate access to the city 
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center, while other camps like Vallejo’s Mare Island operated bus and rail 
services to bring sailors on leave into San Francisco and Oakland.69 
Soldiers and sailors generally received one or two days of overnight liberty 
per week in secure Allied areas, including mainland locations. No more than 25% 
of the crew or unit were supposed to be granted furloughs at a time, but 
commanders usually ignored these rules. Before leaving, the men lined up for 
uniform and card inspection, though many managed to duck inspection or sneak 
out of camp by crawling under the perimeter fences. While on leave, they were 
required to wear their uniform, carry a liberty card, and report back to base on 
time. Shore Patrol and Military Police were charged with regulating troop 
behavior and arresting insubordinate men. If arrested, the soldier was to be 
returned to the Navy yard, base, or ship, rather than the municipal jail. 
Commandants and commanders retained the power to determine liberty and 
leave policy for men under their command, and they used this power to both 
motivate and punish recalcitrant individuals.70 
Liberty Port Networks 
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Figure 1: American Transoceanic Supply, 1942-194371 
 
Transportation networks and destination determined when and where 
sailors and soldiers took leave and liberty. Although several air and sea routes 
moved troops throughout the world, three primary transportation networks linked 
liberty ports together: The Atlantic route, the Caribbean route, and the Pacific 
Route.72 
The main Atlantic route connected four key ports of embarkation: New 
York, Boston, Norfolk, and Charleston. Even before Pearl Harbor, New York was 
the world’s largest and busiest port, with 3.2 million troops, their supplies, and 63 
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million more tons of materiel passing through the maze of docks and shipyards 
during the war. New York, as the central hub for the Atlantic, received from sub-
ports while feeding other sub-ports. Troops poured out of New York’s harbor en 
route to Northern Europe and the Mediterranean. They departed from Hampton 
Roads at Norfolk, too, the second most important Atlantic port and a sub-port of 
New York until 1942. Ships hauled nearly 13 million cubic tons of crucial supplies 
and over 760,000 passengers chiefly to Africa and the Mediterranean through 
this industrial weigh station. At the same time over 760,000 passengers and 9.5 
million cubic tons of materiel funneled through Boston—also governed by New 
York’s commandant until 1942—on their way to along the Northern Atlantic line 
of Newfoundland, Halifax, Greenland, and Iceland. Charleston housed many of 
the army hospital ships, while also serving multiple destinations.73 
 New Orleans stitched the Caribbean network together, linking smaller 
ports like San Jacinto, Mobile, Galveston, Jacksonville, and Miami, as well as the 
American territorial ports of Panama and San Juan, Guantanamo, the leased 
British ports in the West Indies, and Brazilian ports like Natal and Sao Paulo. 
These smaller ports were fed by larger inland hubs like Dallas, Houston, and 
Memphis. Nearly 175,000 passengers and 8,000,000 cubic tons of cargo passed 
through New Orleans’ waters on their way south. Americans explored west 
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Santurce and the nightlife built up next to the Isla Grande naval base in San 
Juan, before setting off for North Africa, Cape Town, or the Mediterranean via the 
South Atlantic. Panama served as the key transshipment point for the Caribbean 
network. Men destined for North Africa and Europe drank and caroused in 
Cristobal’s red light district in the Canal Zone before departing. Ships slated to 
travel the Pacific expanse crossed the canal and docked in Panama City for 
leave and refueling.74 
 San Francisco and Los Angeles anchored a vast Pacific network 
stretching from Alaska to Panama and the Philippines. San Francisco and the 
greater East Bay sent men and materiel to all areas of the Pacific as the major 
west coast transshipment point, handling about half the traffic of New York—
making it the second most important port in the U.S. and the most significant in 
the Pacific theater. Los Angeles formed the other primary port, with B-24s and 
flying boats from the San Diego sub-port crowding the decks of the city’s bustling 
docks. 217,000 people transferred through the port on their way to the Western 
and Southern Pacific, but not before “slumming” in barrio clubs or catching the 
peep shows in San Diego’s Gaslamp Quarter. Seattle supplemented these two 
cities’ output, while setting up the shipping lanes to Alaska and Western Canada. 
At first a sub-port of San Francisco, and later fed by Portland and Prince Rupert, 
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by 1942 Seattle brimmed with manufacturing shipments and sojourning sailors, 
with 12 million cubic tons of cargo and 580,000 people shipped during the war.75 
 
Figure 2: Army Passenger Traffic in the United States, 1941-194576 
 
These port networks were connected by a vast internal rail infrastructure 
which aimed to quickly ship troops, workers, and freight via America’s heartland. 
While the armed forces occasionally utilized buses and trucks, rail remained the 
predominant form of transport for man and materiel. Chicago notably grew as 
both a key zone of rail traffic and as the home to the Navy’s main training center. 
Army officials selected Chicago as the central artery for all rail traffic because of 
its location and an already well-developed railway system that featured a large 
amount of trackage, office space, and a capable receiving platform that could 
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readily process the constant truck deliveries. Chicago’s Junction Railway location 
near the Quartermaster Depot allowed for quick communication and coordination 
between railyard, receiving platform, and substations. As the primary 
consolidating station, Chicago received incoming shipments from all over the 
country, broke these carloads down, and then moved the reconsolidated trains 
onto their ultimate destination. Train platforms overflowed not only with 
seemingly endless tons of war supplies and lines of flatcars, but also with a true 
menagerie of eager servicemen, migrating war workers, and wives and families 
following soldiers. In total, Chicago consolidated nearly half the total freight 
shipped throughout the war, making it a routine stopover point for soldiers, 
sailors, and civilians shuttling about the country for lucrative war work. 
Substations and smaller consolidating stations quickly developed to supplement 
the overwhelming traffic flooding Chicago’s tracks. Midwestern and heartland 
cities like Detroit, Cleveland, Minneapolis, and St. Louis emerged as the most 
important regional substations—pivotal points that fed Chicago and then 
redirected the traffic flowing outwards. This mass expansion of rail traffic brought 
servicemen into contact with Americans outside the coasts, as troops packed into 
already crowded railcars or sought diversions in stopover cities with the 
inevitable train delays.77 
 “A Soldier’s Three Desires” 
                                                     




Most servicemen gravitated toward three things upon hitting port: women, 
alcohol, and brawling. Civilians were tasked with providing each. As their 
furlough periods approached, men obsessed over passing inspection and spent 
nights together reading letters from “favorite girls” and planned where to find 
“some very attractive girls.” New recruits envied men who had already 
experienced the excitements of liberty, and they listened eagerly to stories of 
what awaited them. All thoughts came back to “women, women, and women and 
more women and liquor” and “sally[ing] forth in search of gin and sin.” Soldiers 
reminisced about the cheap beer and the women on Coney Island’s beaches 
while others wrote of all “the pretty girls” in Manhattan. Army officers noted the 
common view of a soldier’s three desires: “a woman, a drink, and a dollar left 
over.” A sergeant’s poem put it more bluntly: “A soldier’s the sort/For rape and 
slaughter/Not fit to escort a patriot’s daughter.” These violent impulses extended 
to fighting with “4-Fs” and “Jodies.” Some men thought of scrapping with civilians 
as both good fun and a duty bestowed by the uniform. Then Army grunt LeRoy 
Neiman explained, “We headed out to the fancy midtown bars and restaurants in 
military uniform just to show the slackers and café society toffs that we were real 
men on a real mission, while they were just weasels.” If coercing and assaulting 
women constituted a kind of sexual domination then fighting with civilian men 
formed a corollary form of domination.78 
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Liberty ports provided spaces where men could fulfill multiple desires, 
often in the same spot. Troops flocked to bars, beaches, parks, cafes, transport 
stations, nightclubs, dancehalls, fleshpots, grindhouses, “blind pigs” (undercover 
cabarets), brothels, peepshows, and crooked hotels. Existing red-light districts 
like San Diego’s Gaslamp Quarter flourished, Chicago’s Gold Coast was reborn, 
and Times Square was revived after hard times during the depression as a 
worldclass amusement zone. Yet servicemen did not solely head to these most 
famous haunts. Newly flourishing vice quarters prompted joint civil-military 
crackdowns on the trade in an effort to stop an epidemic of venereal disease and 
underworld crime. But these moves unintentionally drove soldier traffic and cash 
to the Pike in Long Beach, San Francisco’s Mission District, Central Park, and 
Coney Island. These areas, which catered to both working and middle class 
patrons, came to fully embrace the vice economy, offering seedy and dangerous 
delights to furloughed soldiers while changing the reputation of these 
neighborhoods for decades to come.79 
Going AWOL 
 For many men, the temptation of pleasures in the city—and an escape 
from the military—proved too enticing. Despite the threat of being court-
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martialed, soldiers and sailors attempted to “extend” their leave by “straggling,” 
meaning they returned to their base or the naval yard hours late or even days 
late. These men were considered absent over leave (AOL) and identified as 
stragglers, while those who left duty without permission were classified as absent 
without leave (AWOL). Troops absent after 30 days would generally be labeled 
deserters, a far more serious offense that worsened rampant manpower 
shortages and caused delays as ships and units struggled to fill missing 
positions. Absenteeism—often used as a catchall term for straggling, AWOLism, 
and desertion—seemed to peak in 1942 and 1943, though the military never truly 
eliminated the issue. Sailors and soldiers tended to straggle or go AOL when 
they arrived in liberty ports for leave and furloughs. Here they could find unrivaled 
entertainment and opportunities to escape the dull regimentation of military life.80 
Army and Navy archives, as well as contemporary newspapers, feature 
enormous numbers of reports highlighting straggling, criminal AWOL troops, 
desertion, and concern among military authorities about this unshakeable 
problem. Civilian newspapers generally attempted to either shame deserters or 
to point to AWOL men who had become criminals and betrayed their military 
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duty. The New York Times’ profile of Mess Sergeant Thomas Flynn offers a 
typical public portrait of the criminal AWOL soldier. After deserting his post in 
Pennsylvania, Flynn stole three pistols and hitchhiked to the Bronx. There he 
attempted to assault a woman in her apartment, before being arrested. Other 
deserters left the military to “turn Fagin,” as the Chicago Daily Tribune described 
it. Two AWOL signal corps privates began running a gang “of juvenile purse 
snatchers and car thieves,” “sitting in stolen cars and pointing out women victims 
to their youthful conspirators.” Other absentee servicemen were caught when 
their souvenir bazooka shell exploded in their hideaway apartment, or when their 
theft of over a hundred crates of cheese was discovered.81 
Some attempted fantastic and foolish escapes, like Richard Lee Bailey. 
On August 6, 1944, Bailey stole a plane from Williams Air Field in Arizona. Bailey 
presumably planned to fake his own death by crashing the plane into the ocean, 
while parachuting to safety. With the plane’s gasoline nearly depleted, Bailey 
dropped the plane to 1000 feet and then aimed it towards the approaching sea. 
He leapt out of the plane, released his parachute, and landed in a small field in 
Mexico. As his stolen plane crashed off in this distance, Bailey gathered his knife, 
gas mask, a Luger pistol, candy bars, and other supplies. He soon met a 
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presumably bewildered Mexican family that found him after the “landing.” Bailey 
spent the next three weeks hiding in the mountains and tiny Mexican border 
villages, before contracting an illness and getting arrested by the Mexican police, 
who then returned him to an US Army envoy at Nogales. Many more absentee 
men, however, avoided police notice and found ways to disappear into liberty 
ports, further alarming the military’s command.82 
Attempts to clamp down on absenteeism became a highly influential test 
case for different modes of policing, eventually leaving most military authorities to 
conclude that little could be done to change the behavior of servicemen. Initially, 
military commanders—particularly Naval commandants and older Army 
officers—attempted to strictly enforce the rules governing liberty. Men who 
returned to ship late or drunk would be thrown into solitary with only bread and 
water. Sailors who went AWOL or deserted could be dishonorably discharged 
and possibly given prison sentences, though commandants preferred to levy a 
30-day stay in the brig. They might also see a decrease in rank or rating, and 
therefore, pay grade. Other officers revoked future liberty privileges. In November 
1942, the War Department notified all forces of Executive Order No. 9267, which 
suspended the limitations on punishments for AWOL troops. Secretary Henry 
Stimson intended the order as “a deterrent to the alarming increase in the 
number of such offenses and to make it possible in aggravated cases to impose 
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punishment.” Those who routinely straggled or became deserters were likely to 
face time in prison and expulsion from the military.83 
Here though, the armed forces once again encountered the dangers of 
unintended incentives. By demonstrating that if a serviceman would be 
discharged if he went AWOL or straggled enough, men discovered a way to 
leave the military and avoid ever facing the threat of combat. Chronic stragglers 
might enjoy their extended liberty time while avoiding the privations of 
regimented life, eventually get booted from the military, at worst serve a short 
prison term, and then likely pick up a more lucrative war industry job. Trials by 
court-martial for absenteeism also imposed an administrative burden on the 
Army and Navy bureaucracies and commanders. Military authorities soon 
recognized that rampant alcoholism and the average servicemen’s disdain for the 
military would make AWOL and straggling policies, as well guidelines governing 
good behavior on shore, totally unenforceable.84 
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 Confronted with a collapsing manpower pool, brigs full of drunks, and 
lengthy court-martial trials, military officials moved to revise policies on furloughs 
as well as guidelines on good conduct beginning in the fall of 1942. The early 
war’s wave of absenteeism drove the Army and Navy to set up policies that 
discouraged court-martials while giving tacit approval of criminal behavior in 
liberty ports. Commandants began by establishing offices devoted to returning 
stragglers to their ships while official guidelines recommended minor sentences 
or no punishment for drunkenness, absenteeism, or disorderly conduct on liberty. 
The welfare of civilians proved a secondary concern to war goals, as the Navy 
and other military branches asserted that “discipline is not designed to reform 
officers or enlisted personnel nor to pass judgment on their morals. It is designed 
to maintain the efficiency of the Service.” While Navy discipline circulars set up 
some minor punishments for infractions like assault and indecent exposure, 
commandants emphasized that these punishments were “intended as a guide 
only, and is not to be interpreted as limiting in any way the discretionary powers 
vested by law in Commanding officers.” Chief of Staff Marshall echoed this in 
November 1942, warning commanders that “reliance on courts-martial to enforce 
discipline indicates lack of leadership and faulty command.” Marshall declared 




that the court-martial “should be resorted to only when adequate disciplinary 
action cannot be provided by other means.”85  
Even the official punishment guidelines reflected a prioritization of military 
efficiency over civilian welfare. For example, while troops who stole military 
property faced a dishonorable discharge, those convicted of being drunk and 
disorderly did not. In early 1943, Secretary of War Stimson followed up on the 
previous executive order that erased limitations on punishments for AWOL men 
by tacitly admitting that the policy of harsher punishment had backfired. This 
follow-up order to all Commanding Generals and port of embarkation 
commanders warned that the removal of limitations on punishments for absentee 
troops “must not, however, be construed as encouragement for an unwarranted 
increase in the number of trials by general court-martial….Trial by general courts-
martial must not be resorted to unless there is no other appropriate remedy.” 
Many officers took this to mean that drunken men, stragglers, and those gone 
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AWOL need not be punished, leading one dutiful Shore Patrol officer to 
eventually complain that sailors expected “little or no punishment and feel they 
have committed a more or less harmless prank for which they may only be 
reprimanded.” Despite these complaints, district officials ultimately praised the 
relaxing of disciplinary procedures and speedy trials with Los Angeles’ 
commandant noting “this substantial improvement already has resulted in a 
tremendous saving of man power for the war effort.” Officers were effectively 
incentivized to avoid prosecuting their men for their misdeeds. Indeed, 
commanders who court-martialed too many men could be accused of failing to 
exercise sound leadership by high command. In adjusting discipline and 
punishment, the military succeeded in easing the burdens of court-martial panels 
and port brigs while also improving their manpower shortage.86 
 Nevertheless, over-leave and desertion remained a continuing, if 
somewhat reduced problem throughout the war. Writing at the end of 1943 while 
docked in San Francisco, Rear Admiral Wilder D. Baker seemed resigned to the 
reality that no policing strategy would ever prevent men from going AWOL: “Our 
trouble seems to boil down to the fact that too many men are willing to be thrown 
out of the navy, or at least to take chances on that punishment.” Baker knew that 
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court-martialing and imprisoning stragglers and deserters would only preserve a 
path for men to escape military service by committing a non-violent crime. Yet, 
the Navy’s new policy, which effectively offered deserters clemency to return to 
their post, created another perverse incentive. When absentee sailors rejoined 
their ships, their shipmates noticed they had escaped punishment. Baker noted 
that his own ship experienced a spike in absentees after the return of four 
Bluejackets who had their desertion convictions set aside, and he cited 
“inadequate punishment of flagrant offenders” as one of the key reasons for 
continued issues with over-leave. The fleet finally saw an improvement in 
absentee rates after they granted longer leave and liberty periods in 1945, 
suggesting that insufficient leave time contributed to men to abandoning their 
posts.87 
 Yet these legal adjustments effectively granted extralegal and 
extraterritorial privileges to servicemen: they were no longer bound by civilian law 
or policing, or for that matter, outmoded codes of moral sobriety. Nor did they 
expect serious punishment from a military desperately scrambling to catch up in 
a two-front war. Absenteeism, drunkenness, “skirt-chasing,” and harassment of 
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civilians effectively constituted military sanctioned spoils of war, not just against 
foreign civilians, but their own. Improvements in the absentee rate and reductions 
of court-martials became linked to giving servicemen more time in liberty ports 
with fewer restrictions on their conduct. Infantrymen even began to re-designate 
going AWOL as “after women and liquor” or “a wolf on the loose.”88 
“Blind Asshole Drunk” 
Troops arrived in liberty ports ready to get drunk, exacerbating already 
growing problems of sexual assault, prostitution, and vandalism. Men often hit 
the bars near the dockyards before moving on to the red light districts and honky-
tonks. Before reaching port, or while on the street, sailors reported “loading up” in 
preparation for a weekend of liberty. Whether it be beer, whiskey, moonshine, 
bathtub gin, wood alcohol (that sometimes blinded sailors), swipe (“an ad hoc 
distillation of sugar, canned fruit, potato peelings, and other such ingredients”), or 
torpedo juice (torpedo fuel mixed with apple juice or grapefruit), soldiers found 
ways to get “pie-eyed” and drink “themselves into unconsciousness.” The Navy 
actually began adding croton oil—“an explosively powerful purgative” that burned 
the mouth, throat, and abdomen, sometimes killing men—to the torpedo fuel, 
though sailors found ways to safely distill it.89 
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Other soldiers began looting whiskey and alcohol from medical supplies, 
stealing as many cases as possible and then hiding the bottles in cargo holds. 
Some enterprising GIs even began selling the whiskey to fellow soldiers at black 
market rates. Others snuck booze onto trains or purchased it at stops, leading to 
whole cars becoming drunk and disorderly. This propensity for soldiers to get 
drunk at rail stations and layovers consistently resulted in delays and missed 
trains. The military’s failure to identify or condemn alcohol abuse when drafting 
and selecting men drove some of these excesses. Hungover men appearing for 
a draft inspection received no disapprobation from inspectors and one 
psychiatrist determined that “the indulgence of the Army was particularly marked 
in the case of alcoholics.” British officers remarked that American soldiers were 
“drunk all day” and GIs reported that they “got blind asshole drunk every chance 
we got.” Subsequent medical studies confirm that World War II veterans suffered 
significantly higher death rates because of alcoholism compared to non-
veterans.90 
Drinking became so problematic that Chief of Staff General George C. 
Marshall wrote to Provost Marshal General Allen Gullion —the head of Army 
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policing—regarding alcohol abuse among soldiers in November 1942. Marshall 
began by referring to the recurring issue of “soldiers drinking on trains,” and then 
went on to acknowledge the “touchy problem in the matter of drinking elsewhere, 
especially in cities where enlisted men congregate during the week-ends.” 
Marshall’s main concern appeared to be the civilian enmity created by the 
rampant drunkenness and violence of his men, admonishing Gullion that “it is 
essential that the mounting wave of criticism and resentment be stopped.” 
Months later though, commanding officers received notice that “many reports 
continue to reach the War Department relative to drinking and misconduct of 
military personnel on public carriers and in towns and cities adjacent to posts, 
camps, and stations.” The Inspector General and General Gullion demanded that 
commanding officers require their men to “correct defects in conduct, dress, and 
military courtesy,” though they offered no specific methods of how commanders 
might accomplish this. Officers faced a formidable task to reduce drunk and 
disorderly conduct in port. Command had already discouraged the use of 
dishonorable discharges, court-martials, and confinement, as these punishments 
all resulted in manpower loss. Outside reductions in rank and levying extra 
duties, commanders could revoke liberty privileges. Once again though, Naval 
protocol warned that “loss of liberty becomes a more onerous punishment when 
opportunity for liberty is very limited.” Indeed, losing liberty could spur waves of 




web of contradictory military policies left officers with no effective method of 
preventing poor conduct and performance caused by drinking.91 
Some district naval commandants made attempts to curb drinking early on 
to limited effect. In July 1942, Miami’s Rear Admiral James L. Kauffman and 
Brigadier General Ralph Wooten unilaterally decided that all places serving beer 
and liquor in Dade county would be forced to close at midnight and at 1 a.m. on 
Sunday. Military authorities explained to Variety that “it is imperative that these 
measures be taken because of the increasing difficulty in controlling drinking 
among service personnel.” They proceeded to openly admit that the sheer 
numbers of men coursing through Miami had left only a scattered number of MPs 
and Shore Patrol struggling to keep the peace. Notably, Miami’s command 
included civilians in the ban, explaining that were civilians allowed to continue 
drinking, morale would collapse and troops would feel this was “discrimination in 
favor of the civilians.” The order ultimately did little to shelter Miami from the 
disruptions brought on by excessive drinking. A March 1943 profile of Miami in 
the Boston Globe explained that “the Army and Navy have taken over” and that 
the swarms of uniforms had “profoundly change[d] things.” Bars and liquor stores 
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still did a regular trade, shops catered more and more to selling GIs “cheap and 
tawdry stuff,” and streets swelled with singing men.92 
The “GI Gauntlet” 
 
 Most ports of call featured well-known red-light districts, openly catering to 
the drives of servicemen. American-controlled areas like San Juan, Trinidad, 
Bermuda, and the Panama Canal Zone emerged as desired stops for men on 
transshipment routes, specifically for their vice zones. In Colon and Panama City, 
American sailors mixed in the wild, colorful, and dangerous streets filled with 
vendors, prostitutes, barmen, foreign soldiers, and taxi drivers calling out the 
names of brothels like “La Case del Amor.” For one Naval officer, it was “the 
tropics, maturity, and the Fall of Man simultaneously.” In “the honky-tonk main 
street of Panama City lined with bars,” amidst the cacophony of competing 
jukeboxes, men could buy “cameras, silk hose, liquor, handbags decorated with 
the stuffed heads of baby alligators, bracelets of Mexican silver, and jade 
supposedly from the Orient.” Packs of servicemen hurried off the docks after the 
canal trawl, drinking their way through Ancón’s open-air taverns to El Chorrillo’s 
sweltering cabarets. Along the way, they picked up “pictures made of butterfly 
wings, or coconuts…or red bananas, or bottles of rum” from the peddlers and 
hawkers dotting the streets. At nightclubs, men danced with hostesses, watched 
                                                     
92 A similar ban was implemented in San Francisco, to little effect. For the Miami midnight liquor 
ban see “Army, Navy Issue ‘Toughest’ Curbs To Miami Night Clubs; New Curfews,” Variety, July 
8, 1942, 45; William H. Clark, “Servicemen Have Given Miami a Strong Home Town 




stripteases, and listened to music as women “shook [their] giant naked breasts” 
in their faces. As sailors with “red faces” and “unfocused eyes” stumbled through 
the night, prostitutes beckoned from flung open shutters. Military Police and 
Shore Patrol made no effort to stop the vice trade, but instead transported 
passed out and inebriated men back to their ships in time to make the crossing. 
Privately, the Army conceded that MPs remained ineffective in the Caribbean 
due to poor training and the lack of Spanish speaking officers.93  
 Yet Panamanians and other populations in American controlled ports did 
not just passively accept the U.S. military’s use of their cities as pleasure zones. 
Civilians in the city saw opportunities to exploit visiting soldiers, while others 
found ways to actively challenge the military’s domination. Some Panamanians—
including the local police—beat and robbed drunk personnel, while others 
profited off the vice trade. Civilian groups organized protests aimed at expelling 
troops from liberty ports. Riots and other disturbances involving servicemen and 
civilians made major newspapers throughout the period, and reflected active 
resistance against the American presence on the ground. Often, the violence 
could be traced back to nightlife, women, and liquor. Troops and MPs in Colón 
were injured when “a free-for-all in a cabaret spread to the street.” Later, in Natal, 
Brazil sailors sparked “a quasi riot” when a drunken crew of nearly three hundred 
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“annoyed” and “seized” several women, provoking a “general brawl” that had to 
be put down by police and firemen wielding fire hoses. These brawls and riots, 
and the general comportment of Americans in port, fueled anti-American 
sentiment and possibly contributed to Panama’s decision to expel the Army’s 
defense bases after protests by civilians.94 
One might suspect that Caribbean ports afforded American troops a kind 
of anonymity, that it was their foreign location and racial hierarchies that allowed 
for the suspension of normal moral codes. The same kind of raucous, violent 
hedonism, however, could be found in U.S. mainland ports. New York City, for 
example, emerged as the world’s busiest and most popular liberty port during the 
war, and the most desired place for men trying to find a girl before shipping out. 
For many men it was “Last Stop, U.S.A.,” the key Atlantic hub of transshipment 
and transfer for soldiers, sailors, and marines of every Allied nation. Entering 
Brooklyn Harbor amidst the fog, recurring clanging bells, and freighters, men 
could see “the most beautiful sight in the world… Manhattan floating on the 
water.” And in “the Crossroad of the World,” servicemen gathered to see the 
center what of English transplant Alistair Cooke termed “Tijuana on the Hudson,” 
crowded with servicemen surging through the dimly lit streets. Seeing the hordes 
of Bluejackets, GIs, and Merchant Marines, Naval officer Robert Edson Lee 
wrote, “Virgil and Dante saw nothing more spectacular in Hell than those hundred 
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thousand servicemen circling Times Square endlessly walking, continually 
replaced. Desperate, lonely, forlorn, but certain to find there the excitement for 
which they had gone to war.”95 
 Times Square functioned as both the center for liberty activity in New York 
and a central hub for civilian transport, once again bringing troops and civilians 
into contact on the ground. In the Broadway sector, women filling wartime jobs 
and visiting civilians confronted a sea of colors intermixing with “the red pompons 
of French Navy caps mingling with the bright blue collars of the British seamen, 
the somber khaki of America, Australian, and Canadian soldiers.” But this was 
not a peaceful, romantic meeting of the Allied cause, nor was Times Square the 
center of well-ordered spectacle and international consumerism that it is today. 
Instead, Time Square’s appeal lied in its suspension of civic virtue and raucous 
celebration of wolfish aggression. Just like overseas staging grounds, it was a 
militarized zone, where each week millions of soldiers could get drunk in dank 
taverns, carouse and fight, catch a peepshow, and then chase women through 
the dimout streets of the wartime city. “Canteens, above-the-street dance halls, 
shooting galleries, bars, [and] honky-tonks” dominated “the mecca of the 
pleasure-seeker, the curious, the odd, and the homeless.” In this aggressive mix 
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of violent masculinity and frontier spectacle, servicemen provided Times Square 
with the “greatest boom in its history.”96 
 In Times Square, women, the Times’ Meyer Berger noted, ran “a kind of 
GI gauntlet,” navigating the American, British, and French servicemen “forming 
the nightly stag lines” as they ogled the “girls and women surging toward Forty-
second Street subway stations.” Cops warned women to “look out for them 
Coney Island wolves,” but police ultimately did little to prevent the “wolf whistles,” 
stares, and physical intimidation that greeted women as they made their 
commute. Pauline Kael remembered that soldiers picked up “techniques they 
saw in the movies”: “If you were walking down the street and a guy in uniform 
tried stop you and you weren’t interested…they tried to make you feel guilty for 
not wanting to go to bed with them.” Indeed, consent did not usually factor into a 
servicemen’s approach. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox received direct 
complaints about drunken troops “bullying civilians and frightening women and 
children” while Times Square women protested that “sailors call you the vilest 
names if you ask them to leave you alone.” Even pregnant women could not 
escape “being insulted and chased right up to our very door.” Women often found 
little recourse for this chronic pattern of harassment, threat, assault, and rape. In 
the early hours of the morning, Berger observed one woman with “a damaged 
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right eye,” repeating to herself, “‘He hit me, he hit me.’” “But she’s alone,” Berger 
notes, “No one stops her. No sympathy.”97 
  For servicemen though, Times Square, and New York itself, became a 
place to break sexual and racial taboos, while consummating the identities they 
forged in training. After beginning the night by pouring “raw whiskey down our 
throats,” one sailor found himself “in an orgy. I kissed, my God, I kissed a 
hundred women, two hundred women in an hour….I kissed a gorgeous 
Negress….I fondled breasts. Somebody screamed, and we chased the prettiest 
girls up and down….We staggered away, our lips a raw mass of cold sores for 
days to come—badges, envied by all the others on the ship.” These temptations 
proved too much for some Allied soldiers, and New York quickly became a major 
AWOL point for British, Canadian, French, and Chinese sailors, leading 
American civil and military police to launch missions aimed at tracking these 
international deserters down.98 
At times, New York and other stateside cities struggled to house the huge 
numbers arriving on furloughs despite the efforts of volunteer and religious 
organizations to offer housing, apartments, and dormitories to men taking liberty. 
Many hotels refused to give enlisted men rooms, driving them to sleazy 
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establishments or the street. The Times noted that members of the “friendly 
invasion of soldiers, sailors, and marines”—and the women they were with—
could be found sleeping on benches and crowding the park walkups of Fifth 
Avenue and Central Park West. Others, after carousing in Times Square, holed 
up in bus stations and subway terminals. On hot nights, troops openly slept in 
Central Park despite Mayor La Guardia’s order to close it at midnight. The Times 
noted that “it would require a small army to make the order fully effective.”99 
Gay soldiers—and men who identified as “straight” but enjoyed 
homoerotic experiences—also took to liberty ports for dancing, carousing, and 
sex, even though they remained the disproportionate focus of policing and vice 
squads. Like other servicemen, gay troops smartly followed the lists of bars that 
had been declared out of bounds by the MPs, vice boards, and Command. By 
quickly changing out of their uniform and into “civvies,” men could find a 
blacklisted gay bar hopefully without attracting the attention of MPs. Large public 
areas like Central Park offered an ideal space for cruising too, though MPs also 
began cracking down on well-known meeting spots. Police also focused on 
raiding drag shows and burlesque theaters, though wartime gay life in the military 
can hardly be characterized as nothing but crackdowns. Indeed, gay GIs and 
men interested in homoerotic encounters regularly found and “adopted” 
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previously “straight” taverns and clubs, remaining there even when they faced 
opposition from civilian and police forces. In other instances, gay servicemen 
found established spots like Carroll’s bar in D.C., where government employees 
cruised for military men. Carroll’s maintained established traditions and codes of 
conducts that made it a reliable and safe spot to pick up a guy in prewar years. 
But just as heterosexual troops turned on civilians and made nightlife more 
aggressive, the gay servicemen in Carroll’s sometimes bucked the bar’s 
longstanding customs, became drunk, and then violent towards the civilian 
clientele. Waitresses warned their regulars about troublesome troops, but many 
civilians ultimately departed for less dangerous establishments.100 
In Los Angeles, sailors found a more decentralized sprawl of vice as they 
made their way from the Navy Yard and Terminal Island into the nightlife of Long 
Beach, downtown LA, or Hollywood. Main Street and East Fifth Street in Los 
Angeles, San Pedro’s South Beacon, and Long Beach’s West Pike and Ocean 
boomed with servicemen looking to drink and maybe “buy a piece of ‘ass.’” 
Bluejackets and Army grunts also took advantage of LA’s proximity to the 
fleshpots and amusement zones across the Mexican border. Los Angeles, San 
Diego, Tijuana, Tecate, Mexicali, and Ensenada effectively formed a single 
stretch where soldiers could tour the taverns, brothels, and bars. Locals 
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suggested that visiting servicemen pursue the “good neighbor policy by going to 
Tijuana in quest of liquor.”101 
While some soldiers viewed the border towns as spots for carousing, 
others identified the border crossing as the ideal spot to go AWOL. Mexico and 
the United States lacked an official agreement regarding the return of deserters, 
leading Mexican authorities to demand compensation for cooperation. Army 
administrators acknowledged their relative lack of leverage and advised 
Commanding Generals negotiating extradition of absentee soldiers “to avoid any 
possibility of controversy with Mexican authorities who, it must be understood, 
are under no obligation to enter into such agreements.”102 
The American vice traffic sometimes strained relations between the U.S. 
military and the Mexican government. After a night of drinking, an American 
corporal was shot by a Mexican policeman while drunkenly driving away from a 
Tijuana cabaret, leading to recriminations and demands for justice from both 
sides. In Reynosa, the first stop for Texan troops hopping the border, intoxicated 
sailors and soldiers were regularly arrested by the Mexican police “for anything 
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from arguing with a taxi driver about an exorbitant fare to an assault on a 
Mexican, and are almost invariably fined the amount of money in their 
possession.” The Army attempted to declare Reynosa’s prostitution district off 
limits, but because the Mexican Army enforced these regulations, soldiers 
“understood that for a sum…this restriction is waived.” The Army eventually 
formed joint American-Mexican police forces to patrol Juarez and Reynosa in an 
effort to control “prostitution, liquor, and high prices.” Despite these attempts to 
police the stag trade, soldiers quickly became accustomed to having women, no 
matter the law or regulation in place.103  
Across American liberty ports, women “both young and old”—often 
working late into the night—were approached by men in uniform. When told 
“NO,” one woman wrote, sailors would “call me the most vulgar names.” Other 
servicemen would “hide and wait for ladies passing on their way home,” 
catcalling and following after them, “which makes it very unpleasant and 
unsafe—as these men seem to disregard a persons[sic] age and make the same 
advances to both young and old.” At the Pike in the Long Beach Amusement 
Zone, criminality among naval personnel ran unchecked as “thousands of usual 
visitors have been driven from the beaches and pleasures” as “hordes of drunken 
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sailors, running wild, insulting and man-handling women” claimed the area as 
their own. Male civilians escorting women “have been beaten insensible” while 
“trying to protect their families from the moronic desires of these hoodlums.” 
“Irate husbands,” one civilian remarked, “may have to kill a few of these 
gangsters before proper action is taken.” On trains and railways, women often 
could not avoid the advances and attention of soldiers, some of whom spent 
these trips becoming drunk and disorderly, so much so that they assaulted train 
conductors and porters. Few authorities then, seemed able to effectively 
challenge the privileges engendered by military service.104 
Soldiers and sailors regularly engaged in a practice later labeled 
“prowling” by Pearl Schiff, a novelist who lived in a liberty port. Describing the 
mindset of the sailors, she explained that “you prowled the Square and took your 
time, seeing what the evening had to offer.” This generally meant groups of 
servicemen stood at high traffic areas, like busy street crossings, bus stops, and 
subway stations, assessing the women and girls passing by. Men would give 
women “the eye,” a mix of seductive glances and outright leering. Wolf whistles, 
aggressive come-ons, and chasing after a girl might follow. Servicemen, Schiff 
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wrote, debated which girl to pursue and hoped to avoid “committing yourself to a 
profitless evening with a girl who soaked up your liquor like a sponge but gave 
nothing back when squeezed.”105 
Some in the military hierarchy acknowledged the unchecked mistreatment 
of women occurring in liberty ports throughout the country, but they often found 
ways to ascribe the problem to a tiny minority of scoundrels rather than admit 
how widespread this behavior had become. After witnessing the violent 
carousing in Hampton Roads that had previously disturbed General Marshall, 
Rear Admiral David McDougal Le Breton admitted that “some men appear to 
believe that because they are in the military service they are privileged to molest 
women in public places and to insult and disregard the rights of civilians who are 
not wearing the uniform.” Generals in the Army offered similar warnings about 
the rampant lawlessness defining wartime life in liberty ports.106 
Le Breton was an old hand—an experienced Naval lifer dedicated to the 
service who genuinely believed in the idea of being a gentleman officer. This 
ideology informed his declaration that “the conduct of these men brings the entire 
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Navy into disrepute and should be a matter of serious concern to all decent, self-
respecting men in the Naval service.” Given the range of offenses cited—
swearing, insulting women and civilians, destruction of civilian property, assault, 
highway robbery, and manslaughter—Le Breton surmised that the Navy was 
losing respect and confidence of the public, who increasingly saw nothing but 
“disorderly and rowdy conduct in public places.”107 
While the Admiral chose to step up Shore Patrol efforts, issue stronger 
punishments, and encourage a culture of more gentlemanly behavior during 
stays in stateside cities, he failed to recognize how the Navy’s culture of 
swaggering masculinity and anti-civilian tribalism fueled enlistees’ criminal 
behavior. Instead Le Breton blamed the port’s troubles on “criminals, gangsters, 
and other undesirable persons of bad character” who had unfortunately found 
their way into the service. Here, the Admiral ignored the fact that the Navy 
generally had its pick of the best recruits and did not rely on the draft like the 
Army did. Hampton Roads’ struggles with crime and sexual assault also began in 
1942, when the Navy was generally filled with disproportionally educated, middle-
class sailors. Criminal behavior then, could not be simply attributed to poor 
education or a dearth of men raised in “good homes.” Instead, each service saw 
the effects of a training system that emphasized virile masculinity and disdain for 
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civilian life combined with a policing and legal framework that incentivized using 
civilians to relieve stress and have a rollicking good time.108    
Brawling 
Servicemen performed their superiority to non-military men in the city by 
engaging in fist-fights and brawls. Male civilians, thought of as “4-Fs” and 
“Jodies,” were often targeted, usually with no consequences. Fighting with 
civilians asserted the soldier’s dominance over other males, as well as spaces 
like Times Square. On many nights, reporters watched as “soldiers, sailors, and 
civilians exchanged blows” while servicemen vandalized property, but MPs rarely 
arrived to make any arrests. Storeowners expected riots and vandalism 
whenever an election or New Year’s Eve brought masses of servicemen to 
Times Square, boarding up their storefronts and windows to avoid theft and 
vandalism. Stories of sailors murdering civilians in local hotels cropped up while 
civilian police and sailors openly skirmished in bar fights. In New York and 
elsewhere, soldiers drinking, stealing cars, and joyriding remained an unchecked 
problem that created a sense of helplessness amongst civilians.109 
Men sought out establishments that became known for the consistent 
brawling. On San Diego’s Mission Beach boardwalk, soldiers, marines, and 
civilians could scrap in hard-edged bars like the Casino Café, where 
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management made no effort to stop drunken fights that lasted 30 minutes at 
times. Nearby civilians lodged formal complaints against the chronic “fighting and 
profane language,” soldiers using their yards “as a toilet,” and intoxicated 
servicemen sleeping on their property. One resident saw these carousing men 
and the bars they frequented as “a menace to the welfare of my wife and 
family.”110 
Brawls could quickly transform from low level street fights into massive 
riots that put soldiers, civilians, and police forces into deadly confrontations. In 
August 1942, over 1200 people crowded themselves into the ballroom of the Elks 
building in Cambridge, Massachusetts for a Thursday night dance. As the 
servicemen, women, and civilians danced and intermingled, a fist fight broke out 
between a GI and a civilian over a woman. As they fought, a cacophony of 
insults, fists, and screaming overtook the hall as the fighting spiraled out onto the 
dance floor. Men broke bottles, smashed windows, and readied knives. A police 
matron attempting to reestablish order was punched in the eye and knocked to 
the ground. Witnesses saw a soldier thrown from a balcony, plummeting 15 feet 
onto his head. He soon disappeared from view as the combatants on the dance 
floor trampled him. Joint Shore Patrol and civilian police squads stormed into the 
building, and the brawl-turned-riot spread out into the nearby streets. After police 
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arrested the instigators, the crowd turned against them, brawling with the SPs 
and municipal cops. Army MPs soon joined the resurgent riot, and the police only 
quelled the melee by firing tear gas into the crowd. Brawls that escalated into 
riots remained consistent spectacles throughout the war in newly militarized 
ports, and they continued to harm relations between soldier, civilian, and 
police.111 
Civil challenges to military authority and privilege, as well as enforcement 
of “Chickenshit” regulations, could also prompt brawling. Troops knew municipal 
cops held little authority over them while in port, leading to fights when civilian 
police attempted to encroach upon the de facto legal privileges granted by the 
uniform. The “Battle of Astoria” in New York —a 90 minute bar fight between 
scores of sailors and policemen witnessed by 400 spectators—started when 
officers demanded liberty passes and identification cards. The sailors rallied to 
the cry of “so this is democracy!” and began “the free-for all.” Glass panels were 
smashed, stones were thrown at policemen, civilians joined in the fray, and 
scores were injured. Although the sailors were in violation of liberty regulations 
and openly assaulted police officers, the magistrate presiding over the case 
chastised the police: “A bar and grill at 1 o’clock in the morning is likely to 
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become inflamed at the slightest provocation. I cannot understand the physical 
force used by the police in arresting these defendants.”112 
Servicemen’s targeting of civilian men could cause whole cities to be 
declared out of bounds, as happened in Sacramento when “mounting trouble 
between sailors and civilians that culminated in a riotous fight.” Here, 25 sailors 
insulted and then attacked a smaller group of civilian men including a Mexican-
American prize fighter. City officials warned that “friction between sailors and 
civilian young men had been increasing” with earlier brawls at a Chinese 
restaurant where belligerent sailors clashed with waiters who “fought with hot 
soup,” scalding one of the men.113 
Liberty ports also often transformed the nature of brawling. Previously, GIs 
and sailors allowed their rival service identities to provoke fights between them. 
These inter-service brawls could be massive, with one street fight involving over 
150 sailors and marines just outside of Seattle. But when faced with Allied troops 
taking leave in stateside cities, American troops increasingly began to fight these 
interlopers along national lines. In Bermuda, “a bewildering potpourri of fighting 
men” including American sailors, British Navymen, Scottish Highlanders, Free 
French out of Tahiti, and other Commonwealth conscripts congregated in the 
same bars after long ocean trawls. In an area where rum was cheaper than beer, 
international punch-ups proved inevitable. One story claimed a bar fight began 
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after an American sailor and British merchant man began exchanging insults. “To 
hell with your king!” said the American. “To hell with Babe Ruth!” replied the 
Brit.114    
British and American men suffered perhaps the poorest relations. These 
brawls were partly sparked by sexual jealousy and competition. British soldiers 
and sailors abroad carried the burden of rumors and recriminations. Many had 
heard of all the Yanks in the UK supposedly reducing British wives and sisters to 
prostitution. British soldiers also resented the higher pay, better food, and access 
to beer that US servicemen enjoyed. American troops, for their part, despised the 
potential competition for women they saw in British men. Many believed they 
were about to ship out to face potential death and desired a woman as 
compensation for this sacrifice. British sailors seen with American women were 
sometimes targeted by groups of American troops. This competition over women 
soured inter-Alliance cooperation.115 
Even the British and American political and military leaders ultimately 
clashed over unequal legal treaties. While the British assented to American 
merchant marine and sailors in the UK and Commonwealth territories being tried 
by US courts, the Americans made no such concessions for British sailors found 
to commit crimes in the US. The American forces additionally demanded that 
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none of their troops ever be tried by a UK court. The British Admiralty bristled at 
a clearly unequal legal system, but generally cooperated with the American 
demands. Relations between American and British troops eventually became so 
poor that British command instituted a program aimed at training American and 
British recruits together in order to avoid inter-Alliance conflicts. Prominent 
Bostonians responded to street clashes by creating a “Union Jack Club” for 
passing British sailors aimed at keeping them out of rowdy spots and to stop 
them sleeping on the Boston Common. Nevertheless, British sailors did end up 
meeting American women and marrying them. Some British servicemen deserted 
in places like Brooklyn to marry, while Australian merchant marines found wives 
in Los Angeles and took them as war brides back to Sydney.116 
“Tell Your Troubles to the President” 
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 Military officials readily understood the primary causes of trouble on leave 
and liberty, with one Naval official listing “drank too much,” “detained by civilian 
police,” and “couldn’t keep away from girls” as key factors. Following General 
Marshall’s complaints about the behavior of soldiers in 1942, General Gullion—
head of Army policing—likewise identified “intoxication,” “disturbing civilians,” and 
“general obnoxious disorder” as deeply troubling signs of “an apparent lack of 
discipline in the Army as a whole.” Gullion made a number of requests and 
recommendations. First, the Army should greatly increase the number of Military 
Police in key liberty ports, towns near bases, and on trains. Second, he wrote to 
the International Association of Chiefs of Police asking civil police across the 
country to “arrest and confine all military personnel for drunkenness” before 
turning them over to the nearest military station. Gullion finally attempted to 
institute better policing by threatening the Commanding Generals. “Misconduct of 
military personnel, especially outside the confines of military reservations,” he 
explained, “is an indication of poor leadership, training and esprit de corps and of 
the failure of officers to carry out their responsibilities.” Those who failed to 
promptly correct this chronic misbehavior would face “disciplinary measures.” 117 
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 Gullion’s words were sharp, but he lacked any real way to back up his 
implied threats. The military’s policing problem did not result simply from a lack of 
effort among commanding officers and police. Both military and civil policing 
remained ineffective for a number reasons outside the lazy explanation of poor 
leadership. 
 First, the War Department believed that recurring manpower problems 
made devoting more (and better trained) men to policing an impossible request. 
After Gullion made demands for more MPs and patrols, the War Department 
admitted that “the number of military police in all categories is below the number 
allotted,” but maintained that the Army would not accede to an expansion of MP 
units because of concerns over manpower: “It is obvious that as the Army 
increases in size, the vital question of manpower must increasingly influence 
decisions….Assignment of additional personnel to duties which are not closely 
associated with the support of combat units in active theaters must be kept to a 
minimum.” Even as the number of combat and support troops grew—and 
therefore the number of men taking liberty increased—the War Department 
refused to make proportionate increases in police forces. A report in August 1942 
made an even more desperate case, noting that MPs were already short over 
17,000 officers, and would ideally need 26 additional battalions, a 41% increase 
in the total number of MPs. With only 45,000 officers—some of these men were 
dedicated to internal security efforts at defense plants and thus did not contribute 




Police were operating at under half their target strength in manpower. By January 
1945, MP numbers in the continental US stood at 90,000, though the Army’s total 
personnel also grew to over 8 million, leaving the Provost Marshal General with a 
continued shortage of men.118 
 Rather than addressing their men’s alcohol abuse or increasing patrols to 
prevent street harassment and rape, Joint Army-Navy boards used military and 
civilian policing to focus on preventing venereal diseases, attacking 
homosexuality, and investigating black and other non-white servicemen. Any 
area of the city or business could be placed “out of bounds” if it was thought to be 
spreading VD, rendering it theoretically inaccessible for servicemen (though 
these lists often told troops exactly where to go). In centering their policing efforts 
on VD, the military redoubled its commitment to maintaining manpower while 
allowing soldiers to engage in a few “port sins.” But this also drove more and 
more soldiers into areas with civilian women uninvolved in the sex trade.119 
Both the Shore Patrol and the Military Police lacked tradition, morale, 
funding, and the backing of higher-level commanders. Indeed, some ship 
captains bitterly protested when their men were held for drunkenness and 
                                                     
118 “War Department to General Gullion, Military Police Assigned to Public Carriers,” September 
24, 1942, 250.1 General, Administrative Division: Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal 
File 1941-1945, box 65, RG 389 (Provost Marshal General), NACP; For August 1942 report see 
“Determination of the Requirements of Military Police Units Necessary for the Internal Security of 
the United States,” August 7, 1942, 320.2 General #1, Administrative Division: Mail and Records 
Branch, Classified Decimal File 1941-1945, box 79, NACP; For January MP numbers see 
“Strength of the Army Report,” January 31, 1945, 320.2 Strength of the Army, Administrative 
Division: Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File 1941-1945, box 80, RG 389, NACP. 
119 For more on Vice boards see the P Vice files and P Misconduct files. Also see Costello’s 




carousing, demanding an explanation for the loss of morale and manpower. 
When Los Angeles’ Shore Patrol attempted to enforce alcohol and location 
restrictions, a skeptical Vice Admiral wrote in asking senior officers to legitimize 
the policy. A 1942 Army commissioned study of personnel problems in the MP 
corps argued that the whole force suffered from “unqualified personnel,” and 
explained that it was seen as a place to dump “useless individuals.” One 
inspector remarked, “The most frightening situation is personnel—the first thing 
referred to at all posts was personnel.” By the war’s end, few improvements had 
been made and Army Command continued to receive complaints from Generals 
that they could not obtain qualified and well-trained MPs. Major General James 
L. Collins asked that the Chiefs of Staff move to concentrate the scant MP 
resources in “cities that are centers of population having a large impact on 
military personnel,” but this proposal was scuttled. Other commanders pleaded 
that they required “additional military police badly,” and warned of “tremendous 
headaches” should the War Department ignore their requests. Consistently 
understaffed and given unremarkable trainees, the MPs continued to be cast as 
underpowered misfits. Jokes abounded claiming that color-blind draftees were 
made MPs and tasked with directing traffic. Another joke featured an illiterate MP 
telling a speeding colonel’s wife that “you’re damn lucky, ma’am. If I could write 




pass them on the sidewalk, calling them “flatfoots,” implying they could not hack 
it in the infantry.120  
Servicemen thus held little respect for Military Police and Shore Patrol. 
Each force struggled to effectively assert control and authority over unruly men, 
many of whom outright refused to obey the commands of a police force from a 
different branch. GIs like Bill Mauldin saw MPs as matriarchal figures determined 
to impede any kind of liberty activity. In one of Mauldin’s Star Spangled Banter 
cartoons, a scowling MP waving his baton is analyzed by three GIs. When one 
asks, “Whaddaya s’pose makes an M.P. become an M.P.?,” another answers, 
“They want t’keep us boys innercent—it the mother instinct.” A 1943 War 
Department report, “What Soldiers Think About Army Branches,” revealed that 
soldiers despised the MPs. The average grunt identified MPs as having “the least 
amount of work to do” and “the least dangerous jobs,” while also seeing the 
corps as the least liked branch and the branch least important to winning the war. 
Some commanding officers chastised the casual disrespect shown to the corps, 
and feared the sometimes violent disdain GIs displayed towards law 
enforcement. One brigadier general—noticing a growing number of “incidents 
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indicative of an attitude of disrespect toward military and civilian police, and 
toward military and local law”—cautioned that soldiers were showing “contempt 
for the requests and orders of military police.” This was leading to “violence 
committed upon the persons” of MPs. Naval files burgeon with reports of sailors 
cursing out Shore Patrol officers or assaulting them. Other officers reported being 
surrounded after attempting to make an arrest, with troops grabbing at their 
pistol. Army reports describe grisly accounts of soldiers ganging up on isolated 
MPs and savagely beating them.121  
Some Shore Patrol Commanders like Clarence Fogg seemed genuinely 
concerned with the levels of crime, drunkenness, and, as a Naval report put it, 
“the accosting of women” in the Los Angeles area. But how could undermanned 
patrols enforce the rule of law when naval protocols informed them that “arrest 
should not be resorted to where corrective measures will suffice?” The authority 
and effectiveness of military policing rapidly diminished over the course of the 
war, with officers coming to accept their lack of control in liberty ports. Even as 
civilians protested to the military that women were forced to “run the gauntlet” 
and civilian men had to “stand idly by to the abuse and humiliation of their 
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women,” little was done to bolster military policing. Instead, “patrols,” one civilian 
seethed, “advise the victims they are under orders to NOT stop these boys.” 
Other MPs abused their power to coerce women for sexual favors. Several 
women told The Chicago Defender that MPs “bully them into affairs with them, 
sometimes on threat of ‘taking it out’ on their soldier boyfriends or husbands.”122  
Civilian police departments, gutted by the draft that took veteran 
policemen into military service, held even less power over servicemen. The 
police effectively lacked the ability to hold and charge troops except for vice 
violations (prostitution, homosexuality) and the most serious of felonies (such as 
murder, vehicular homicide, or arson). War department policy, as well official 
police bulletins, called for troops to be turned over to military authorities, if 
detained. Soldiers knew municipal cops held little authority over them while in 
port, leading to brawls when civilian police attempted to encroach upon the legal 
privileges that came with service. In a memo to district police officers, Long 
Beach’s Police Chief acknowledged the bleak situation: “There is a growing 
resentment against police officers in general by enlisted personnel of the armed 
forces and…this resentment is rapidly being crystallized. This could, and may 
very easily develop into serious difficulties and consequences for individual 
officers, as well as for the department personnel in general.” The Chief then went 
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on to warn of a complete breakdown of relations with the military and “extreme 
problems” that would make “work more hazardous.” Finally, he implicitly called 
for officers to employ leniency in dealing with the military as “these are trying 
times.” These arrangements extended to all liberty ports, giving servicemen 
extralegal and extraterritorial legal privileges within American territory.123 
Race in Liberty Ports—Houston, Chicago, Detroit, LA, Harlem 
 Reconstructing the wartime lives of African-American servicemen remains 
a far more difficult task compared to the well-documented experiences of white 
military men. Military, police, and civic records were all written and documented 
by whites. Aside from a few notable black newspapers, most crime beats were 
covered by white journalists informed by the era’s prevailing racism. Publishers 
provided far more opportunities for white combat soldiers to publish memoirs and 
journals, further exacerbating the dearth of African-American sources. Rape 
accusations and convictions—and subsequent lynchings—against black troops 
were commonly used as a tool to enforce white supremacy. The Army’s weekly 
intelligence summaries commonly dedicated whole sections to the “racial 
situation” and “negro crime,” and these reports are suffused with blatant racism. 
The administrative division of the Military Police kept detailed records of 
individual incidents involving black soldiers and assessed the degree of “racial 
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agitation” occurring in each command area. Once again, these accounts lack the 
perspective of the soldier and their claims of crime cannot be independently 
corroborated. African-American servicemen also likely felt pressure to not 
publicize their activities in liberty ports. While white soldiers could safely recall 
fond memories of carousing in Times Square or cruising along Mission Street, 
individual black veterans were held to the impossible standard of representing 
the moral character of all African-Americans. Reminiscing about bawdy 
adventures in port had to be excluded in favor of the rhetorical power of the 
Double V Campaign. Historians are thus left with few sources, most of which 
were written by whites.124 
 Nevertheless, some indications of how black servicemen navigated liberty 
ports and other stopover cities exist. Like white troops, black men exhibited 
similar desires for women, alcohol, and an escape from the regimentation and 
authoritarianism of military life. Black Marines lusted after “fine-looking girls” and 
“hot-coeds” offering “pussy.” Old hands taunted new recruits upon arrival by 
asking them, “Didja bring your sister?” One marine being “razzed” by older troops 
for wearing a zoot suit responded by boasting about his access to nightlife: “Y’all 
jealous ‘cause I seen the city an’ y’all h’aint.” Black servicemen echoed white 
troops’ obsession with liberty, describing it as a chance “to get back to 
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civilization.” Unlike their white counterparts, however, black troops journey into 
liberty ports required an uncomfortable train ride in “the standing room only aisles 
of the Jim Crow Special.” Despite the inequalities in travel, both white and black 
military men spent their liberty in pursuit of similar goals. Bill Downey, a black 
marine, remembers his first night in D.C. as a “search for easy women.” Time on 
long train rides was spent playing poker, enjoying “bullshit sessions,” and “talking 
about women.” Black troops took particular delight in waving to women “who had 
not been indoctrinated with racism.” These women waved back and “when they 
saw our black faces and Marine uniforms they yelled like cheerleaders.”125 
 In stark contrast to white troops, African-American servicemen regularly 
faced harsh and violent treatment from both military and civilian police forces. 
The uniform often protected white troops from police action even when they 
acted in the most profane and repugnant ways. But when black men put on the 
uniform, they became an even greater target for cops eager to enforce the white 
supremacist order (and perhaps to exercise their own power and masculinity in a 
time where police were despised and disempowered). Yet it was more than just 
the combination of the light olive uniform and black skin that so incensed whites. 
Black troops taking leave in cities became the ultimate threat because they 
were—for that brief period of leave—outside the total control of their white 
commanders. Knowing that these men would possibly be looking for both liquor 
and women only exacerbated the fears of white police, civilians, and military 
                                                     




authorities. Liberty ports quickly emerged as significant conflict zones between 
black servicemen and whites, and attempts to prevent black troops from enjoying 
the urban nightlife fueled a number of riots and violent incidents throughout the 
war. 
African-American servicemen on leave committed three sins in the eyes of 
whites. First, their performance of military identity in public could be seen as 
unpatriotic. Using the war and military service to gain greater freedom and 
access to major urban areas struck whites as disloyal and exploitative behavior. 
Second, black troops were seen as sexual threats to white women, but also as 
sexual competitors for black women desired by white men. Third, groups of black 
servicemen moving through liberty ports threatened both the de facto and de jure 
segregation of many urban spaces. Police, military, and urban officials 
responded by issuing a whole new set of wartime segregation policies, while also 
employing violent tactics aimed at terrorizing black troops taking leave. The 
conflict and brutal hatred that black servicemen faced, however, not only drove 
racial antagonisms within metropolitan centers, but also made African-Americans 
more cognizant of how amusement and access to public space could become 
key political battlegrounds.126 
 From the beginning of the war, civilian and military police forces seemed 
to find common cause in threatening and harassing black troops taking leave. In 
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early 1942, Houston city cops and military police entered bars and taverns in the 
“the heart of the Negro section of [the] city” to taunt and insult the assembled 
black soldiers. The combined police told them that “they were ‘niggers’ and that 
as long as they remained in the South they would be ‘niggers’ and would be 
treated as such.” Soldiers replied that they were not “‘nigger soldiers’ but were 
American soldiers.” One of the cops responded, “You are a nigger soldier if I say 
so,” before threatening to kill them. The police began arresting the men and 
charging them with “inciting to riot.” Upon release the next morning, the cops 
warned one of the soldiers that “he would be arrested everytime he came into 
Houston.” He was arrested later that night for remaining in the city. Other GIs 
reported being forced to exit restaurants, receiving demands that they remove 
their hats when speaking to whites, and suffering beatings with billy clubs. One 
claimed to have almost been blinded after being struck with by an officer. Major 
Smith, the head of military policing in Houston, defended the conduct of Houston 
cops, maintaining that the police could treat black soldiers “in any they wished.” 
The Major went on to claim that when black soldiers entered the city, they were 
under “the authority of city law,” a marked contrast to military commanders who 
frequently asserted the supremacy of military law for white troops. The Chicago 
Defender and NAACP concluded that “a campaign of terror and intimidation is 
being waged against Negro soldiers by civilian and white military police in this 
area,” and they directly protested to the war department’s “Negro advisor” Judge 




a deliberate strategy amongst the police to prevent any black troops from even 
attempting to go to Houston during their leave and liberty. Local commanders 
likely collaborated in this scheme when they took ammunition and firearms away 
from black companies, fearing armed troops entering Houston prepared to 
confront the racist police forces. Nevertheless, the Defender reported that “Negro 
soldiers have brought arms and ammunition to defend themselves if things get 
too hot for them in Houston.”127 
 The War Department investigated the situation and the claims of John H. 
Thompson, the author who wrote the Defender piece. Thompson warned the 
Army about the lack of black MPs who might be able to more effectively police 
black servicemen, while also noting the consistent police brutality that defined GI-
police interactions and the numbers of black northerners apparently 
unaccustomed to such virulent segregation. The specter of riots loomed in the 
mind of Thompson, who recalled the Red Summer riots of 1919 and advised that 
“the present day soldier which we see here, is not taking the abuse the white 
people are placing on them.” If Houston did not learn to “respect the United 
States uniform even though it is worn by a Negro,” then the danger of riots would 
continue to grow. “These soldiers have told me and other newsmen,” Thompson 
advised, “that they are not going to stand for a lot ‘foolishness’ by whites as long 
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as they are in uniform.” Though the War Department acknowledged some of the 
abuses of Houston’s police force and advocated for improved recreation for black 
soldiers, the report mostly justified the prevailing principle of simply segregating 
the black divisions. The report’s author concluded that “negro training camps 
should be widely distributed throughout the country….In other words, suppose 
that negro camps are placed in Arizona or New Mexico and are not located 
adjacent to cities or towns having a substantial negro population.” A recurring 
lack of black MPs only exacerbated the tensions.128  
While police commanders in Houston attempted to simply prevent any and 
all black troops—even black transport drivers delivering important supplies—from 
entering the city, Chicago’s authorities sought to redouble the hypersegregation 
which defined the city’s North-South divide. However, they reinforced the city’s 
racial order in an unexpected way. In July 1942, a Navy lieutenant commander 
declared that much of Chicago’s South Side would be declared off-limits for white 
sailors. Black business owners received notice that they were to bar any white 
sailors from their establishments. Shore patrol officers soon moved in to enforce 
what the Defender labeled an extension of Jim Crow. The SPs began forcibly 
ejecting white sailors from well-known South Side nightspots like the DeLisa. 
White sailors carousing at the Rhumboogie responded by nearly rioting when 
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“Shore police attempted to invade the night club.” Whites would only be allowed 
to frequent White City, an amusement park that had long been segregated, and 
they were required to reach this fun zone only by public transportation. A local 
NAACP branch attorney explained that the order effectively blocked all white 
sailors from South Side’s streets, shops, and nightlife. The NAACP and 
Defender—both fervent supporters of black business that stood to lose significant 
revenue from this action—argued that the order was a form of “discrimination 
based on race or color” against whites. They also rejected the unstated, but 
intended effect of the order to reinforce the de facto ban on black sailors from the 
North Side. This policy of keeping black troops contained within the city’s “negro 
section” became standard policy in other Northern cities as well. For example, in 
New York, black servicemen were expected to remain in Harlem, despite its lack 
of recreation. In Ohio, black infantrymen argued they were kept from enjoying 
liberty because of a burdensome workload: “The mistreated colored servicemen,” 
wrote one GI, “is discriminated, segregated, ridiculed, misjudged and frowned 
upon. He is given, in most cases the hardest dirtiest work in the service and 
during his spare time, if he has the energy left to go to town, he is confronted with 
the same treatment.”129 
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Naval authorities in Chicago framed the ban as an effort “to protect Negro 
women from being approached by white sailors.” Lieutenant Commander Lowe 
even explicitly stated, “We are trying to protect Negro womanhood from 
approaches of white sailors.” Did Chicago’s naval commanders genuinely care 
about the welfare of South Side’s black women? That explanation seems 
dubious. The Navy, however, might have recognized that competition over 
women between white and black men would likely create fierce episodes of racial 
violence. In the Army’s Weekly Intelligence Summaries, officers consistently 
posted reports that “attempts by white soldiers to date Negro women is creating 
resentment among Negroes.” These reports acknowledge instances of white 
MPs and enlisted men accosting and making advances towards black women, 
prompting their black servicemen escorts to physically defend them.130 
Even the rumor of an interracial transgression could be enough to provoke 
city-wide violence in key wartime centers. Detroit played witness to the power of 
race and rumor in June 1943. Although scholars continue to debate the long-term 
causes of the Detroit Riot—the predominant explanation centers on the city’s 
deterioration of public services and housing, as well as overcrowding—the 
conflict between black and white was sparked by rumors of military men 
committing acts of racial violence. In the summer’s heat, white Detroiters spread 
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wild rumors of black men who “slit a white soldier’s throat and raped his 
girlfriend,” while Detroit’s African-American residents passed on stories of white 
sailors throwing a black woman and child off a bridge into the Detroit River. 
Investigators later dragged the river, but discovered no bodies. When the riot 
began though, stories of interracial conflict involving servicemen formed key 
parts of the narrative. Brawling, looting, and firefights soon spread outward from 
Belle Isle Park as black Detroiters, white sailors, and police—and later soldiers—
battled for three days, leaving 34 dead, hundreds wounded, and the U.S. Army 
occupying the shattered streets. Only a day before Detroit’s riot, black and white 
troops had exchanged gunfire at Camp Stewart in Georgia after a white man was 
accused of assaulting a black soldier’s wife, leaving four dead and many 
wounded.131 
Questions over who could control access to both women and public 
spaces—and the way rumor could inflame existing tensions—would be repeated 
in Los Angeles with the Zoot Suit Riots, as well as Harlem’s riot over a black MP 
shot by a white policeman. For five days in June 1943, white marines and sailors 
went to war against the Mexican-American zoot suiters and pachucos in the 
streets of Los Angeles. Reacting to the zoot suit uniform—with its gleeful disdain 
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for wartime regulations and challenge to the servicemen’s uniform—and the 
perceived threat of young, non-white men competing for women, LA’s military 
men stormed into the city to repeatedly and ritualistically beat the zoot suiters, 
strip them, and then tear their suits apart. Hordes of servicemen and civilian 
spectators watched as they marched through Main Street with liquor and clubs at 
hand. Troops chanted, “We’ll destroy every zoot suit in Los Angeles County 
before this is over.” Eventually, the Navy issued a temporary ban on sailors 
entering Los Angeles for liberty. Newspapers and officials mostly blamed the 
zoot-suiters, and city officials claimed they would be more vigilant in keeping 
juveniles off the streets at night. The LA Times concluded, “Those gamin 
dandies, the zoot suiters, having learned a great moral lesson from servicemen, 
mostly sailors, who took over their instruction three days ago, are staying home.” 
Weeks later in Harlem, the Defender reported that a white policeman’s possibly 
unlawful attempt to arrest a black women blew up when a black MP attempted to 
intervene by striking the cop. The policeman then turned and fired on the MP. As 
news of the MP’s death reached Harlem, reality quickly fused with rumor. Locals 
heard that a cop killed a black soldier in front of his own mother—a false 
narrative that nevertheless captured just how little value white officials placed on 
the lives of black men who served their country. Crowds formed, windows were 
shattered, fires blazed, and riot squads rushed in. By the end of the night, six 
citizens lay dead and hundreds were wounded. Riots, fights, and protests would 




privileges of liberty ports and black communities strived for greater access to the 
freedoms the U.S. claimed it was fighting for.132 
V-J Day 
The mythic view of wartime romance and a safe home front was ironically 
founded on perhaps the most dangerous instance of troop crime in liberty ports: 
V-J Day. San Francisco’s Peace Day Riots—almost completely unknown to both 
academics and the public—proved the most destructive and deadly, but other 
liberty ports experienced similar outbreaks of coerced kissing, assault, and 
looting. The War Department anticipated that victory over Germany and Japan 
would likely bring dangerous revelry to American cities. The Department 
requested that the Army and Navy augment their police forces in advance of the 
celebrations, and asked military authorities to lobby governors and other state 
officials to implement a 24-hour ban on the sale of alcohol. While the report spent 
considerable time worrying about the possible reactions of Japanese-Americans 
and “the colored races,” it also recognized the “large numbers of military and 
naval personnel [who] will be on leave, pass, or furlough, particularly in the 
metropolitan areas.” “It is possible,” the Department noted, “that the actions of 
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such personnel during an impromptu celebration might react to the detriment of 
the service as a whole.” The Army also prepared some troops for riot duty and 
readied the auxiliary military police. The War Department’s report accepted that 
disorders and riots were likely, and vowed that the burden of policing would fall 
on local cops and state guard forces. In this sense, the memo was both a plan for 
preparation and a way of preemptively shifting blame to state governments.133  
 In Boston, Army officials wisely moved to confine all soldiers to bases for 
two days after learning of Japan’s surrender, though some GIs managed to 
sneak out of camps. Store owners, now well aware of the dangers of carousing 
sailors, hurriedly boarded up their shop windows to prevent vandalism and 
looting. Boston’s Police Chief mobilized all 2000 municipal cops, while calling in 
auxiliaries and MPs. Nearby Cambridge, Medford, and Falmouth banned all 
sales of alcohol for 24 hours. The Navy was less cooperative, giving liberty to 
sailors in New England’s naval district. Bars and liquor stores in Boston shipped 
in huge quantities of liquor to profit off the coming celebrations, though perhaps 
these proprietors also realized that servicemen would loot the booze if it was not 
willingly provided. By night, Boston’s downtown turned “into a joyous madhouse” 
as “pent-up tension…exploded like a giant firecracker.” 750,000 people coursed 
into downtown Boston with “soldiers and sailors dominat[ing] the throngs” to 
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celebrate “a dozen New Year’s Eves rolled into one.” Car horns, church bells, 
Chinatown torpedoes, and fire sirens blared out across Tremont, Washington, 
and Boylston. In Southie, mobs of people marched out into the streets banging 
dishpans. Huge bonfires blazed throughout the Common, Public Garden, and the 
North End, while hundreds of sailors climbed and joyrode fire engine ladders. 
The bars and taverns became packed with overload crowds while each man 
spilling onto the street “had a bottle containing his favorite beverage.” Bostonians 
rolled beer kegs and barrels of wine onto street corners, as the city enjoyed the 
delirious “bedlam” that came with peace.134 
“When the excitement really got under way,” one Globe reporter noted, 
“servicemen—and again sailors seemed to dominate the picture—began the 
interesting game of trying to kiss every pretty girl they saw.” Compelled mass 
kissing of women became the hallmark of V-J Day across the nation, with every 
sailor being “entitled to at least one kiss.” Well into the second day of “tumult,” 
the Globe reported “Sailors still kissing girls as holiday roars on.” Servicemen 
sometimes demanded more than a simple kiss. At “the orgy of kissing” around 
Tremont and Boylston, sailors were reported picking up girls, tearing off their 
skirts, and then waving their prizes like flags. “Uncooperative” women who 
refused to be kissed were grabbed by “exuberant sailors” and then “flung” into 
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the Common’s frog pond as the men chanted, “No kiss, then kerplunk!” Women 
familiar with the behavior of furloughed soldiers who “sort of got out of hand” 
knew to avoid certain areas. Alison Arnold, the Herald society editor recalled that 
“young ladies were more or less advised to keep away from Scollay Square.” 
Civilian men and servicemen also fought throughout the region. In New Bedford, 
civilians and soldiers exchanged blows in the city center, sparking a riot involving 
100 people. State Guardsmen, police, and Shore Patrol armed with bayonets 
and tear gas managed to restore order after two hours of fighting in the streets. 
Throughout the Boston area, several died and hundreds were injured throughout 
the raucous “victory whoopee.”135  
In Los Angeles, thousands of “gobs, G.I.’s, gyrenes, [and] Coast 
Guardsmen” took to the downtown streets for “street kisses” as the “growing roar 
of sirens and whistles” marked the Allied victory. “Masses of humanity” 
overflowed into Pershing Square and Main Street intermixing in the confetti snow 
and “the carnival spirit.” Autos were smashed by the surging crowds of 
servicemen, while liquor stores were busted open before police could arrive. 
Other men began “jerking trolleys from the wires” sparking fires. Throughout the 
night, fights broke out between men and “servicemen kissed every pretty girl they 
met.” Key thoroughfares were blocked by raging streetfires fed by the “paper 
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strewing the streets.” Altogether, 8 people died—mainly in traffic accidents—and 
hundreds were treated for injuries ranging from gunshot wounds to firecracker 
burns. The police, who marshaled their entire force after learning of Japan’s 
surrender, took a “good-natured” approach to the celebrations, allowing drinking 
and coerced kissing, while trying to prevent “robberies and drunk-rollings.” They, 
and other police forces, having seen the disorder and violence committed by 
servicemen during the war “contented themselves with the philosophy: ‘It could 
have been worse.’”136 
Despite the violence, rioting, and sexual coercion that marked V-J Day, 
and all the wartime chaos in liberty ports that had preceded it, only one scene 
has managed to gain a foothold in most Americans’ memory of the home front: 
Alfred Eisenstaedt’s “Kissing Sailor.” For the public, it became a romantic token 
of postwar America’s relief and promise as it moved from “the Good War” to the 
Cold War. Yet the photo actually captures a drunken sailor, George Mendonsa, 
forcibly accosting and kissing a dental nurse running the gauntlet which women 
faced on nightly basis in wartime ports. Eisenstaedt’s series of photos reveal her 
attempts to struggle free of his control and prevent her dress from being yanked 
up by the man overpowering her. Greta Friedman, the women in the photo, 
recalled “I couldn’t speak. I mean somebody much bigger than you and much 
stronger, where you’ve lost control of yourself, I’m not sure that makes you 
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happy.” In another interview she maintained, “It wasn’t my choice to be kissed. 
The guy just came over and grabbed!”137 
 Over 2,000,000 crowded into Times Square and another 500,000 
marched to Coney Island, with police making no effort to stop the groups of 
sailors and soldiers moving in. Men strung up effigies of Hirohito and Hitler and 
crashed the “champagne parties” on Broadway’s bars and dance halls. PM’s 
man called it “the wildest, loudest, gayest, drunkest, kissingest hell-for-leather 
celebration the big town has ever seen.” Police stood by, as “showers of confetti 
and streamers fell in abundance,” watching the “service men exact[ing] kisses 
from strolling girls as tribute for their part in the victory.” Indeed, “kissing became 
a popular and public pastime” with sailors taking firm hold of nearby women. One 
woman, seized by a kissing soldier, yelled, “I’m Married! I’m Married!” The “gob” 
replied, “Well tell your husband this is with the compliments of the Third Division.” 
One nurse who “wanted to be part of the celebration” soon found herself 
“retreat[ing] into the next opening of the subway” because of “amorous sailor[s].” 
The Times’ Alexander Feinberg reported, “one girl, her lipstick smeared, 
marched down the street indignant. ‘They don’t ask a girl’s permission—can I 
kiss you?—they just grab,’ she said.”138 
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Over the next two days the fire brigades struggled to put out the 275 fires 
burning throughout the city. The hospitals overflowed as 6 people died and 
nearly a thousand suffered injuries. Servicemen looted liquor stores, brawled, 
and reveled in the streets. All the while, women and other civilians, as they had 
throughout the war, attempted to negotiate the presence of military men in port.  
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Chapter Three: Women Face the Uniform 
In a wartime environment defined by the upending of law and growing problems 
policing all the newcomers swarming into cities, women were often left to protect 
themselves, even as they increasingly left their homes for work and other 
activities. Constant risks and even mortal dangers lurked when military men 
came to town. Every trip out, every step on the street threatened to become a 
humiliating ordeal or frightening trial. But in the wake of the disorder troops often 
created, women also took advantage of the changes visited upon urban hubs of 
production and transit. Wives, workers in the flourishing defense industries, 
enlisted WACS and WAVES, or con-women and others profiting off the vice 
trade—all experienced life in liberty ports as a contradictory time defined by the 
immense danger, but also sometimes the new possibilities, posed by 
servicemen. 
Military mobilization created whole new economic, sexual, and social 
opportunities for the women who flocked to defense plants for work and 
downtowns for fun. Even housewives uncovered ingenious ways to enjoy the 
town, and seize greater control over their lives. The Army’s WACS (Women’s 
Auxiliary Corps) and the Navy’s WAVES (Women Accepted for Voluntary 
Emergency Service) discovered that like their male counterparts, they could 
leverage their military privileges to carouse and avoid consequences. B-girls—
short for bad-girls or bar-girls—and con-women developed innovative ways of 




economy that fed off the government wages of the military and armament 
industries.  
 This expansion of opportunities for women does not negate the fear, 
harassment, and violence that so many experienced. But in examining the 
negotiations, responses, and tactics undertaken by women in these hubs, 
historians can gain a far more complete portrait of their lives on the home front. 
The history of American women during World War II is filled with narratives about 
liberation in the defense factory, bittersweet goodbyes, and U.S.O. dances. Other 
stories depict how women became targets of the government’s obsession with 
venereal disease. Those histories are not wrong. They miss, however, what the 
war worker did with her money, or how women worked to find romance in a 
period of unchecked rape, and how wives managed a marriage separated more 
by time and jealousy than distance. For many women, the war was not just a 
story of working and waiting. It was also a time to take part in a mixture of 
rebellion, accommodation, experimentation, and repression that brought women 
into direct contact and conflict with American and Allied servicemen.139 
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 “Uniform Crazy” 
Despite a growing reputation for aggressive conduct, sailors—and to a 
lesser degree, GIs—were seen as exciting and desirable. Pearl Schiff’s 
bestselling and scandalous portrait of wartime Boston, Scollay Square, offers a 
compelling and detailed look into how women saw men in uniform as rugged, 
sexy, and powerful. The novel focuses on Beth, a respectable woman from 
upper-class Beacon Hill, and Jerry, a rough, hard-drinking sailor taking furlough 
in Boston’s cheap amusements quarter of Scollay Square. When Beth first meets 
Jerry she immediately gazes at his “impressive shoulders, wide and muscular 
under that taut fabric of the blouse” and his towering, 6-foot stature. Beth also 
notices another sailor looking marvelous in “his trim naval lieutenant’s uniform. 
His body was lean and well-proportioned, his skin a healthy tan.”140  
Other genres reinforced similar themes and images. Musical comedies 
like Two Girls and a Sailor (1944) depicted Navymen as attractive and charming, 
but also as “racy, sly, and wistful.” Popular films—many adopted from stage 
musicals—like Victor Shertzinger’s The Fleet’s In (1942), H. Bruce 
Humberstone’s Iceland (1942), Gene Kelly’s On The Town (1944 musical 
followed by a 1949 film), George Sidney’s Anchors Aweigh (1945), and Hal 
Walker’s Sailor Beware (1952) featured sailors as handsome, hopeless 
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romantics, but also coy and possibly lonely, longing for a girl. Other women 
hoped for the kind of liberty-born romance captured by Judy Garland and Robert 
Walker in The Clock (1945). Some likely found such romance in real life.141 
More often though, troops were depicted as tough paragons of 
masculinity—physically intimidating, but also warm and comforting because of 
this macho presence. In Schiff’s Scollay Square, Jerry’s imposing stature is both 
threatening and reassuring at the same time. Small actions like Jerry placing his 
sturdy arms around Beth’s small waist to steady her against a harsh gust of wind 
slowly build the sense of strength and security Beth associates with the uniform. 
Schiff regularly describes Jerry’s tough, weathered hands wrapping around 
Beth’s tiny hips and roughly pulling her towards him for an embrace or kiss. For 
Beth, his tight, even forceful grip becomes “strangely comforting.” Jerry’s forearm 
tattoo—Josephine, a nude dancing girl that he makes move with each clench of 
his fist—becomes a physical symbol of his virility and association with the taboo. 
Beth enjoys “the easy way the blasphemies rolled off his tongue. After all, he was 
a sailor.” But a sailor’s appeal could also come from the rare instances of 
vulnerability and loneliness that women perceived in moments of intimacy. 
Women routinely lusted after the deep, colorful eyes of servicemen which might 
betray their softer side. When Jerry softly brushes Beth’s hair, she stares into his 
brown pupils and watches as “the flames in his eyes bobbed and curtsied at her.” 
After Beth tells Jerry of her paraplegic soldier brother, his voice becomes “kind, 
                                                     




gentle, full of understanding.” Unlike the civilians in her life, Jerry can understand 
the perils of combat and how it can destroy a man and his family. The military 
man then, was not just a brawny, sexy hunk, but also a reassuring and 
empathetic figure.142 
Perhaps the most unsettling, but recurring theme of wartime romance, is 
the desire of women to have their military dates take charge or even force them 
into sex. For the first two months of their relationship, Beth refuses to go all the 
way even as Jerry increases the amount of pressure and physical force. As the 
sexual tension builds between Beth and Jerry she thinks to herself, “Oh God. I 
want him. I wish he’d force me so I wouldn’t have to decide.” At other times Jerry 
kisses Beth “fiercely, angrily.” When they have sex for the first time, Beth 
dreamily remembers “upon her body his hands had been strong and 
uncompromising, breaking down resistance.” After this first instance of rough, 
forceful sex, Beth throbs “with desire for the feel of his skin and the taut muscles 
under it and the outline of bone under that.” Another character, Emily, enjoys a 
similar dynamic with the sailors she picks up, playing a game of consent and 
power. After a night of drinking and flirting, Emily reveled in the sense of power 
she had “to carry things just as far as she wanted and to stop them where she 
wanted.” She could happily let “a sailor rub up against her in a doorway” with the 
safety of knowing that she could still say no and escape. This game was 
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“exciting, intoxicating, dangerous fun.” This desire for a strange kind of 
consensual force or aggressive seduction may have been a strategy that women 
employed to overcome social and religious pressure to avoid premarital sex or 
casual encounters. If the man simply overpowered his date, then she would be 
blameless for the subsequent moral transgression. These desires fall into the 
“rape fantasy” genre or perhaps more accurately, the “forced seduction fantasy” 
that first appeared in the romance novels of the Victorian era, continued with the 
“bodice ripper” category of pulp fiction, and then became even more popular in 
the 1970s after the publication of Nancy Friday’s My Secret Garden.143 
The uniform drew women in precisely because it could mean so many 
different and contradictory things at the same time. For some, the man in uniform 
promised grand passion. He was an exotic lothario ready to sweep a woman off 
her feet. One of Schiff’s female characters spends time fantasizing about “that 
intense, dark sailor lounging near the subway entrance.” Another longs for a 
chance romance with a wholesome boy next door, or “the shy blond kid” who 
made a clumsy, but charming advance.144 
Many women echoed the themes of novels and films when they confessed 
to being “uniform-crazy” and to lusting after “the handsomest thing you ever saw 
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in his uniform.”145 Civilian groups, such as the War Camp Community Service 
(WCCS), a secular aid organization, worried about “the problem of the young girl” 
in the vicinity of soldiers and sailors and hoped to persuade women to be more 
careful around servicemen, all the while tacitly admitting that little could be done 
to adjust the behavior of the draftees. With the surge of thousands of men into 
sleepy communities near bases, WCCS members argued, women and girls 
would succumb to “the lure of the khaki.” Seeing uniformed men, these young 
women would become “thrilled to pieces” and so excited that she could not be 
trusted to her own “chaperonage.” The WCCS explained that the attractive, 
friendly woman believed “everything in uniform is a hero to her,” but then 
cautioned that in reality “everything in uniform is not a hero” and the men would 
be “quick to offer advances.”146 
Despite these admonitions and potential threats, many young women and 
girls eagerly sought out dates with troops. Appearing before a Senate 
subcommittee, Dr. William Healey, a children’s mental health expert, emphasized 
that “the adolescent girl quite normally tells herself that a serviceman, for 
instance, is entitled to all the pleasures she can give him before he goes off to 
war.” One 17-year-old girl from New York admitted that “you read and hear much 
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about young girls walking arm in arm with sailors and soldiers,” and that the 
public blamed the girls for “promiscuous sex relations, venereal disease and 
pregnancy.” Another girl argued “many girls go out with a soldier or sailor just 
because of the excitement of it. But most of the girls run away if the guys try to 
get fresh.” But several other girls disagreed that these youthful dates of 
servicemen maintained such control. One teenage girl explained “many of the 
girls don’t realize what they are doing because they are taken into bars and given 
drinks, and most of them never had any liquor before. Then they get drunk and 
before they know it they are doing something they would not be likely to do 
otherwise.” A Baltimore boy suggested that the police start actually cracking 
down on bars that served these girls and he asked, “Why don’t the Army and 
Navy instruct sailors and soldiers to stop leading girls astray, to stop taking 
advantage of the silly, stupid ones who fall for their line and think it’s glamorous 
to be a Victory girl?”147  
The Army khaki or Naval blue sometimes reminded girls and women of 
husbands, brothers, or fathers, drawing them to potentially risky dates. Spending 
time with a uniformed man offered an opportunity to comfort one’s “husband by 
proxy.” But uniforms were also standard issue—something mass produced and 
given to men mobilized by the millions. which encouraged women to see the GI 
as a classless, regionless totem of security and state sanctioned romance. The 
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serviceman’s anonymity also provided women a soft escape or semi-departure 
from the moral and religious norms of their communities. Precisely because 
military men were often on the move, they held the promise of short and sweet 
relationships or even casual sex. After such a fling, the soldier or sailor could 
simply disappear back into the crowds of khaki and blue.148  
Women sometimes banded together to “adopt” a “lonesome” sailor—an 
image popularized by musical and films—by sending him pictures and letters. 
The Navy even went so far as to warn “well-meaning but misinformed…Juliets of 
unknown vintage” that most sailors were not suffering from “lonely hearts.” These 
proclamations could not tamp down female fascination with uniformed men. In 
1944, 2,500 “Miss Manhattans” flocked to “dance and jitterbug” with “GI Joes” 
and “shy” sailors “on a moonlight patch” in Central Park. Papers wrote up page-
one stories like “‘Cinderella’ Finds Her Bill the Sailor,” where a down-on-her-luck 
girl, lost in the city, found a kind, handsome sailor to marry her. By the end of the 
column, “she was the happiest girl in the world.” Some young women, taken in by 
the “lure of the uniform,” would end up assisting their beau’s misbehavior. At Fort 
Jackson’s hospital in South Carolina, young women began sneaking alcohol into 
wards filled with recovering soldiers. They concealed the liquor in handbags and 
packages and, claimed an angry mother, could not stop “running after the 
soldiers.” One young nurse’s aide—after being warned about her troubled and 
                                                     




irresponsible soldier boyfriend—thought, “He was a soldier. He could not be 
anything but a marvelous, magnificent human being.”149 
Some simply enjoyed the opportunity to sample men with a chance for fun 
and romance. Dellie Hahne, a substitute teacher, stated that “a young woman 
had a chance to meet hundreds of men in the course of one or two weeks, more 
than she would in her entire lifetime, because of the war. Life became a series of 
weekend dates.” Going out during wartime meant heading “into bars and 
drinking,” and romancing troops, a near civic duty, made this activity more 
acceptable for women. Others remembered going to a nightclub to see a 
“striptease,” or getting “mixed up…drinking and running around.” Workers said 
that they “wanted to live…wanted to dance…wanted to go out.” Some spent too 
much time “drinkin’,” leading them to take No-Doz tablets or to nap in the 
bathroom for 15 minutes during their shift. At Lockheed, young women workers 
almost revolted when the social clubs closed because of electricity shortages. 
The GI or sailor about to depart also proved a recurring temptation for married 
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women, and some fantasized about getting “toujours gai” with a comforting, but 
roguish officer.150 
 Many war workers seized opportunities to transgress sexual boundaries 
and enjoy their chance to date multiple men. While this willingness to see 
multiple men may have driven troops to be more aggressive and possessive, 
women found ways to take advantage of the situation. One riveter remembered 
all the “boots” she could meet in Portland, OR, remarking, “Gee, there was no 
lack of knowing men, for goodness sakes. I was right at the source of supply—
and whoopie! You’d wade in barefoot and have a great time.” Another single 
woman remembered that she had “boyfriends in the service” and wrote to “three 
or four different fellows” using the same letter. Because troops were only present 
for short periods of leave, one worker explained that she would “concentrate 
mostly on what could be done” and resist getting tied down to one man. 
Servicemen often attempted to marry girlfriends or get them to promise to marry 
when they returned. Yet women demonstrated a willingness to ignore these 
demands. Margarita Salazar McSweyn rebuffed constant pleadings from her 
service boyfriend: “We would see each other and he would pressure me to get 
married. Then I wouldn’t see him and I’d see other fellows, and he’d see other 
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girls and he’d go his merry way….He knew that I was going out, but he also was 
doing it, so why not?”151 
The quick turnover of troops meant that encounters could be brief, 
pushing women to meet more men. One worker described this dynamic saying, 
“Most of the fellows that I knew, by 1943 were gone in three days or in a week. I 
mean they were just gone! The next thing you’d get a letter with just a PO 
number.” Other women, like Marilyn Renner of Iowa, worried that too many men 
were marrying abroad, dooming her and others to “spinsterhood and lives of 
loneliness.” Writing to The Sydney Daily Telegraph, she asked that they do all 
they could “to prevent marriages between United States soldiers and Australian 
girls.” Women in coastal centers of production, however, did not suffer similar 
absences of available men. Jean Bartlett—who started seeing sailors and 
soldiers in the Bay Area at age 14—described how she went “through fifty or 
hundred” servicemen, eventually failing to “keep track of what they looked like. 
They were just coming through this revolving door of my life.” Bartlett claimed to 
be “engaged fourteen times” and later reflected that “the war absolutely ruined 
me. The more men I had, the more my ego was fed. I had no attachments at 
all.”152 
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 The war also meant that women would get a chance to meet men from 
outside their neighborhoods and social circles, and even indulge in the exotic. 
Allied soldiers could be particularly tempting. Women quickly found sport in trying 
to distinguish one uniform from another. “In the metropolitan war centers like 
New York, San Francisco, New Orleans, Toronto, Montreal, the gamut of 
uniforms is bewildering,” explained one married woman, “On their streets of a 
fine Saturday afternoon one can see the uniforms of Britain, the United States, 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Free French Navy, airmen of 
the Royal Norwegian Air Force and the Royal Netherlands Air Force, Dutch 
Marines from Java, six-foot Polish officers with orange tabs and their curious 
square-cut caps.” Women shared sodas, dated, and married Australian merchant 
marines, with the Los Angeles Times declaring, “Australian lads who lost their 
lovely lasses to Yankee doughboys find at least a measure of consolation—one 
of their number has claimed a pretty American girl as his bride.” Women 
expressed a particular preference for Scottish troops: “When you get into the 
tartans and kilts of the Scottish regiments the thing becomes a whirl, although 
you’d give your eyeteeth to have your beau show up in kilts and a balmoral, so 
outrageously handsome would it make him look.” Observers in marriage license 




his pompommed, cap-topped presence proof that a strange country and a 
strange language are no bars to romance.”153 
Other women used the U.S.O.—United Service Organizations—to pursue 
their own desires. Most U.S.O. hostesses were in their late teens and early 20s, 
unmarried, and quite often looking to meet men. The military fingerprinted each 
hostess and demanded personal references. Romance was officially 
discouraged, but women routinely went out with soldiers and married them. One 
hostess explained, “I’m supposed to be doing this for patriotism, but frankly I’ve 
never had so much fun in my life.” “Center girls”—essentially the Servicemen’s 
center’s equivalent of U.S.O. hostesses—flocked to the clubs so they could chat, 
dance, and flirt with men from all the Allied forces. One center girl, Lois Brown, 
scoffed at “the idea that girls go to the center for purely patriotic reasons.” 
Instead, she did it to have “a good time—she loves to dance and it’s fun following 
the lead of a boy from Brooklyn who does the Lindy Hop, a coast guardsman 
from Michigan who waltzes, or a sailor in the Queen’s navy who does some 
strange gyration akin to the Lambeth Walk.”154 
Women sometimes mimicked the tactic of “treating” that turn-of-the 
century working-girls used to buy a good time. Here, a girl or young women 
hoping to see a film, head to an amusement park, go dancing, or get a drink 
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offered the implied promise of romance or sexual favors in exchange for the man 
footing the bill. Rather than rotting away at home, the women in Schiff’s Scollay 
Square reason that they ought to enjoy the pleasures of the city. One character 
figures “if she wanted to see a movie she got a feller to take her. So if he slipped 
a hand under her sweater to make it worth while, what the hell? At least she was 
out of the house. At least she was having fun.”155 
Servicemen’s wives also found fun and temptation, defying established 
social norms and encroaching boredom. Wives remembered being “blighted [by] 
evenings with bores” and “crazy to get out and around with a man of your 
choice.” War wives argued that they now existed in a social netherworld: “We 
woman are neither wives nor widows and are therefore a kind of social nothings,” 
wrote an Army wife, “We are the abandoned wives and the world expects us to 
stop living and lie quietly on the shelf until our men come home and dust us off.” 
Many women agreed that remaining cooped up would be impossible. Though 
married women would likely face the whispered rumors and disapproving glances 
of neighbors, many still went out. One servicemen’s wife wrote that “the 
neighbors sit behind their curtains with field glasses to see who goes in and out 
of the home.” Middle-class wives in big cities also found value in a world without 
husbands. Full control of the pocketbook and a need to be self-reliant could be 
fulfilling. “Majordomos without portfolio, they pay the bills, pay the insurance, pay 
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the taxes,” wrote Nancy MacLennan in the NYT Sunday Magazine, “They mix the 
cocktails for a party, draw the Extra Man at dinner. Alone, they name the baby.” 
These women found work, new circles of friends, and education at lectures, 
exhibits, and plays. MacLennan concluded, “The lonely wife admits she is 
becoming more ‘capable,’ more ‘resourceful.’”156 
Providing entertainment for troops constituted a state-sanctioned way for 
young women and wives to interact with men who were not their husbands. 
Guides advised wives to volunteer at the local U.S.O., though unmarried women 
were still imagined to be more suited for the role. Married women also joined 
hobby clubs and recreation committees charged with organizing troop 
entertainment. These committees charged wives with “trying to get the 
unattached girls attached to the timid boys,” while also giving them opportunities 
to dance themselves. To mitigate the idea that dancing with other men 
constituted a dangerous temptation, guides preached confidence and a feeling of 
security in one’s marriage. Dancing with troops was additionally thought of as a 
useful preventative measure. If wives could dance and entertain men in a well 
ordered and supervised U.S.O. event, they would avoid more tempting situations 
and proposals. Boston’s hostesses found that conga lines and jitterbugging with 
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scores of marines and sailors was regarded as perfectly acceptable provided it 
was overseen by well-established neighborhood organizations.157 
 When military men hit port, they brought fun, dancing, dating, even 
romance and sex. But, as many women quickly discovered, they would also bring 
challenges, anxieties, and dangers. 
“So Your Husband’s Gone to War!” 
Wives’ attempts to maintain their marriages offers an instructive view of 
how liberty ports both constrained and expanded women’s social lives. Although 
only 8% of women were actually married to servicemen, these “war wives” 
exercised an outsized influence on the politics of infidelity and debates about 
women’s roles on the home front in general. Ethel Gorham—writer of So Your 
Husband’s Gone to War! (1942), one of the most influential guides for war 
wives—told their story. She became a kind of Emily Post for the middle-class war 
wife, dispensing advice on appearance, letter writing, and travel, while also 
issuing cheerfully worded warnings about the dangers posed by wartime city 
streets. Her guidebook, full of interviews and field observations, offers a rare look 
into the predicaments of military wives.158 
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Wives tried to use liberty and furlough visits—the “Week-End Marriage”—
to maintain the health of their partnerships and the loyalty of their husbands. 
Because women never knew how many of these visits they might get, they 
placed immense importance on making them perfect occasions. Gorham 
counseled her readers that the short furlough presented “a kind of microcosm of 
your marriage,” an opportunity “to gather up all the loose ends of your life and try 
to knit them together without dangerous stitches that may one day run.” Though 
wives saw this as much more than a simple opportunity to have sex, friends and 
acquaintances often reduced these visits to nothing more. Gorham asked if other 
wives had been “embarrassed by people who drool and leer when they hear 
you’re to see your husband?” Too often, wives were “made to feel like the 
forthcoming participant in a Polish wedding ceremony where all the family and 
friends remain close by to cheer the bride right into her marriage bed.” This 
constant gossip and planning, however, offers a reminder that troops never fully 
left—leave and furloughs remained a recurring part of life on the home front.159  
Preparing for leave and furloughs formed a key activity in the lives of war 
wives. Maintaining one’s beauty and appearance became critical. Women 
seemed to understand that their husbands would romanticize their appearance 
while in the barracks, and this heightened the pressure to “wow” the furloughed 
husband. As men endured the petty annoyances and dangers of military life, 
many coped by describing the beautiful “girl he left behind.” After weeks 
                                                     




obsessing over a wife’s beauty, the husband’s mental image “suffered no 
chapped skin or excess weight or frowsy hair.” Soldiers failed to account for the 
hardships of the home front and would not “excuse a sloppy figure or broken 
nails or a scalp in search of stimulation.” “What a glamorous creature you would 
be,” Gorham concluded, “if you only looked half as pretty as the man at the front 
remembers you.”160 
Guides advised that a poor appearance or a decline in beauty regimen 
could drastically increase the potential of infidelity. Wives were warned that they 
would need to look enchanting if they hoped to pass the “once-over.” Staying fit 
required vigilance as it would be the first thing a husband noticed. “Fat is the 
most obvious disfigurement,” noted Gorham. Woman’s columnist Antoinette 
Donnelly offered similar advice. She warned that since their husbands had left, 
wives had begun to gain weight, failed to maintain their nails, and grown lazy. 
She counseled war wives that “if you neglect your appearance, there will come a 
time you may regret it….A good motto to keep before you is: ‘When he comes 
home, he’s going find a more attractive women. So help me!’” Pressure mounted 
when wives saw that their husbands were now slimmer, fit, and dashing in their 
uniforms. If women didn’t “want to be taken for the dowdy elder sister, or even—
heaven forbid—for his young-looking mother, you’ll have to follow a regime to 
compensate for his.” Women ought to wear something familiar rather than chic—
something he could easily remember from the days before the war. A lasting, 
                                                     




beautiful image was the main bulwark against a husband falling prey to 
temptations in port. The burden of keeping husbands happy and faithful fell on 
the wife, but they also needed to avoid coming across as jealous.161 
Even with a successful week-end marriage, wives and girlfriends 
sometimes experienced recurring fears, loneliness, and anxiety. When husbands 
left to serve, wives realized the strains that would be put upon their marriages. 
From the moment the draft notice arrived, women reported a simultaneous dread 
and desire to ignore the coming change. Thinking about the inevitable departure 
of their husbands was like “the contemplation of death,” according to Gorham.162 
Beyond the threat of losing their husband to grievous wounds, capture, or 
death, wives reported an encroaching loneliness and sense of abandonment. 
The New York Times called them “the loneliest women in America.” Wives feared 
a daunting “lonely and endless” daily routine. The Chicago Daily Tribune reported 
that “wives argue they’re lonely, and no doubt many of them are, lonelier than 
they ever were.” Yet women’s writers warned wives to avoid boredom, and even 
blamed them for their feelings of loneliness. “What is loneliness, continued 
loneliness?” asked Doris Blake, “It’s a self-centeredness, inertia, the will to 
victimize oneself.” Wives ought to pursue “work, study, and personal 
advancement….They may not cure loneliness, but they remove the sharp edges 
of it.” Besides, some wives argued, husbands moving into service had to take on 
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“the strain of a new environment,” “the discomfort of sharing your privacy with a 
thousand others,” and “the tastelessness of official food, official clothing, official 
lock step.” “If you’re going to feel sorry for anyone,” Gorham concluded, “you 
ought to feel more sorry for your husband than you do for yourself.”163 
Loneliness created temptations, as did time away. Both husbands and 
wives confronting the intransigent reality of a war often came to see it as a time 
of hiatus. For sweethearts, infidelity, and fears of infidelity, flourished. Troops 
feared the “Dear John” letters and male civilians who might be trying to take their 
place at home, and sometimes violently deterred or punished unfaithful conduct. 
At the same time, they obsessed over the other women they imagined would be 
waiting for them when they hit town. 
Indeed, even as military husbands fantasized about carousing in port, they 
issued warnings to their spouses. An Army Chaplain declared, “Any service 
man’s wife who is playing around here with another man is about the lowest thing 
I know. And about the next lowest thing I know is that man who plays around with 
her.” Before departing, one Navy Ensign told his fiancée, “I don’t want you going 
out with other men.” In Brooklyn, a sailor with the Merchant Marine—“prompted 
by jealousy”—fatally stabbed his wife, sister-in-law, and others after she failed to 
answer his questions about her faithfulness. Civilian men likewise forcefully and 
sometimes violently opposed affairs. One husband viciously stabbed his wife 
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after she confessed her love for a soldier. He then knifed the soldier attempting 
to save the wife. Women also condemned unfaithful wives. Opera singer Grace 
Moore recommended that each adulterous women “should have her head 
shaved forthwith as a mark of shame and disgrace.” She went on to blame these 
women for “driving their men into the arms of women of Europe.”164  
Government officials also raised the specter of wives who in their infidelity, 
proved themselves disloyal to both their husbands and the war effort. Agents of 
the state used social pressure, but also judicial and legislative power to punish 
women suspected of adultery. Presiding over a petty officer’s divorce case, 
Circuit court Judge Julius H. Miner declared that unfaithful wives sinned against 
both their husbands and the military, damaging both morale and morality: “In time 
of war it is wicked and ignoble that the wife of a man in military service should 
invite illicit association of another in our fighting forces. She thereby undermines 
the morale of her husband and corrupts the morals of her paramour.” Labeling 
these women “nonessential wives,” the Judge railed against those women who 
“demoralize the home front and impede the prosecution of the war. National 
welfare demands their divorcement.” Beyond granting more divorces, other 
officials tried to use shame and even prosecution to prevent “the disillusionment 
of the returning soldier” who found “his wife living with another man.” One States 
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Attorney—railing against the “dark side of the civilian picture” and “the cheater 
wives” who had yielded to “moral weakness and cupidity”—declared that he 
would criminally prosecute adulterous wives to deter “these unsavory situations.” 
“Flagrantly fraudulent wives” would also face “public disapproval and 
punishment…through the initiative of the State.” House Representative Dewey 
Short went on to declare that immoral women were “marrying soldiers” and that 
“harlots [are] free to run around while drawing [dependency benefits] from a boy 
they hardly know.” Rumors swirled that these wives might be taking advantage of 
the tax exemptions granted to military spouses. A Congressional Committee 
demanded that the Army investigate suspected “wayward wives” and determine 
their faithfulness. The Army opposed the demand as the measure might lead to 
an exacerbated epidemic of soldiers questioning their wife’s’ fidelity.165 
Wives experienced a mix of dread, pressure, and resignation when 
contemplating their husbands’ potential infidelities. During the war, the marriage 
rate slumped as the divorce rate nearly doubled. Women, especially brides who 
met their grooms on furloughs, expressed anxiety over what their husbands 
might be up to outside of camp or the city dockyard. Women were told that “you’d 
be a foolish wife to ask your husband what he does with those leaves of his when 
he can’t get home.” One wife recalled that even when her husband went on 
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leave, he was liable to “run around with other soldiers who are free.” A 21-year-
old bride declared, “If a marriage weathers this, it’s fool-proof.” Another young 
furlough bride hoped only that if “my husband comes back even remembering 
me….I suppose our marriage has a chance. But when I think of those Southern 
lulubelles down in Georgia where he’s stationed my blood runs cold.” Gorham 
noted that “the young wife down in Georgia is probably shivering over what the 
Yankee girl is going to do to her darling.” Despite this obvious double standard, 
guides asserted that women ought to excuse the misbehavior of soldiers given 
the stresses and dangers of war. Wives also despaired when civilian husbands, 
now raking in generous wages in defense plants, spent “their time in beer joints 
drinking and carousing with the women they have met on their jobs.” These 
women contemplated tolerating husbands who went “out with a cutie” and spent 
“$25 or $30 on showing her a good time.”166 
Beyond the difficulties of maintaining a marriage and dealing with real and 
imagined infidelity, women also confronted new men in their lives. Here, wartime 
expectations about female propriety and duties became more byzantine and 
even contradictory. While troops and the broader public—especially 
newspapers—condemned “wayward wives” unfaithful to the man fighting abroad, 
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wives were also expected to entertain servicemen and even go out with male 
acquaintances. This mandate provided wives opportunities to explore the 
nightlife of the city, but also created new dangers when men attempted to take 
advantage of unaccompanied women.167 
Married women made efforts to prepare themselves to fend off threats 
from both troops and civilian men, who saw the “lonely wife” as a vulnerable 
target. “Don’t think there won’t be any men,” warned Gorham, “You can be cross-
eyed or bowlegged or hide your light under a bushel at night—but you’ll find a 
cross-eyed man to follow you, a bowlegged one to phone you, a blind one who 
will petition you in Braille. Especially if you’re ‘alone.’” Civilian men seemed to 
target married women more than soldiers and sailors, as married women were 
less likely to frequent the entertainment zones favored by enlisted men. Civilian 
men also had more access to married women as their neighbors, social 
acquaintances, and increasingly, their co-workers. The lonely wife became a 
figure of temptation for these men. She was simultaneously available and 
unavailable, in need and forbidden: She gave the wandering male a chance to 
vainly act like a “gallant” gentlemen, comforting a supposedly melancholy woman 
in need of masculine support. Instances of men taking advantage of distraught 
women could be particularly devastating, especially when wives who were taken 
advantage of then found their local community condemning them. Lamenting that 
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“no one seems to care what happens” to war wives, one Army wife’s editorial 
declared that she was “sick of all the furrow-browed finger shakers. We are a 
desolate, desperately lonely, bewildered, grieving, weeping group of women.”168 
Married women attempted to identify men who might be “wolfish,” but 
often failed to guess which former friends, new acquaintances, or servicemen 
would ultimately become aggressive or lascivious. There were men seeking to 
use women, one woman lamented, “And the most unexpected ones they turn out 
to be too. Why is it that all the towers of virtue, the monuments of sobriety, the 
ideal husbands and fathers turn out to be the garter-snappers, the stray pinchers, 
the wolves?” Husbands’ friends could be the most flagrant offenders. Wives 
reported a standard narrative: It would all start with a social gathering and a 
suggestion of dancing or dining, or perhaps the theater. After a few outings, 
wives discovered that the male companion dropped his friendly act for a lustful 
one. One wife said, “‘I was so used to being friendly and unsexed with my 
husband’s men friends I had forgotten that that wasn’t the way of life. It had been 
so gay too’—she sighed—‘going out for a bit. Why couldn’t he have left it that 
way?’” Wives sometimes despised the burden placed on them to placate 
coercive men, but most agreed that little could be done to change this double 
standard. They were usually left with little more than intuition.169 
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Despite instances of fun and independence, women understood they 
needed to be vigilant about the potential dangers posed by both civilian men and 
troops. Yet many still placed responsibility and blame upon themselves if their 
date became amorous or forceful. Gorham cautioned fellow wives that “it takes 
two to make a bargain,” so they should not “blame everything on the man if a 
nice casual date goes moaning low” and “then whine and weep because men are 
beasts.” Both experienced couples and furlough brides were counseled to not “try 
it with temptations,” or let their loneliness lead them to a lapse in faithfulness. 
Guides like So Your Husband’s Gone to War! and social pressure demanded that 
a wife place fidelity and loyalty above these temptations, even if her husband 
could not be asked to do the same. Here, World War I loomed large. Wives 
acknowledged that the Great War ruptured marriages, resulting in many 
divorces. If wives were not faithful it would be “the woman who takes it on the 
chin.” Other wives ruefully noted that the press and society seemed eager to 
criticize “army wives abandoning children, running around nights, and in general 
conducting themselves as the fuddy-duddies say they shouldn’t.” Married women 
needed to diligent, careful, and shrewd when maintaining their marriage and 
dealing with new men. Gorham offered these wives a final, key aphorism: “But 
now it’s other times, other customs, and the wolf only takes the hindmost.”170 
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Women’s columnist Doris Blake gave similar advice to unmarried young 
women to learn their “escort’s marital status.” She and others warned that 
married men would pose as single, and their easiest prey was “the inexperienced 
young girl who may innocently enough meet this shatterer of her dreams.” 
Married men on the move would be strongly tempted “to deny their marital ties, 
or ignore the subject entirely, when meeting young women.” Fears of infidelity 
also populated women’s fiction. Books like Sailor’s Star (1944) centered on Navy 
wives rushing to New York, only to find their sailor husband entranced by a new 
woman. Ultimately, women expected poor behavior from their husbands, even as 
men enforced a double standard when it came to fidelity. “Let your blood run 
cold,” wrote Gorham, “But don’t imagine he remains pure as the driven snow to 
match your own temperature. Men aren’t made that way, but they certainly 
expect women to be.” Women were advised they ought to forgive husbands 
these “peccadilloes” while noting that wives should not expect husbands to 
“forgive any of yours should you ever commit them.”171 
“Assault with Intent to Please” 
Aside from the threats of new men in their lives, women confronted new 
challenges in booming wartime metropolises. Finding adequate living quarters, 
managing lascivious male co-workers, and safely traveling through the city 
constituted the daily privations of life in liberty ports.  
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Taking a defense job, despite its wages and promise of greater 
independence, often required women to relocate to places close to troop bases, 
transports, and fun zones. Yet the sheer number of troops staying in the city 
during weekends and furlough periods drastically reduced the number of 
available rooms. Housing became scarce and expensive in many metropolitan 
areas, pushing women into crumbling, dingy, or unfinished apartments in rowdy, 
unsafe neighborhoods. Workers sometimes resorted to moving from hotel to 
hotel: “You could only stay in a hotel for X amount of days and you had to move. 
This was a wartime thing.” Even if workers could find housing through their 
company, there was little guarantee of a completed apartment. Marie Baker, a 
worker in the empennage department at North American, discovered that her 
brand new $46.50 a month apartment in Redondo Beach lacked both lights and a 
stove, leaving her to heat soup on an electric percolator or buy hamburgers at 
the pier.172 
Yet compared to other housing arrangements, a missing stove and lighting 
was little to complain about. Early in 1942, the Women’s Bureau of the 
Department of Labor called on local organizations and state governments to 
“improve living conditions for women workers snared in the maelstrom of 
migrating peoples surging into defense industries.” In boom towns and west 
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coast industrial centers, women faced “housing and general living conditions” 
that were “appallingly below desirable standards” with five to six women sharing 
one room or two to three sharing a bed. By 1944, little had changed. The 
Women’s Bureau Special Bulletin listed “the lack of adequate housing, 
recreation, transportation and child care facilities” as endemic to industrial areas, 
causing “discontent, absenteeism, turn-over, and other production saboteurs.” 
Even though women were earning “good money,” landlords stated that they 
disliked female tenants, in part, because they “entertain more, especially men 
friends.”173 
Even military wives struggled with housing, since, as one recalled, 
“property owners do not like to rent to military personnel.” Upscale hotels, too, 
began refusing to serve enlisted men, leaving one husband to apologize for 
taking his wife to a boardinghouse “where all the sailors are staying.” “If only I 
had known what I was going to be up against,” his wife said, “It would have made 
things easier. You plan so for such a week end; you buy a new hat, new 
perfume, new dress. And when you see the kind of place you’re dumped in you 
feel that much worse than if you had known.” Many decent and even shabby 
hotels were claimed early because of the huge numbers of servicemen passing 
through ports. Women were also advised to look out for potential threats beyond 
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just enlisted men: “There’s the lecherous clerk who would pinch your behind if he 
could reach over the counter. There’s the seedy house detective who almost 
does.” Little could be done to avoid these ramshackle hotels and rundown 
boardinghouses. Gorham suggested to “come prepared for the worst 
accommodations and do what you can to forget them.” In New York, hotel 
associations put out pleas for couples to avoid the rush for rooms on Saturday or 
plan in advance. Traveler’s Aid even suggested that couples who owned homes 
and apartments in New York might house servicemen and their wives on the 
weekends.174 
 Work could be also difficult and demanding, leaving some women with 
little time or energy for anything outside of the job. Part of the daily drudgery 
included male co-workers harassing or propositioning them. War workers dealt 
with men asking if they were married, with one male co-worker saying, “All the 
good looking girls around here are.” Even when told that they were married, and 
no, their husband was not in the in the Army, men responded, “Well, let me know 
if he goes….I’ll see you don’t get lonesome.” Other women struggled against 
stereotypes that defense workers were “frivolous” or “gum popping, silly, flowers 
in our hair” or women who went “roaming the streets looking for soldiers.” “It’s not 
true,” said one factory laborer, “By the time you got out of work, you were so 
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damned tired you didn’t want to do anything. In my case, the first thing I wanted 
was a bath.”175 
Adding to the burdens of housing and work, simply traveling through 
liberty ports could become a dangerous proposition. The immense numbers of 
troops moving through cities made transportation a taxing and sometimes 
hazardous challenge. Gorham described trains as “crowded, noisy, often held 
up” and as a space where “the war is brought home” by “so many men in 
uniform, going, coming, on the move.” Sailors and soldiers took up whole 
sections, crowded into sleeper cars, and filled the smoky aisles making passes 
as women tried to squeeze by. Given the difficulties of travel, marriage advice 
author Mary Day Winn recommended that women should not even attempt to 
follow their husbands as they moved about the country. By 1942, the War 
Department realized that poor discipline on both civilian trains and troop 
transports required a bolstered MP presence. One report acknowledged that 
more MPs “have been placed on public carriers to solve the many problems 
created by hundreds of thousands of men in the armed services traveling under 
orders or on furlough.” Nevertheless, women still faced “misbehavior” and 
disorder while traveling. Bill Mauldin’s servicemen cartoons captured these 
scenes with soldiers leering and propositioning women on transports. Chief of 
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Staff George Marshall acknowledged “soldier drinking on trains” as a recurring 
issue, demanding a solution to this lack of discipline that threatened civil-military 
relations. In November 1942, Marshall wrote to the Army’s head of policing to 
complain that he was “still receiving reports of drunken soldiers on trains,” as well 
poor MP performance. Marshall even received direct complaints from a woman 
and her daughter traveling on a train “filled with drunken soldiers who molested 
her to the extent that she and another lady were forced to ask civilians to sit with 
them as protection from the soldiers.” Marshall went on to tersely note that 
“Military Police were on the train but apparently did nothing.”176 
Women’s safety, too, was imperiled on city streets. War workers reported 
being attacked and assaulted, especially late in the night. Chicago’s Phyllis Blair, 
for example, one “slight and attractive war worker” was hit over the head with a 
brick and assaulted by an unknown man, dying later on. Her attacker, like many 
others, followed her when she left her factory job after midnight. Her fellow 
workers told police that “she had previously complained about being followed 
when on the way home.” Other young workers reported similar instances of male 
assailants striking them and then attempting “to molest” them. Soldiers often 
managed to commit multiple attacks without repercussions. Private Edward 
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Green was arrested five to six times in Atlanta before being transferred to New 
York for guard duty in the city. There, he mugged and raped multiple women in 
Gramercy Park and Brooklyn late at night, before slashing a woman’s sailor 
escort with his bayonet and assaulting her in Madison Square Park at 3 a.m. 
Many experienced the kind of startling, seemingly random episodes of violence 
visited upon Alberta Burgett of Boston. Leaving the Old Howard Theatre in the 
servicemen dominated Scollay Square, an Army sergeant “grabbed her, pushed 
her into an alley, and choked and beat her when she resisted him.” On Los 
Angeles’ Hollywood Boulevard, women described similar instances of men 
stalking them while walking or exiting streetcars before attempting to rape them. 
Some women, like Fanny Christina Hill, avoided “gallivanting” because of the 
dangers that came with it: “I knew how to get around, and I knew how to stay out 
of danger and not take too many chances.” Another women testified that her 
newfound experience as a welder had given her the strength to fend off an 
attempted rape.177 
Brazen assaults like these took place at an alarming rate throughout the 
war. After the rape and strangling of Jessie Strieff—a young D.C. female 
worker—Eleanor Roosevelt urged young women in cities to “go home early, or 
with a reliable escort” and to “accept no favors from strangers or casual 
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acquaintances.” Roosevelt also cautioned against going out with men “until 
assured of their good character” and that “if a girl drinks at all, it should be done 
with well-known friends.” By 1945, Chicago’s crime commission declared a “war 
on rapists” in response to an explosion in the number of rape cases caused by 
the “lowering of moral standards because of war.” Attacks like these, and a 
general fear of nighttime assaults, may have lead labor leaders like Elizabeth 
Gurley Flynn to demand “special transportation for night shifts.” Early on, the 
National Council for Women demanded “women patrol officers” who would 
“protect girls in defense centers.” Yet, many continued to live with the regular, 
omnipresent fear of being attacked without warning while conducting the most 
mundane activities or walking home. Even worse, was the sense that a rapist’s 
uniform would save them from prosecution or punishment.178 
Many who were attacked never found justice or recompense. The papers 
became especially infatuated with cases involving young, white, middle-class 
victims, and those cases stood a far better chance of receiving a full 
investigation. Women of color in particular found that a white assailant’s uniform 
and race granted extraordinary cover for their actions. In Detroit, furloughed 
Coast Guardsman Mike Stephanchenko attacked and raped a 23-year-old black 
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mother. Stephanchenko grabbed her from behind and dragged her into a field 
obscured by tall weeds. “See these hands,” he told her, “I’m the maniac of the 
neighborhood and I’ll kill you.” After he raped her twice, she managed to escape 
to a friend’s home. Despite living near the scene, confessing to having drank 
over eighteen beers that night, and extensive physical evidence, the all-white jury 
found the guardsman not guilty. After the verdict was read, the Judge 
admonished the jury, saying, “You’ve made a serious mistake.” The wife and her 
husband wept in the courtroom.179 
Even in Pearl Schiff’s wartime romance Scollay Square, the female 
characters initially enchanted by handsome, virile sailors eventually learn the 
dangers that came with these romances. As the novel progresses, Jerry—Beth’s 
sailor love interest—cannot break out of the endless cycle of drinking, fighting, 
and sex. When Beth attempts to end the relationship, the tight grip she once 
associated with a reassuring strength becomes a threat. Jerry refuses to break 
off the relationship, picks her up, and flings her onto a bed. Beth protests, “This is 
rape,” but Jerry merely agrees, “Sure. Assault with intent to please.” Schiff 
concludes the scene by noting, “When he let himself out of the apartment, she 
was lying face down on the bed crying silently into the pillow.” The other female 
protagonist, Emily, is likewise assaulted by a Bluejacket: “He hit me….He got me 
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up to a room and he took off his clothes and he hit me. He kept hitting me with 
his fists. He enjoyed hitting me.” Schiff, a Bostonian in her twenties during the 
war, captured what many women were unable to ever speak or write.180   
“Listen Little Lady” 
  Some of this violence occurred because of the revulsion against feminine 
and civilian life tacitly condoned, even encouraged, during military training. 
Because Command routinely failed to check crimes that ranged from 
drunkenness to harassment to rape, men understood that violent carousing was 
essentially a sanctioned way of releasing pent-up pressure and stress, while also 
exercising military privilege. Given the manpower crisis, flagrantly poor police 
numbers and training, and the legal privileges granted to men in uniform, women 
were mostly left to fend for themselves. Of course, understanding the endemic 
harassment, assault, and rape that occurred on the home front requires more 
specific explanations. 
Troop aggression may also have been a response to newly independent 
and financially self-sufficient women, particularly war workers. Women working 
relatively lucrative jobs in defense plants could take home more income than the 
average GI or Bluejacket, upending traditional power relationships. One riveter 
Helen Studer stated that “people didn’t know what to do with their money when 
they were making so much,” while another claimed to have “six or eight checks 
laying in my dresser drawer that I hadn’t even cashed.” Betty Jeanne Boggs, also 
                                                     




a defense plant worker, agreed.  She could “buy everything: my shoes, lingerie. 
The more I worked, the more clothes I bought. I could go out and blow my whole 
pay in one day if I wanted to.” Because wartime rationing put limits on consumer 
goods, women, like servicemen, often directed their disposable income towards 
plentifully available entertainment and nightlife. Gorham recommended to 
working wives that “the whole city is yours, depending on how much money you 
both saved for the excursion, and you can do pretty much as you always have 
when you’ve gone big-city gallivanting. You’ll find you get somewhat more for 
your money in amusement than you did before.” Black workers, however, were 
warned in The Chicago Defender “not to indulge in reckless spending.” Seeing 
women reaping greater rewards because they chose to upset social norms may 
have disturbed servicemen, who after all, were supposed to be symbols of 
strength and power. Confronted with the question of how a military man could be 
the epitome of strength when he did not even earn as much as the women next 
to him at the bar, some may have lashed out at these female threats to their 
machismo. Psychologists, doctors, and military officials argued that the new 
economic and social opportunities afforded to women drove a postwar epidemic 
of “wife-beating.” These officials “placed a good share of the blame on the wives” 
and called on them to be “very tolerant and understanding” of this domestic 
abuse and control of their lives.181 
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Women were also compelled to tolerate the abuses of servicemen as part 
of their patriotic duty. Over and over single women were reminded of their key 
role in boosting and maintaining servicemen’s morale. “Suddenly, single women 
were of tremendous importance,” said one young worker, “It was hammered at 
us through the newspapers and magazines and on the radio. We were needed at 
USO, to dance with the soldiers.” Propaganda especially drove women to see 
dancing, dating, and romancing soldiers and sailors as a wartime duty, one that 
young women later acknowledged had exercised “a tremendous influence” on 
their lives. “Listen little lady, it’s the order of the day/Issued by the highest of 
authority/Fellows in the service simply can’t be turned away/You know that 
defense must get priority,” instructed one characteristic popular song by Joan 
Merrill.  “Patriotically inclined” women were advised to “get out your lipstick and 
powder” before dancing with a sailor or soldier. “You can’t say no if he wants to 
dance,” Merrill explained, “If he’s gonna fight he’s got a right to romance.”  On the 
radio, in magazine shorts, and in films, women recalled a recurring narrative: 
“The central theme was the girl meets the soldier, and after a weekend of 
acquaintanceship they get married and overcome all difficulties.” Young workers 
felt immense pressure to marry men on leave and liberty, even when they did not 
love or even like them: “I met my future husband. I really didn’t care that much for 
him, but the pressure was so great….The pressure to marry a soldier was so 
                                                     





great that after a while I didn’t question it. I have to marry sometime and I might 
as well marry him.” Women who did not meet this kind of prescribed political 
obligation were seen as failing to live up to the duties of a citizen in wartime.182 
Even as military commanders privately exchanged escalating worries 
about the lack of discipline among their men while in liberty ports and fielded 
protest from female citizens, they also moved to scapegoat women as a threat to 
their men and the entire war effort. For government officials, women’s sexuality 
was a disturbing force that posed a danger to the health of the Armed Forces. It 
could only be contained by a vigorous legal and policing regimen aimed at 
destroying vice and venereal disease. By the end of the war, accusations of 
prostitution and promiscuity began to lose real meaning. A U.S. Public Health 
Service physician even developed the portmanteau “patriotute” to describe a 
woman who both was both patriot and prostitute. For officials, it became far too 
easy to dismiss women’s concerns and protests as sob stories or the excuses of 
promiscuous girls. One official equated prostitution and venereal disease with 
treason, pushing the Army-Navy Vice boards to attack female bodies as a source 
of infection. At the same time, the military’s campaign for men to engage in safe 
sex became a tacit incitement for men to prove themselves sexually.183 
“Wolves in Friend’s Clothing” 
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In major cities across the country, women prepared for the wide range of 
threats that came with mass mobilization. Most soldiers and sailors did not 
perpetrate outright assaults. But many engaged in other kinds of coercive, 
“wolfish” behavior. They catcalled, leered, followed, or became aggressive when 
a date did not become something more. A typical instance of harassment took 
place in Norfolk, when a soldier repeatedly made advances towards a woman 
watching a film at the cinema. The woman was not physically harmed, but neither 
was the soldier arrested for his behavior. Gorham warned women to guard 
themselves from “wolves in friend’s clothing.” She also recognized that men in 
uniform would become more aggressive on streets “where women are appraised 
and approached via the once-over and yoo-hoo techniques.” “One general 
cannot stop the traditional sport of fifty million Americans,” she wrote, “and when 
American men get into a masculine groove they sharpen their eyes and give the 
girls the once-over as they go by.” Good Housekeeping published guides for 
women as they attempted to navigate a city populated by “stag parties”: “Don’t 
overdress…wear simple clothes…If you want to avoid whistles and caustic 
comments on your excursion…thread your way along quietly.” Stags are jovial as 
a rule,” the author warned, “Cast a couple of warm glances in their direction and, 




all else, women should “be inconspicuous and dignified” in order to avoid 
unwanted attention.184 
Given the lack of policing and freedom accorded to men in the service 
when off base, some women sought out a decent military man to protect her. 
This need to find a reliable escort may have also driven women to see multiple 
men in case one was unavailable. The First Lady, as previously mentioned, 
suggested the necessity of a reliable escort, but offered few guidelines of how to 
obtain one. Doris Blake acknowledged early in 1941 that women would soon lack 
a “steady escort” and that the problem of choosing new escorts “really boils down 
to one of intuition.” Women often lacked a totally reliable soldier to choose, 
forcing many to pick between going it alone or taking their chances with a 
somewhat rough GI that could ward off less savory interlopers.185 
In 1942, Catholic priest and writer Daniel A. Lord explained the escort role 
in starkly military terms: “That word is used to designate the cruisers that protect 
a line of merchantmen during a war. The job of an escort is to protect that which 
is being escorted.” “What,” asked Lord, “would you think of an escort cruiser that 
suddenly started to try to sink the ship it was sent to protect?” Wartime made 
sorting out the protector from the “wolf” increasingly difficult. “Modern young 
men,” according to Lord, increasingly argued that “if she lets me get away 
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murder, then it’s her responsibility” and that men sought to “find out as soon as 
possible how much a girl will let you get away with.” Other young men suggested 
that “If a girl says, ‘No,’ pretend that she has said ‘Yes,’” and that if an escort 
“paid for the girl’s evening, she ought to be willing to pay you back…by permitting 
you familiarities.” Moving unaccompanied through the city was likely more 
dangerous than taking a chance on a military man as an escort. Still, intuition 
only went so far when assessing a man’s character. And with the movement of 
millions of troops throughout liberty ports, women found more men who believed 
that “chivalry is a fine thing in poetry, but has no place in a taxicab.”186 
Women in liberty ports, however, did not passively accept aggressive 
conduct or attempted assaults. Imogene Stevens, an Army Major’s wife, gained a 
minor celebrity after shooting and killing a sailor “in an ‘aura of sex recrimination, 
beer, and window smashing reprisals.’” Late in the night, the “beautiful and 
socially prominent” Mrs. Stevens heard some noise and noticed the absence of 
her neighbors. She made her way next door and confronted two sailor brothers 
enjoying their liberty. After demanding to know why the two intoxicated 
servicemen were there, an argument ensued and the two brothers assaulted 
Stevens, ripping her clothing and leaving her with bruises and scratches on her 
throat. Stevens pulled out her pistol and fired upon one of the sailors three times, 
as the other fled. Although initially put on trial for manslaughter, the prosecutor 
eventually agreed that the evidence supported Stevens’ claim of self-defense. As 
                                                     




the war went on, many women decided that their best chance of self-defense 
was in arming themselves. At Terminal Island in Los Angeles, “prompt, 
unpleasant surprise overtook a 21-year-old Navy coxswain who tried to bite the 
hand that fed him a Christmas dinner—and found it held a gun.” Edna Olson, a 
54-year-old mother of a sailor, described as “diminutive” with “graying hair” 
invited a young Bluejacket to her home. Upon arriving, the sailor produced a .45 
service automatic and demanded the family’s car and cash. Olson “marched to a 
closet and seized the family .38-caliber revolver” and then “won a brief battle of 
nerves” after the sailor fled the showdown. After posing with the pistol for the 
papers, Olson declared, “Do you think I’d let that young whipper-snapper take 
our car when we worked so hard to get it?” Those who fought off attackers 
though, risked prosecution. In San Diego, a Navy wife shot and killed a sailor—
not her husband—who accompanied her home after midnight. “A fight developed 
in the house” and the wife seized a rifle from the sailor, firing two bullets and 
mortally wounding him. At her arrest, the wife attempted to demonstrate her 
patriotism and avoid prosecution remarking, “I have a friendly feeling for all 
servicemen because my husband is in the Navy.” She nevertheless faced a 
murder charge.187 
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 Women also dealt with attempts to push them into prostitution, another 
flourishing industry in wartime. Sarah Killingsworth, a black worker in Long 
Beach, recalled that during wartime she faced “so many opportunities go wrong.” 
Waiting for the bus, prostitutes would approach and tell her, “We got good jobs. 
You could make as much money in one day as you do in a month.” Killingsworth 
explained that “they’d go out and date these white fellas and spend the night with 
‘em.” Other prostitutes worked “a red-light district in San Bernardino, where the 
soldiers would go.” Many of them “were married, very attractive women” whose 
husbands acted as their “pimps.” Other women remembered pandering attempts 
in nightclubs. One young woman accused a couple of pressing her to join “the 
largest and best call house in Los Angeles” where she “would entertain no one 
but film executives and celebrities, earning as high as $400 a week.” The 
recruiters promised “easy money and jewels” when luring to women to work “as a 
call girl.” Law enforcement became so concerned about prostitution among war 
workers that they directed women’s counselors to begin investigating prostitution 
recruitment occurring in factories. Susan Laughlin, a counselor at Lockheed, 
began spying on women in the restroom after “the FBI had word of a certain 
woman who was recruiting for the camps, for the girls to go up and sleep with the 




however, found ways to avoid what Killingsworth called “selling my body for a few 
dollars.”188 
“Spawning Ground of Evil” 
Though the fears of military and federal officials over promiscuity and 
“patriotutes” was unrestrained and ultimately harmful to many women, the vice 
trade boomed on the home front. When men hit port, they left their ships and rail 
cars with full pocketbooks and desire. For GIs and sailors from “podunk” towns, 
the liberty port could be a revolutionary experience. These men and boys desired 
sex above all else, and this desire drove the economy and geography of vice.  
Men flocked to the bars and saloons. Most of these establishments at 
least took on the façade of a café or bar in an attempt to avoid policing from the 
military or civilian vice squads. Other establishments became “water joints,” or 
bars that had already had their liquor licenses revoked as trouble spots. 
Enterprising operators developed “breakfast clubs,” which opened as the regular 
bars closed, beckoning in troops for liquor served surreptitiously. In saloons and 
soda shops like the Stag Café, the Victory Canteen, Ye Olde Winery Club, and 
Shanghai Red’s, attractive B-girls waited to part servicemen from their spending 
cash. Men could buy the girls liquor, or more likely soft drinks, which they could 
then spike with rotgut. In exchange, the B-girl offered a kiss, a wandering touch, 
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or perhaps more. The drinking establishment profited, while the B-girl received a 
cut and a drink. Other young women—single girls, defense workers, and lonely 
wives—sometimes populated these cafes and clubs, hoping to meet a dashing 
Navyman or a bold GI. Cafes and bars with B-girls also brought the desires of 
servicemen into direct conflict with nearby civilians. This mix of alcohol and 
swaggering masculinity meant competition for women could be fierce—and men 
did not take rejection from their female acquaintances lightly.189 
Military and civilian authorities quickly recognized the potential for crime 
and exploitation in the rough taverns and heady fleshpots of Main Street LA, 
Times Square, and San Francisco’s Mission Street. If not contained, both the war 
effort and the safety of the home front might be jeopardized. Yet these authorities 
did not focus on preventing drunken brawls, vandalism, or troops assaulting 
women. Instead, both commanders and municipal officials identified women as 
the great recurring threat to the furloughed serviceman. This partly lead to the 
crackdown on prostitution and a demonization of some women as nothing more 
than a threat to spread venereal disease.190 
But many women were a threat. Even in an environment that incentivized 
soldiers and sailors to commit crimes and prey on vulnerable women, B-girls, 
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con-women, scam-artists, and female gangs were ready to take advantage of 
inebriated men and their flush pocketbooks on payday. Rather than passively 
submit to the coercive and sometimes violent impulses of military men, many 
civilian women actively exploited servicemen carousing the burgeoning 
entertainment zones. Los Angeles became a port plagued by “murder, robbery, 
shootings, bunko games, drunk ‘rollings,’ the spread of venereal diseases among 
combatant servicemen granted leave…and general hoodlumism.” Military 
authorities publically decried the “feminine bar flies, thieves, degenerates, and 
habitual criminals” who made service personnel loaded with back pay their 
“natural prey.”191 
The Army’s head of policing sought to ban B-girls almost immediately. 
“When is a bottle of pop dangerous to the Army and Navy?” asked The Los 
Angeles Times. When it was served by one of the “harpies of Main St,” 
apparently. Employing crackdowns, raids, and the revocation of liquor licenses, 
municipal and military authorities attempted to drive the B-girls from their usual 
haunts. But these techniques were often ineffective. How could you tell a B-girl 
from another young woman? And what should an officer do if the soldier 
drunkenly objected to the women’s arrest? Usually the girls just moved to a new 
café or water-joint, directing the flow of vice traffic into areas of Los Angeles 
beyond South Main Street, including downtown and Hollywood. They also 
developed new methods. As the men poured out of their ships, B-girls beckoned 
                                                     




to passing uniforms from “photographic studios.” Luring the men into a 
ramshackle storefront, the B-girls promised to pose with them for a 25-cent 
photo. After a few shots and perhaps a kiss, the men soon discovered the 
photograph cost much more.192 
Other women participated in robbery schemes that directly targeted GIs 
and sailors. Many worked in pairs, running various routines that exploited men’s 
desire for drink and sex. One pair of young women picked up pairs of sailors as 
they arrived at the docks, bar-hopped with them and then suggested a ride in 
their car. The women would then knock the drunken men out and make off with 
hundreds of dollars of back pay. Young women also worked with older women 
and wives as part of a “mother-daughter” combination. The pair would invite a 
soldier “to a private home for chicken dinner.” Once in the car, the mark received 
“a bump on the head and a missing wallet.” Girls in the West End of Boston 
committed similar robberies. One British sailor reported losing $1500 after being 
lured into a darkened apartment hallway by a blond and brunette he met in a 
café. As he stepped into the hallway, a male accomplice—a common third 
member of these teams—grabbed his throat while the women searched his 
pockets. Sailors could be stabbed to death after following a female “pickup” 
home. Teenage girls, including a 13-year-old who called herself “Queen 
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Dorothy,” even ran “crime clubs” that broke into department stores to sell 
watches and jewelry to sailors in Boston’s Scollay Square. In Staten Island, the 
Times profiled “two blond ‘glamour girl’ burglars, who apparently have invaded 
another field of male activities in wartime.” In D.C., women sometimes posed as 
women’s police bureau agents, demanding to see the ID cards and wallets of 
sailors because of some fabricated infraction. They would then claim to take the 
wallet back to the receiving station, making off with the cash. Back in Los 
Angeles, two blond sisters who worked in defense factories doubled as holdup 
girls. After making dates with sailors who they met in cocktail parlors, they invited 
the men outside where they received a beating and a liberation of their earnings. 
Los Angeles authorities estimated that Army and Navy men visiting the city had 
lost nearly $100,000 to robberies in just one year. “It’s just the same old story,” 
remarked Shore Patrol Commander Fogg, “Money is plentiful and there are 
enough crooked men and women after their share of it to make our job tough.” 
Yet, officers also admitted that “it is the serviceman, in many instances, who is to 
blame for his predicament, and victimization,” because they chose to frequent the 
crooked establishments.193 
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Nationwide, officials worried that the war was becoming a “spawning 
ground of evil” for girls and women. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover consistently 
used the press to warn the public of “the alarming upswing in crime among 
women and girls,” and to publish regular annual jumps in both arrests and 
offenses. In just one year, the FBI recorded a nearly 50% surge in the number of 
girls arrested. Women’s police bureau officials declared the girl-gangs of 
Washington D.C. to be “the true counterparts of the Werewolves and the Forty 
Thieves.” Armed with knives and razors, these girls were not the “‘gun molls’ of 
the cheap movies and magazines,” but rather “truly criminal, well on the road to 
professional standing.” They “hover at night waiting and watching for a soldier or 
sailor,” cautioned a women’s police captain, “Rolling drunks is one of their 
elementary accomplishments.” Academics made similar claims. Sociologist 
Elizabeth K. Norton suggested that though the war prompted “a new stimulus to 
emancipation—even including economic equality,” this transformation would be 
“dearly bought.” Dr. Norton advised that in wartime “feminine behavior that would 
once have been described as vicious became respectable or was at least 
condoned.”194 
WACS and WAVES 
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In contrast to war wives, workers, and even these con-women, female 
members of the military often experienced a fundamentally different dynamic with 
servicemen. While military men generally viewed civilian women as prizes, or 
objects of pursuit, WACS and WAVES could be seen as belonging to the military, 
rather than being members of the female sex. Military sources are limited, but 
what exists suggests many male soldiers treated their female counterparts as 
fellow carousers. They shared a common tribal belonging, one that was forged 
through the shared experience of training, as well as the uniforms that set them 
apart from the civilian world. Female troops even got military tattoos in hard-
edged martial zones as a way to cement their bond to the Armed Forces. So 
when WACS and WAVES took leave in the big coastal cities and inland 
waypoints, they often acted like male troops: drinking, swearing, cruising through 
juke joints and taverns, and mocking the authority of the police.195 
Like male soldiers, MPs reported instances of female troops becoming 
drunk and belligerent on trains. In one example, a female first Lieutenant on the 
train from Nashville to New Orleans was reported for “using loud and profane 
language; drinking to excess; creating a disturbance.” The male MP proceeded 
to treat her with the same deferential, even obsequious manner used when 
approaching male offenders. After repeated requests to desist and produce 
identification, she pulled rank and stated that she “did not have to obey the 
                                                     





orders of enlisted men.” Similar incidents occurred when female and male troops 
went out carousing together. On Memphis’ Union Street, several MPs confronted 
three WACS, a marine, a sailor, and an Army captain who were drunk and 
disorderly. The MP’s report specifically identifies the women as the most 
belligerent and pugnacious. Swearing, drunk, and with their uniforms disheveled, 
the assembled personnel were creating a scene that “did attract the attention of 
people passing by.” They repeatedly ignored the MP’s requests, and asked what 
right the police had to tell them to do anything. The WACS’ male counterparts 
attempted to get them to go back to base, but the women refused. One WAC 
struck out at one of the officers, while another accused the ranking MP of being a 
“damn shavetail”—meaning an inexperienced officer—and that all he had was 
“brass” to be back him up. They continued to mock the MPs, calling them 
“chicken,” “bitches,” and “yellow.” Increasingly agitated, one of the WACS swung 
at and then kicked an MP sergeant in the groin.196 
Much has been made of the hostility that soldiers directed toward female 
enlistees, and the hateful rumors they spread about them, but all of this behavior, 
from the drunk and disorderly behavior in an urban locale to the disrespect for 
MPs and fighting, demonstrates WACS mirroring the behavior of servicemen. 
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Indeed, servicewomen occasionally managed to invoke the privilege of the 
uniform to either escape punishment or to leverage power to beat an unfair 
charge. A contingent of African American WACS at Fort Knox used the respect 
garnered by their military position to essentially force a white civilian police officer 
to resign after he struck one of them. Even civilian observers drew more 
similarities than differences between male and female sailors. For example, 
profiles of Coney Island depicted sailors and WAVES essentially as equals, 
making no distinction when describing their domination of the park. In other 
instances though, male servicemen, especially officers, used their power to 
abuse female troops. A San Francisco Naval lieutenant was reprimanded for 
repeatedly breaking into the WAVES barracks in an attempt to solicit sex. In 
Tampa, a corrupt Army captain coerced a WAC to have sex with him in 
exchange for a promotion to the rank of sergeant. Thus, in the end female troops 
did not escape the sexual violence visited upon civilian women.197 
Though the wartime lives of WACS and WAVES substantially differed 
from other American women, they nonetheless capture the contradictory dynamic 
of the military’s effect on liberty ports. Men and women could be both allies and 
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adversaries, though often the real relationship lay somewhere in between. In the 
war within the war, many women could not avoid the suffering caused by the 
military’s sanctioning of rampant assault and harassment. And yet others 
leveraged these disruptions to produce a new range of movement and 





Chapter Four: The Militarized City 
Writing in 1990, Mike Davis envisioned Los Angeles as a dystopian metropolis 
not unlike the brutal fortress cities of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner or John 
Carpenter’s Escape from New York. Beginning in the 1960s, the rise of 
“megastructures and supermalls” brought about the destruction of public space 
with the help of a police and private security apparatus dedicated to middle class 
demands for “increased spatial and social insulation.” This “militarization of urban 
space,” Davis argues, ended the democratic ideal where classes could mix in the 
lost “paradise of free beaches, luxurious parks, and ‘cruising strips.’” Davis 
specifically identifies Mayor Fiorello La Guardia’s New York City and LA’s 1940’s 
downtown as exemplars of the Olmstedian tradition of heterogeneity and 
democratic space. Los Angeles, New York, and other liberty ports certainly 
featured more mixed public spaces and less corporate urban planning. But just 
because a space was more democratic, does not mean it was not also 
militarized.198   
 World War II brought about the first true wave of urban militarization. 
Cities were transformed not just by the presence of millions of servicemen, but 
also by the military’s annexation of property, policing, and regulation of 
businesses. Civilian and military leaders sometimes cooperated, but often argued 
over who should have control. Religious leaders, anti-vice organizations often 
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with roots stretching back to the Victorian era, and business groups joined the 
fray, seeking to shape local policies on issues like curfews, out of bounds zones, 
and policing. The streets of World-War II American cities in the path of millions of 
conscripts certainly featured the dynamic and vibrant life Davis romanticizes. 
However, their streets also fostered bitter civil-military conflicts and drove the 
growth of military power in urban America. Civilian life itself experienced its own 
militarization as well. Civilians responded to the friendly occupation by America’s 
men in uniform through a mix of cooperation, accommodation, profiteering, and 
protest, though many found themselves powerless to stop the military’s control of 
liberty ports. 
“The Crossroads of Hell” 
In booming ports like Boston, servicemen revitalized and expanded red-
light districts, creating whole new sexual networks that brought martial 
masculinity into everyday life. Each city frequented by troops on furlough or en 
route to training grounds or combat zones had at least one quarter where men 
could hit the taverns, cafes, bars, cabarets, and brothels for booze and B-Girls, 
dope and “well stacked” prostitutes. Hotels with “special offers” and bellboys 
connected to the flesh trade proliferated. The reinvigoration of red-light districts 
produced both cooperation and conflict between troops, businesses, anti-vice 
crusaders, “slumming” civilians, politicians, and military authorities, all of whom 
sought to determine the order and character of these spaces. Transformations 




and economy was defined by the presence and behaviors of soldiers flooding the 
streets.199  
 Boston’s history of catering to the sailor on shore leave began long before 
World War II. In the 1850s, ships released their crews along the original water 
front, sending them onto Anne Street, home to a host of criminals, swindlers, and 
prostitutes. Rushing out with their wages and “pent-up desires,” the sailors 
crowded the bordellos, burlesque theaters, gambling houses, “rat pits,” and “jilt 
shops” where the bar staff ran scams and robberies on drunken patrons. Men 
surging out from Dock Square lost themselves in the blood-sport, drinking, and 
whoring without much fear of the police, who dared not send lone officers into 
those “vicious highways.” Richmond Street in the North End became known as 
the Black Sea, another center of sin and “slumming,” where both sailors and 
wayward students could place bets on ratting—how fast could a dog kill twenty 
rats released into a pit?—or find a girl in one of the combination dance hall-
brothels flourishing near the wharfs. Vice squads and moral reformers 
periodically raided these “streets of sin,” but Boston’s economic transformation 
into a center of finance generally proved more effective in driving out the 
purveyors of drink and flesh.200 
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 During World War II Scollay Square emerged as a rival to Times Square 
for revelry and risky fun. Originally a cow pasture, then host to a quartet of grand 
hotels, Scollay had become “a disreputable slum” by the early 1900s. During and 
after World War I, with the great expansion of the Charlestown Navy Yard and 
the battleship fleet, sailors thronged the Square, searching for last minute 
amusements before their ship departed. Still, the Square of the 1930s remained 
a classic red-light district, full of any kinds, from the Brahmins to the down and 
out. Troops taking liberty blended into, rather than dominated, the scene. World 
War II changed this as Bluejackets swarmed in not only from the Navy Yard to 
the North, but also from the new South Boston Naval Annex. The Square’s 
businesses capitalized on the cycles of pay days and benders, and the sector 
was soon ruled by military law and servicemen’s whims. By 1945, this rush of 
sailors would transform Scollay Square into a projection of the Navy’s power into 
the heart of Boston and a central hub for civil-military conflict.201 
 Before troops even arrived in Boston, most knew about Scollay Square. It 
developed an almost mythological appeal conveyed in apocryphal stories. In one 
tale, Marines holed up on a Pacific island mark their bivouac with a sign reading 
“Scollay Square.” In another story, two ships sailing the Atlantic approach one 
another and begin sending a flurry of wigwag flag signals. The message is 
quickly translated and read back as “How are things on Scollay Square?” 
Civilians recalled GIs wandering down Washington Street and asking, “Hey bud, 
                                                     




where’s Scoll—,” but before they could finish the question, they were already 
receiving directions.202 
For Boston’s citizens, the Square could be many things. Boston mothers 
employed it as a warning against immoral conduct, telling their teenage 
daughters that too much lipstick and waggling of hips would damn them to being 
a streetwalker in Scollay. But at the start of the war, all kinds of people, not just 
those wearing Navy blue, went there. High school boys and undergrads treated it 
as a kind of coming-of-age rite, frequenting the notorious block for “burly 
distractions.” Some underage boys recalled burying themselves in big winter 
jackets to hide their youthful appearance, and then affecting a deep voice when 
trying to purchase a ticket to see a striptease. Harvard students—and some 
professors—ventured across the Charles River to visit the premier burlesque 
theater, The Old Howard Athenaeum (nicknamed The Old Harvard). Before 
graduating as a Crimson man in 1940, JFK was rumored to have fallen in love 
with one of the strippers named “Peaches Strange.” Even women from the city’s 
elite Cabot family visited and remembered the “nice, healthy looking girls” 
performing stripteases. “There was no special class that went there,” insisted one 
of the Square’s film projectionists, “You’d see the affluent, you’d see the poor, 
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and you’d see all in between.” An African-American woman agreed, asserting “it 
was everyman’s place.”203   
 Officially, Scollay was only one city block in the serpentine streets of 
Boston. The actual Square featured a small number of establishments including 
theatres, “dine-and-dance spots,” restaurants, a tavern, two cinemas, a 
pharmacy, penny arcade, bowling alley, tattoo parlors, shooting galleries, and a 
liquor store. Patrons understood, however, that Scollay also enveloped the 
surrounding streets, including businesses like Joe and Nemo’s on Cambridge 
Street, known for its hotdogs. But even describing Scollay as a red-light district 
fails to capture how novelists, visitors, and reporters thought about it. Boston’s 
Pearl Schiff, author of the scandalous and best-selling romance Scollay Square, 
saw the area as “a mood, a rhythm” or “a catchy tune with dirty lyrics.” A GI also 
identified the area as synonymous with the obscene, the dirty, and the shocking.  
“Scollay Square was the closest thing to a four letter word that you could’ve had,” 
he put it. The district offered a place to “escape into make-believe” where 
someone might “drink and make love and let the world go to hell.” Scollay offered 
a bit of make-believe for everyone. For the man on liberty, it was an escape into 
“an almost infinite choice of pleasures.” For the Harvard crowd and Beacon Hill 
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elites it provided a titillating brush with “the earthy kind.” Respectable women 
might enjoy a night of rowdy fun without risking their social standing.204  
 Both sailors and civilians originally came for the many varieties of 
burlesque. The Old Howard was “Boston’s Temple of Burlesque” and wartime 
audiences regularly packed the 1500 seats. Originally famous as the site of 
William Miller’s non-ascension into heaven, the Howard found fame in the years 
between the World Wars with the signature stripteases of Ann Corio, a queen of 
the genre. By World War II, Corio was making movies, but many other striptease 
artists took her place. Even without Corio, the war produced regular audiences 
for the burlesque routines offered by the Howard, with signs proclaiming “Always 
Something Doing.” Others theaters featured “fan-dances,” with scantily-clad 
women seductively waving huge, white feather fans, covering and uncovering 
skin to music. Visitors also sought out the tassel-dancers at the Crawford House, 
where one act featured a woman who could rhythmically move her breasts so 
that each tassel would swing in the opposite direction. Punters would cat-call and 
yell from the audience, “Take it off!” to which the performer gamely replied, “I 
can’t take that off. I’ll catch a cold!”205 
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 But in time, the war transformed Scollay into a more militarized, hard-
edged, dangerous place, far less welcoming to civilians. Shore Patrol officers, 
who increasingly replaced city cops, were soon “everywhere, their gaitered legs 
and belted waists with the small businesslike clubs swinging at their hips, 
investing them with authority” Schiff recalled. Civilian men who did not join the 
service learned to avoid the Square. Women and girls, who were not prostitutes 
congregating to capture military dollars, charted alternate routes through the city 
and carefully scanned the avenue when exiting the nearby subway station.206 
Wartime Scollay was defined by its sights, smells, and sensations. “Jack 
Ashore” understood, as one historian put it, that “Scollay Square, like the ladies 
who frequented it, was best seen in the evening.” Furloughed sailors were 
greeted by the blazing electrical bulbs of café signs and the penny arcade’s neon 
tubes that “glowed with jewel-toned brilliance of ruby, emerald and sapphire.” 
When sailors and women stumbled out of the gin-joints and saloons, jukebox 
music filled the street, before going silent again as the door slammed shut behind 
them. The air was heavy with the mix of sauerkraut, vomit, smoke, and pungent 
cologne. Visitors and observers uncovered rhythms that dictated movement and 
actions within the Square. At the beginning of the night, Schiff observed a “slow 
shuffling tempo” as day-drunks, bookies, and horse-players lounged in the 
streets. As the women and girls hit the Square at dusk, sailors poured out from 
taxis, subways, and side-streets, and the tempo began to build. Cat-calls, 
                                                     




obscenities, and raucous laughter formed a kind of soundtrack, while men 
increasingly threw fists at each other. Homeless men, derided as “stewbums” 
and panhandlers by troops, begged for cash as men hunted for a girl. The “grand 
finale” occurred when the cafes, honky-tonks, and dance halls ejected their 
patrons out into the wide avenue late at night. Then, sailors fought over women, 
and women fought over sailors. Shore Patrol frantically attempted to keep the 
peace and clear the zone. Some departed near dawn in taxis for crooked hotels, 
others left for the Common “where the ground is hard but free.” More settled for 
doorways and sides of buildings, where car headlights briefly illuminated a flurry 
of hands, mouths, and thighs. By early morning, the quiet was interrupted only by 
a scattered giggle, cry, or smashed bottle.207 
 Businesses capitalized on the near constant military traffic and burgeoning 
war worker populations. Street hawkers and shops began catering to 
servicemen’s various desires for trinkets and mementos associated with their 
time in the service. Many sold large, heavy rings that sailors wore on their middle 
fingers. As an alternative to more noticeable and illegal brass knuckles, the rings 
worked well as both a masculine accessory and as a fighting implement. Each 
ring featured a huge plate of metal placed on top of the band and imprinted with 
the faces of women or “wild west” Indian warriors. After a brawl or scuffle, men 
might find these designs stamped into their faces and skin. Photo studios, similar 
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to ones featuring B-Girls in LA, offered a place for sailors and women to capture 
a keepsake of a wartime romance. The Rialto Theatre explicitly catered to sailors 
by screening films into the early morning hours. Sailors explained that “Boston is 
like a morgue at one o’clock,” so many would hole up in the Rialto until dawn. 
Night-shift workers joined them to watch vampires attack “some Hollywood cutie” 
and to “sober off before going home to the wife.”208 
Scollay’s tattoo parlors were dominated almost entirely by GIs, marines, 
sailors, and men from the Coast Guard—often called “coasties.” The Square’s 
main parlors were all owned by members of the appropriately named Liberty 
family. Edward “Dad” Liberty and his sons Ted, Frank, and “Lefty” ran a cluster of 
studios. Amid the myriad of colors, designs, and insignias spattered across tattoo 
shops’ walls, sailors picked from “ships and girls, in memoriam and religious 
motives, patriotic emblems, pirates, cupids, Mickey Mouse, and such mottoes as 
‘one home, one flag, one girl.’” Many went for their service’s emblem, a visual 
commitment to their new lives as military men. Ted Liberty, the barrel-chested 
son, explained that “servicemen comprise the biggest number of our customers 
and nowadays they go in more for military emblems and sentimental motives, in 
contrast to the old-timers who were apt to favor female forms.” Paying cash in 
advance, coasties and Bluejackets pointed to the tattoo’s desired location, 
received a quick shave with the aid of a “murderous looking straight razor” and a 
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“sturdy forearm.” After a dash of Vaseline, the tattooist placed the stencil and 
used lamp black to outline the design. Then, like a swarm of tiny bees, the 
needle danced across the skin, stinging the ink fifty times a second. Besides 
being a boon to civilians like the Liberty family, getting tattoos together offered 
servicemen a shared experience of pain and camaraderie.209 
 Sailors idolized Scollay’s full embrace of vice and the power they 
exercised in the district. In Schiff’s Scollay Square, a sailor extols Boston 
because it cherished “the tradition of its narrow streets, and set aside its widest 
thoroughfare for drinking and whoring.” While other cities might hide their red-
light districts “on mean back streets far removed from the wide pleasant avenues 
of respectability,” Schiff wrote, Boston’s hub for fun had become the home for the 
military man on leave, “the beer joints were his children.” Other troops 
sentimentally remembered it as “gay, raucous, and uninhibited,” a spot to escape 
the war and make full use of the privilege of the uniform. As the end of the war 
approached, officials even announced plans to cordon off Scollay Square and 
designate it as the official V-E Day celebration zone.210    
City officials and civilians, however, began to see the growth of military 
specific businesses as proof of Scollay’s descent into iniquity. Many denounced 
this shift as “a disgrace to Boston” while using whatever municipal power they 
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had to counter the spillover of crime and hedonism that had overtaken the 
Square. In 1942, Boston police issued a 10 p.m. curfew order for both Scollay 
and the Common, with city cops, Shore Patrol, and Military Police sweeping both 
areas for any “girl or man in uniform.” Police Commissioner Joseph F. Timilty’s 
board on wartime vices cleverly invoked a previous Park Department ordinance 
to clear the Common and surrounding areas. Commissioner Timilty also 
assigned more police to the Common and streets near Scollay in an attempt to 
crack down on “young girls in those places.” Though Timilty couched the curfew 
and step up in police presence as a response to the “teen-age girl situation,” he 
also explicitly mentioned that “thousands of servicemen are here over the 
weekends,” suggesting he viewed them as a part of the problem. Though the 
curfew did not last, city bureaucrats found other ways to curb what they saw as 
Scollay’s descent into depravity. The Boston Licensing Board employed health 
checks to close down unsanitary establishments. Occasional citywide blackouts 
forced temporary business closures, though many establishments failed to dim 
their lights until compelled to. Despite these efforts, the area’s nightlife grew 
increasingly difficult to control. Even one soldier from Massachusetts began to 
despair when he heard of Scollay’s changing reputation from a bawdy “bright-
light district” into something more sinister. Writing to the Globe, the soldier 
explained that Scollay was no longer “safe for a service man to take his mother 
through.” Feeling “burned up by the things I hear about it,” stories from sailors 




cheap city for bums.” On his own furlough, he noted seeing “a lot of things that 
disappointed me” and warned that Scollay was “ruining the reputation of the city.” 
He demanded that “the authorities” do something to check the stories that spread 
throughout the Armed Forces.211 
Boston’s Watch and Ward Society—an anti-vice group that would 
sometimes raid offending businesses and haul performers to jail—increasingly 
worried about the way sailors were expanding Scollay’s reach and worsening its 
reputation. Originally founded as the New England Society for the Suppression of 
Vice, the group had won several victories in their campaigns against drinking, 
gambling, and prostitution, including shuttering the Old Howard for a brief period. 
The war undid many of their gains and the society feared that the new military 
presence had introduced far worse threats to the morality of the city and its 
citizens. Members decried Scollay as “a sink of sin” and they despaired when it 
became apparent that their crackdowns resulted in publicity that drew sailors to 
the very establishments they hoped to close. A Boston judge said Scollay had 
become the “crossroads of hell,” while radio star Fred Allen depicted it as a 
“burial ground not listed in guidebooks.” Under the onslaught of wartime 
mobilization, and with the streets filled with Navymen, Boston’s Watch and Ward 
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could do little to slow the Square’s growth in revenue and danger, and their 
operations within Scollay soon dwindled.212 
“Shangri-la of Joe Doakes” 
While the sailor invasion of Scollay Square made the block an area 
unwelcoming to civilian interlopers, the war also sparked a growth of servicemen 
amusement zones into new areas beyond the old boundaries. Although Central 
Park and Coney Island never truly rivaled Scollay’s worldwide reputation among 
the services, both areas became defined by their military visitors. This mass 
influx of troops presented a formidable challenge to some of the most powerful 
city officials in America. Even the legendary “master builder” Robert Moses saw 
his urban renewal efforts dashed when servicemen arrived. 
By the 1920s, both Central Park and Coney Island had slid into disrepair 
and disrepute. No longer the testament to middle class sensibilities and proper 
conduct its makers envisioned, large sections of Central Park had become 
unkempt and neglected refuges for drunks and the homeless. Moses confronted 
a real crisis when he took control of the park in 1934. The mall was marked by 
“dust holes,” potholed walks, paths “covered in dung,” heaps of trash, and rows 
of dead trees. At the Central Park Menagerie’s animal houses, the park stationed 
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armed guards tasked with shooting carnivores who might escape the rotting 
cages. The few remaining attractions included “a senile tiger, a puma with 
rickets, and a semi-paralyzed baboon.” The Harlem Meer had become a 
particularly unsafe section with little oversight from the Park Department and 
police. One visitor claimed that “you couldn’t tell the difference between a park 
employee and the bums hanging out in the park.” Moses soon moved thousands 
of workers into the park, reconstituting the Shakespeare garden, creating the 
Great Lawn, constructing new playgrounds, evicting Jacob Wrey Mould’s inbred 
and deformed herd of sheep, destroying shantytowns, and killing hordes of rats 
(over 230,000 in one week alone). Moses hoped to beautify and revitalize Central 
Park, throwing out its less reputable denizens to restore its pastoral beauty.213 
But the war brought unexpected challenges to Moses’ efforts, as Central 
Park became a “beachhead” where New Yorkers encountered the “‘invasion’ 
forces of joyous doughboys and gobs.” In the unlit “shaded lanes” soldiers and 
women could “promenade à deux…until the moon glows high and most civilians 
are in bed.” In hired rowboats and horse carriages, they slipped their arms 
“possessively around their dates.” But this lack of lighting also provided cover for 
a series of robberies, rapes, and murders committed by military men that 
hindered Moses’ reforms and gave Central Park a dangerous reputation. One 
woman was found strangled in the Harlem Meer section, while a 17 year-old was 
                                                     
213 Robert Caro, The Power Broker: Roberts Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Vintage 




rescued in the Ramble area from an attempted rape by a group of men including 
two British sailors. Park Department officials chided women to avoid visiting 
certain sections of the park “day or night.” But even women who stuck to Moses’ 
revitalized areas were not safe. One sailor abducted a 13-year-old girl from the 
Mall, took her to a number of bars, and then eventually transported her to 
Columbus, Ohio before she managed to escape while he was passed out. Young 
male civilians could likewise be targeted by servicemen. One 11-year-old boy 
who interrupted a sailor “wooing a girl” was thrown into Central Park Lake. Other 
men who attempted to intervene between servicemen and women could face 
more severe consequences. In a highly publicized case, three veterans were 
found guilty of murdering a woman’s escort—himself a former AAF man—and 
then raping her in the early hours of the morning. Throughout the war, Moses 
demanded larger details of police to manage the furloughed men who flagrantly 
disobeyed rules on drinking and sleeping in the park to no avail. At times, he took 
alternate—and somewhat petty—routes to excluding soldiers from his parks, 
such as when he barred them from free golf, claiming that the average G.I. 
“doesn’t know a divot from an Attic tomb inscription.”214 
Similar challenges hampered Moses when the war came to Coney Island. 
A longtime refuge for working and middle class New Yorkers seeking respite 
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from the crowds of Manhattan, the piers, beaches, and parks of West Brighton 
and Brighton Beach had always bordered seedy areas like the west end’s “The 
Gut.” But during the Progressive Era, Park entrepreneurs like George C. Tily had 
worked to cordon off these bawdier spots—such as the Pavilion of Fun—from the 
more respectable seaside resorts. By the 1930s, however, the arrival of subway 
lines, immigrants from Southern Europe, and the Great Depression drove the 
middle class away from the “Landscape of a Vomiting Multitude,” as the poet 
Federico Garcia Lorca called it. Commissioner Moses despised the beaches 
polluted with peanut shells, shattered liquor bottles, and garbage that “jammed 
the beach so full on a Sunday that one could hardly see the sand.” Coney’s 
iconic mechanical amusements likewise, he thought, posed a threat to moral 
sobriety. Rather than “bemoaning the end of the Old Coney Island fabled in song 
and story,” Moses envisioned “a new and very different resort” where respectable 
patrons could “come for exercise and healthy outdoor recreation” in the model of 
the suburban Jones Beach on Long Island. Taking control of zoning and 
regulations in 1937, he instituted bans on barkers advertising shows, 
phonographs, the sale of food on the shore, and “using newspapers as beach 
blankets” while planning “a strict enforcement of police, building, fire and health 
regulations.”215 
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Moses’ remaking of Coney collapsed with the outbreak of war and the 
influx of servicemen desperate to experience the famous oceanfront. Even New 
York’s most powerful unelected official could not stop a record 46 million visitors 
from coming to the amusement zone in 1943. Servicemen and gas-rationed New 
Yorkers flocked “down to the sea in subways” to drink, party, and pick up girls in 
the revitalized “nickel empire.” Like Times Square, Coney became a “rollicking 
playground” where “every race and tongue has a representative” and every 
nation “has a delegate to this turbulent convention of pleasure seekers.” It was 
“sordid, shoddy, thin as pasteboard. A Coney Island of the mind,” the novelist 
Henry Miller reveled. Elderly middle class patrons attempting to enjoy Moses’ 
vision of a middle class beach did not share Miller’s glee. They found “little 
pleasure in being jostled every five strokes in the water” or in “the tremendous 
vitality of the mob” that left “them cold and a bit frightened.” Driven away by 
crowds of military visitors, the respectable beach crowd longed for “the order and 
lebensraum of their old haunts.” Park Department employees attempting to find 
the families of lost children were heckled by passing sailors who yelled, “I’m lost, 
too. Blow that whistle and find me a momma—a young one.” Along the 
Boardwalk, men encountered a variety of attractions: the World’s Fair’s 
Parachute Jump, “tests of strength,” “sideshow freaks,” and caricatures of Axis 
leaders that could be smashed with baseballs. Passerby would hear the voices of 
loud, often inebriated soldiers singing “the refrains of sentimental ballads” in 




carnival spirit” of the Bowery, men picked up girls on roller coasters or took them 
into “darkened tunnels streamlined for romance.” The enforced wartime dim out 
became one of Coney’s key appeals for servicemen. Murray Schumach of the 
Times wrote, “Faces are in shadow except when the flame of a match curls 
around a cigarette.” The darkness provided cover for illicit activities and a refuge 
from Moses’ attempts to convert Coney’s den of pleasure into “a more crowded 
Jones Beach.” Rather than undergoing Moses’ vision of urban renewal, soldiers 
drove away middle class reform. Coney was reborn as the “Shangri-la of Joe 
Doakes” where servicemen could find “a refuge that is free from taboos and 
repressions.” It was a place where “you enjoy risks, a little well-chosen 
danger.”216 
The military also formally annexed or temporarily commandeered civilian 
establishments like hotels, bolstering the unofficial military takeover of other 
urban locales. In Miami, military officials simply seized the cheap “dollar-a-night” 
hotels, as well the “$35-a-night de luxe palaces” near the beach. In Atlantic 
City—another renowned amusement zone—hoteliers watched as some of the 
most profitable spots were “requisitioned by Uncle Sam’s land forces.” In addition 
to the Ambassador Hotel, the Army Air Forces snagged several other famous 
beachfront resorts, giving them control of most of the city’s largest 
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establishments. The move, Variety reported, left “hundreds of employees out of 
work” and caused several orchestras and the Ice Capades to cancel their 
lucrative summer tours. By mid-way through the tourist season, the Army took 
nearly 30 more hotels and Atlantic City’s trade floundered. Variety concluded that 
the city was now a “militarized resort.” In Chicago, the military moved into some 
of the most expensive hotels near the beach and amidst the skyscrapers and 
downtown shopping districts all along the Loop. By September 1942, the LA 
Times proclaimed, “Uncle Sam turns innkeeper,” and the military’s expansion into 
urban centers made the federal government the largest hotelier in the country. 
This loss of property accompanied a loss of municipal tax revenue, as cities 
struggled to collect taxes from sailors and soldiers.217 
Accommodation and Cooperation 
 Civilians were not foolish or naïve about the kinds of disruptions that war 
and a major troop presence brought to their midst. Some civilian businesses saw 
great opportunity and profit in the hordes of men and their now plump wallets, but 
many more women, law enforcement figures, neighborhood associations, and 
religious organizations feared the crime and disorder that accompanied a military 
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presence. Given the scale of mobilization and the stakes of the war, however, 
most civilians recognized little could be done to resist the accumulation of military 
power in American cities. In the face of government propaganda touting civilians’ 
duty to be “war-minded” and the complimentary promotion of the combat soldier 
as an unassailable, almost reverential figure, few people could carve out a space 
for explicit public criticism of the military. Though some open protest against the 
disruptions caused by servicemen in liberty ports did occur, most civilians chose 
to either cooperate or accommodate these special visitors.218 
 Civilian cooperation with the military took many forms, both passive and 
active. In some cases, civilians simply ignored or tolerated troop misbehavior and 
crime. They mocked the soldier’s nemesis, the Shore Patrol, calling them “Stool 
Pigeons.” At other times, they actively defended the apparent rights of 
servicemen to revel and drink while taking liberty. In multiple incidents, civilians 
joined troops fighting military or civilian police attempting to make arrests. The 
pattern was fairly simple. The police arrived after an incident or because of a 
complaint and moved to clear an establishment or arrest an offender. A fight 
would kick off, and civilians—often fellow patrons of a dance hall or tavern—
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might reject what they perceived as police encroachments on the right of 
servicemen to carouse, and then join the fray. Police brutality may have also 
sparked larger battles. In other cases, fights that started as civilian versus soldier 
could transform once the police arrived. In Vancouver, Washington—a liberty 
spot for troops in Portland—city police arrived at the river front district to break up 
a fist fight between a soldier and civilian. But after a policeman struck the soldier, 
sending him to the barracks hospital with a head injury, both the assembled 
crowd of 2000 troops and civilian bar patrons turned on the cops. Eventually the 
police broke out tear gas and riot guns, the fire department threatened to use fire 
hose to put down the riot, and the chief of police called in the state guard. 
Opposition to police action then, could unify civilians and soldier even if they had 
been initially fighting each other.219  
 In contrast to civilians who defended the liberty privileges of servicemen, 
others cooperated with military authorities and the government by informing on 
AWOL troops and deserters. Military Police records are filled with reports from 
informers who despised men who “shirked duty.” In one letter, a “lawabiding 
citizen” from Brooklyn claimed it was his “duty” to notify the MPs about Mickey, a 
“lazy good for nothing” deserter whose family brazenly kept “the Service flag in 
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their window.” “The nerve of them,” steamed the informer who had two sons of 
his own serving in the armed forces. He even suggested specific times when the 
MPs might catch him. Other civilians wrote in with similar complaints about 
AWOL men who were not “loyal to this country.” One informant claimed his 
AWOL son-in-law stated, “I would rather fight for anything but this country.” In 
this case, MPs suspected “a family quarrel may have been the basis of his 
allegation.” Citizens sometimes demanded furlough papers from men they 
suspected might be deserters and relayed their suspicions to military authorities. 
Occasionally, informants reported on suspected deserters because they were 
“continually drunk” or “the boisterous type,” or played their radios too loud “& 
wake every body up.” To incentivize informers, the Army issued films and posters 
targeted towards civilians imploring them to turn in deserters, while also 
publishing the names and addresses of AWOL soldiers in the absent man’s 
home newspaper.220 
 Some civilians were driven to excuse the excesses of troops because of 
Roosevelt’s idea that citizen and soldier had entered into a moral compact. 
Civilians would honor the potential sacrifice the soldier was making by 
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committing to personally sacrificing at home. In his April 1942 fireside chat, 
Roosevelt declared “there is one front and one battle where everyone in the 
United States—every man, woman, and child—is in action, and will be privileged 
to remain in action throughout the war. That front is right here at home, in our 
daily lives, in our daily tasks.” Being a part of a war front, civilians would be 
expected to make sacrifices. This might mean not striking for better wages, 
buying war bonds, or tolerating a bit of carousing. War workers were also 
motivated to cooperate with troops and the military because of the economic 
boom created by the war. By 1943, unemployment had plummeted to 1.2% due 
in large part to the burgeoning defense plants surrounding liberty ports. In 1945, 
defense spending totaled 37% of GDP, helping to produce a substantial increase 
in the discretionary income of many civilians. Politicians, besides hoping to 
appear patriotic, also likely recognized that criticisms of soldiers would be an 
especially poor electoral strategy and tended to accommodate the military. 
Republicans and Democrats both courted the soldier vote and Roosevelt openly 
pandered to troops in his 1944 reelection campaign, suggesting that Republicans 
hurt morale with their campaign rhetoric. By the end of the war, some civilians 
even pressured the Armed Forces to be more lenient towards servicemen. 




military justice had become “unduly severe,” leading the military’s general council 
to worry that congressional criticism would present “increasing difficulty.”221 
 Civilian police mostly ceded control of handling servicemen to the Army 
and Navy, tolerating flagrant abuses of officers and an erosion of legal authority. 
Before the war began, police chiefs openly acknowledged that selective service 
would strip departments of experienced officers. At a meeting of the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, one retired chief admitted “there are very few 
police departments that are up to snuff insofar as numbers are concerned, and 
so far as trained men are concerned.” The chief also served as a draft board 
member and warned that his district’s best officers would be classified as the 
most likely to be drafted “if I don’t have my way.” Across the country, chiefs 
                                                     
221 For this idea of a moral compact between soldier and civilian and the Roosevelt quote see 
Sparrow, Warfare State, 168; For additional work on the idea of civilians sacrificing for the 
military, state, and troops see Robert Westbrook, Why We Fought: Forging American Obligations 
in World War II (Washington: Smithsonian Press, 2004), Westbrook, “‘I Want a Girl, Just Like the 
Girl That Married Harry James’: American Women and the Problem of Political Obligation in 
World War II,” American Quarterly, 42. 4 (December 1990), Mark H. Leff, “The Politics of Sacrifice 
on the American Home Front in World War II,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 3 
(March 1991), 1296-1318; For an examination of how advertising and music was used as 
propaganda see John Bush Jones, All-Out for Victory!: Magazine Advertising and the World War 
II Home Front (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2009) and The Songs that Fought the 
War: Popular Music and the Homefront, 1939-1945 (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 
2006). Also see Holly Cowan Schulman, The Voice of America: Propaganda and Demoracy, 
1941-1945 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990). For economic numbers see Sparrow, 
Warfare State, 114-115; For discussion of soldier vote and Roosevelt’s charge see Ernest 
Lindley, George Gallup, “Vote of Soldiers Could Decide ’44 Election, Gallup Poll Finds,” NYT, 
December 5, 1943, 48,“Soldier Vote: Has Become Party Issue,” TWP, March 17, 1944, 9 and 
“Charges Assault on Morale of Soldiers and Families,” TWP, October 6, 1944, 1.For 
congressional criticism of military justice see “Minutes, Meeting of the General Council,” July, 
1945, 337 General Council Meeting June 1945-, Administrative Division: Mail and Records 
Branch, Classified Decimal File, 1941-1945, 337 General Council Nov 1944 to Feb 1945, box 95, 
RG 389 (Provost Marshal General), NACP; Some of this criticism, however, likely originated from 
the case of Private Joe McGee, who was convicted by a military court for striking German 
prisoners. For McGee case and military response see Cabell Phillips, “Army Explains Its System 




worried they were facing a “very dangerous” situation that could might “cripple 
us.” The collected chiefs briefly considered agitating for exemptions for police 
officers, but then worried that this exemption might incentivize men to “join the 
cops and escape the draft.” Fearing a public and political backlash, they 
concluded that using their influence to prevent officers from being drafted would 
be “decidedly unwise…we don’t want any accusation directed toward the police.” 
Some departments pursued clever strategies. In Boston, Commissioner Timilty 
campaigned for a large servicemen’s recreation center at the junction of Tremont 
Street and Beacon, just a block away from Scollay Square. Timilty likely intended 
to capture the sailor traffic before it got to Scollay, but his strategy was scuttled 
when the Navy rejected the plans.222 
Nationwide though, police departments suffered a dearth of experienced 
and well-trained officers that further fueled the decline of civilian legal authority. 
In prewar years, those who committed the unofficial crime of “contempt of cop”—
essentially not behaving deferentially to police—faced arrest or a beating (and 
often both). Servicemen felt no compulsion to respect or generally even comply 
with civilian police directions. The Army’s head of policing occasionally lamented 
the recurring ineffectiveness of cops. In addition to “an apparent lack of discipline 
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in the Army as a whole,” the Provost Marshal General cited the “failure of civil 
police to treat military personnel for infractions of law, as the police would treat 
civilians.” But how could municipal cops expect to effectively police soldiers when 
the military had asserted that civil authorities lacked any real legal authority?223 
Both official wartime regulations and unwritten agreements produced a 
legal regime that stripped old and undertrained cops of their power to project 
authority and to wield “command presence.” The Army generally relied on a 
patchwork of explicit wartime legal orders and verbal agreements with local 
leaders to supersede civilian jurisdiction. One official regulation stipulated that 
military officials would handle “civil violations perpetrated by military personnel” 
and that troops detained by cops would be immediately transferred to Military 
Police. Some cities surrendered sections of city halls for use by MPs. In other 
areas, military and civil leaders negotiated verbal agreements to the same effect 
but believed any written regulation “would be unwise.” Why some commanders 
resisted written agreements remains unclear, but perhaps they feared legal 
challenges might arise if this policing and legal regimen was made explicit. When 
local district attorneys attempted to try GIs in 1941, the Army contested the effort 
and even ordered MPs to never testify in civilian courts unless told to by the 
Provost Marshal. The military appeared to be more willing to surrender men 
when they had committed murder or rape against middle to upper class white 
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civilians because these cases were more likely to garner press attention and 
negative publicity should Commanders deny civilians their justice. 
Despite these exceptions, the War Department unambiguously stated that 
“a commanding officer is not required by Article of War 74 or by any other law to 
surrender a member of the military service, accused of a crime or offense, to the 
civil authorities for prosecution.” The armed forces jealously guarded this 
“paramount right of custody” and explained that “the war effort should not be 
impeded by unnecessary arrest and detention by civil authorities of members of 
the military service.” Even civilians recognized the disempowerment of the 
country’s police forces, and routinely mocked municipal cops at this time, with 
one man arguing “American police not only do not enjoy the confidence of the 
public, but are loathed by it as a body of moronic bullies.” He continued to 
guarantee that “no one above the grade of a cretin is going to take orders from a 
dumb cluck of a cop.” This disdain for cops may have arisen when officers, 
lacking the usual projection of power, increasingly relied on the billy club to solve 
disputes. Given the legal hurdles and manpower issues most civilian police 
departments faced, however, little could be done to check this growth of military 
power on the home front.224 
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The challenges of cracking down on wartime crime and a purported 
outbreak of juvenile delinquency left city politicians and police stretched thin. 
D.C. officials simply asked the Military Police to help “check the current wave of 
depraved and vicious crime.” Mayor La Guardia never explicitly criticized the 
troops, but he did attempt both nudges and shoves aimed at stopping crime and 
disorder, while simultaneously bolstering his own power. In early 1942, La 
Guardia implemented volunteer city patrols to stem the losses of his police force 
to the draft. Not content with this meager augmentation, La Guardia met with the 
American Legion and formed a volunteer auxiliary police brigade of 2500 
Legionnaires, who would relieve regular patrolmen between 8 p.m. and midnight. 
The Legionnaires would ideally be armed with automatic pistols and clothed in 
their World War I Army uniforms. Other cities copied this arrangement as part of 
an Office of Civilian Defense initiative. This program faced opposition in Chicago 
after Mayor Edward J. Kelly announced the Legion would seek 7000 officers, 
with the Chicago Civil Liberties Committee writing that they saw “decided threats 
to democratic processes” and that the plan was “a dangerous extension of public 
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power to a private group.” If Chicago proceeded, the Committee argued, they 
would be endorsing a force “that smacks of the gestapo or storm troops.” 
Chicago and other cities moved ahead with the plan anyways, seeking any path 
to reinforce department ranks.225 
 The pervasive accommodation afforded to troops by civilians, politicians, 
and police allowed the military to grow its sprawling legal oversight. Beyond 
essentially granting American troops immunity from many crimes, the military 
also asserted its power to police, arrest, and try American citizens. Using a legal 
justification taken from the “Digest of Opinion of the Judge Advocate General of 
the Army, 1912-1940,” commanders made civilian employees serving on 
transports and in ports of embarkation subject to military law and tribunals. Chief 
of Staff Marshall reiterated this policy in a memo declaring that all persons—
including American civilians and foreign troops—“in the field” would be subject to 
military jurisdiction. Here, the term “in the field” referred to any place on land or 
sea where “military operations are being conducted.” “Military operations” were 
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defined incredibly broadly and effectively meant anywhere military men were 
stationed or where logistics operations occurred. Even outside of U.S. ports and 
bases, MPs claimed the authority to confine and arrest civilians to Army 
guardhouses. In one publicized case, a Shore Patrol officer arrested and then 
beat a civilian accused of stealing $16. The municipal court judge overseeing the 
case censured the SP and declared that as “far as civilians are concerned, the 
military should leave them alone.” As Shore Patrol officers gradually took on “a 
complex that the whole world is out to trim sailors,” the judge reasoned, “they 
become too partisan and lack the detached viewpoint of civil authorities.” This 
censure, however, did nothing to change the military’s expanding legal power.226 
Civilians could be blindsided by the extent of military jurisdiction. One 
merchant seaman, after striking the civilian master of his convoy en route to 
Casablanca, was surprised to learn that he was subject to military law because 
the ship was transporting soldiers and supplies. Initially sentenced to seven 
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years of hard labor, the federal judge hearing his appeal agreed with the 
military’s claim that the merchant seaman’s presence near soldiers made him 
subject to military justice. The National Maritime Union angrily protested the 
ruling and sought an appeal “not only to determine the rights of its members but 
also all civilian workers who are engaged in the transportation and manufacture 
of supplies for the Army.” To the Union, the case marked a flagrant and 
“unwarranted imposition of Army discipline on civilians.” Their protests 
nevertheless failed to change the military’s power to try and punish civilians.227 
Outside the continental U.S., the armed forces exercised an even greater 
level of legal power. In Shanghai, for instance, the Army held three citizens 
without charging them for over four months, prompting a habeas corpus petition. 
But the greatest conflict occurred in Hawaii, where civilians were subject to 
martial law after Pearl Harbor. Hawaiian civilians accused provost court judges of 
being nothing more than “a soldier sitting on the bench with a gun on one side, a 
gas mask on the other, and big cigar in his mouth.” Other civilians subjected to 
these courts claimed these soldier-judges forced them to purchase war-bonds. 
Territorial officials argued that “the Army had assumed control over the personal 
life of everyone in the islands—including his dog.” After a civilian naval employee 
and a stockbroker appealed their convictions, a federal judge agreed to settle the 
legal conflict. The civilians’ attorney charged that the Hawaiian military courts 
                                                     





produced extremely high conviction rates and defendants could be fined $200-
$500 for drinking too much. The case eventually went to the Supreme Court 
where the justices retroactively struck down the territory’s martial law in 1946 and 
agreed that the Army denied civilians their constitutional rights.228 
Profiteering 
 The war’s economic boom created a swell of soldier and defense worker 
dollars that bolstered businesses in liberty ports and stopover towns. With the 
amusement and vice trades flourishing, proprietors could reliably pull in 
significant profits with each arriving ship or train. Many tailored their businesses 
to the furloughed troop, the adventurous girl, and the war worker teeming with 
cash. Capturing these spoils of the war economy, however, came with constant 
risk. Business owners might see their property or establishment wrecked by the 
regular brawling and disorderly conduct with little chance of being compensated. 
Soldier establishments also attracted prostitutes, B-Girls, and con-women, which 
in turn drew the oversight of vice squads, MPs, SPs, and the Army-Navy Vice 
Board. These anti-vice forces zealously attacked sources of venereal disease 
and leveraged their power to declare problem businesses out of bounds for all 
military personnel. Thus the proprietors of bars, taverns, dance halls, and other 
businesses had to carefully find ways of drawing in servicemen and women, 
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while preventing too many fights and avoiding the scrutiny of the military’s anti-
VD taskforce.229 
 Military authorities routinely pressured trade groups like liquor 
associations to ensure that their members would self-police by keeping 
prostitutes out of their establishments. In November 1941, after a bit of prodding 
from the Army, the Chicago based Illinois Association of Breweries issued a 
warning to the bars and saloons that it represented. Acknowledging the growing 
number of soldiers and sailors stationed near cities, the association noted that 
“many of these young men have, or will undoubtedly patronize your place.” 
Maintaining a “high code of conduct” and ensuring that nothing might “endanger 
the welfare and well-being of our young service men” would be a critical duty of 
every proprietor, the letter advised. Retailers that failed to uphold a high standard 
and “wholesome conditions” by banning people “of questionable character” would 
face consequences. Businesses that allowed prostitutes or other unsavory 
characters might gain an “unpatriotic stigma” for failing to uphold “our country’s 
national defense program.” The association went on to spell out the real 
penalties of this thinly veiled threat, explaining that owners who did not maintain 
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a proper standards might have MPs stationed near their businesses, lose their 
licenses, or be declared out of bounds by military authorities.230 
 Avoiding an out of bounds designation became a consistent challenge for 
many businesses. Even if a business owner wished to comply with military and 
trade regulations, ejecting women from a soldier bar was no simple task. Troops 
could obviously resist such efforts, and even if successful, a bar with no women 
would likely mean no trade. Proprietors, though, would be held legally 
responsible if they failed to eject prostitutes from the premises. Military forces 
and the Justice Department invoked the May Act, a law aimed at undercutting 
prostitution near Army camps and bases, to make business owners complicit in 
any legal charges. Speaking to the International Association of Chiefs of Police, 
now Director of Civilian Defense Mayor La Guardia argued that any owners who 
ignored prostitution in their establishment were “as much responsible as the 
pimps who bring the girls to the place.”231 
If declared out of bounds, businesses lacked a clear path to redemption. 
After being placed off limits to sailors, the owner of Hollywood Tropics, a Los 
Angeles restaurant on the famed Vine Street, issued telegrams to both President 
Roosevelt and Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes pleading to have its out of bounds 
designation repealed: “We conduct a first class restaurant…and only your office 
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can prevent our closing the doors which would mean not only our entire financial 
loss and source of living cut off but the unemployment of forty or more people. A 
good many of whom have families to support.” In a rejection of this appeal, the 
district commandant noted that the restaurant was notorious for producing drunks 
and stragglers that “endangered the security of the Task Force.” The Hollywood 
Tropics was just one of sixty-two establishments in Los Angeles off limits for 
servicemen, and LA’s Shore Patrol uniquely appears to have diligently reported 
and policed the most troublesome spots. They even recruited sailors and soldiers 
to record which businesses were violating regulations or producing the rowdiest 
and most violent situations. Shore Patrol Commander Fogg publically exhorted 
LA barkeepers to “run your bars in a clean, orderly, and respectable manner. 
This is a patriotic duty.” Crackdowns on troublesome bars and taverns, however, 
did little to attack the source of the drunkenness and disorder. So when one 
saloon was shut-down, another gin-joint a block away was ready to snatch up the 
displaced dollars.232 
 Besides evading the attention of the military authorities, operators of 
military bars faced a higher risk of getting caught up in a physical altercation. 
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Because most managers and owners were male civilians attempting to manage 
often drunken servicemen, they could easily become targets. In one instance, a 
floor manager of the Honeymoon Lane dance hall in Midtown brawled with four 
GIs on Broadway after a dispute over a cab at 4:30 a.m. The manager recalled 
that the soldiers “had been drinking and were feeling a little tough.” After a 20-
minute fistfight, witnesses claimed Colonel Elliott Roosevelt—FDR’s son—
emerged from the crowd to break up the fracas, telling the soldiers “to scram.” 
Occasionally proprietors needed to step in and break up clashes between men. 
In Chicago, a tavern owner’s wife ended a knife fight between two sailors by 
smashing a beer bottle over the head of one of the combatants. In one Louisiana 
boom town several national guardsmen wrecked a saloon after the owner 
announced a price jack on beer, leading the owner to shoot one of the 
guardsmen. In another tavern, this one in Chicago, two sailors spent a night 
insulting and abusing the barman. One of the Bluejackets, roaring drunk, hit the 
bartender in the face with a loaf of bread and threatened to kill him. After the 
bartender returned with a pistol, the sailor rushed him. The bartender fired the 
automatic pistol hitting him 19 times, leaving the sailor dead on the floor, and the 
bartender in jail. Such armed conflicts between proprietor and patron occurred 
throughout the war.233 
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 Some businesses decided the revenue that came with these risks was 
ultimately not worth the trouble. In D.C., an Army Lieutenant went on a rampage 
in the Hi-Hat cocktail lounge at the Ambassador Hotel, drunkenly swearing at 
guests, punching the civilian manger in the stomach, before kicking and breaking 
a glass door. The hotel feared that this behavior would drive off its civilian 
clientele. Other incidents produced publically humiliating incidents for the Navy 
and severe property damage. In New York, the district commandant worked with 
the glamorous Hotel Astor in Times Square to put on parties and dances for 
naval officers and enlisted men. The hotel gave the Navy the space for free and 
made up the difference by selling men drinks and refreshments. Commanders 
enjoyed the arrangement because it allowed a ship’s crew to take liberty in Times 
Square, but under naval supervision. But one party in 1945 turned into what the 
hotel manager described as “a disastrous experience.” Crewmen got smashed 
on the hotel’s roof garden and became disorderly. The manager and assistants 
frantically attempted to clear the 350 sailors from the garden. Navymen jammed 
themselves into elevator cars above safe capacity, while the employees lobbied 
the “absolutely ineffectual” Shore Patrol officers to help. By the end of the affair, 
the manager and his assistants had been knocked down by the sailors and “very 
nearly kicked into unconsciousness.” In his letter to New York’s commandant, the 
hotel manager explained that the Hotel Astor would never again allow the Navy 




harder in areas with undiversified economies where servicemen’s wages were 
such a central part of the local trade.234 
 The war also sparked rampant price-gouging and profiteering related to 
the liquor trade. Military investigators regularly scoped out establishments 
suspected of engaging in price-gouging, which could result in an out of bounds 
designation. Taverns and cafes pulled a number of tricks aimed at driving up 
prices like conveniently “running out” of draft beer just at 7:00 p.m. on weekend 
and pay nights, right as men began to stream into the establishment. The 
barman could then triple prices for bottled beers. Military Police dedicated whole 
units to investigating this profiteering and sought to shut down establishments 
that engaged in it. In one notable case, a group of soldiers sued a bar for 
overcharging and won a $600 settlement. Even the military in Hawaii though, 
engaged in a kind of sanctioned price gouging by charging large fees for liquor 
permits. Taxi drivers, besides over-charging fares, sometimes worked with 
proprietors by picking up servicemen and then recommending the proprietor’s 
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tavern. The driver received a kickback and the tavern got a customer. Other 
cabbies cut out the drinking establishments entirely by directly selling black 
market whiskey to their military fares. Barbers attempted their own rackets, giving 
soldiers a haircut before producing a comb with yellow flakes on it. The barber 
would then explain that the soldier suffered from yellow dandruff, “a contagious 
disease” that could only be solved by an expensive treatment the barber luckily 
had for sale.235 
 In addition to these rackets, civilians ran a number of scams that 
specifically targeted servicemen. Some scams were simple. Young boys would 
wait for soldiers to arrive on “short-stop” trains at stopover points like Omaha, 
Nebraska, and then offer to purchase meals and other items for them so they 
didn’t need to leave the train. After obtaining the cash, the boys never returned. 
Bases and camps attracted carnivals, road houses, and gambling joints, where 
B-girls enticed troops to drink and play crooked games. Troops frequenting 
downtown D.C. regularly encountered street photographers who would 
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encourage the men to pose, supposedly snap a picture, and then give the marks 
a numbered card. The soldier simply needed to mail the card and some cash to 
the listed address and soon they would receive a photographic memento of their 
time in the nation’s capital. No photo ever arrived, of course. Similar photo scams 
existed in all the major port cities. Other scams became quite elaborate. Horace 
Lancaster, a particularly inventive con artist, befriended servicemen and 
convinced them that he was an acclaimed portrait painter. For under $10, he 
would transform a man’s photo into a large portrait. In reality, Lancaster 
periodically worked as a butler and handy man for a family of artists. When 
troops asked to see his work, he showed portraits painted by the family he 
worked for. Convinced of his ability, troops surrendered the fee and a photo with 
the promise of a portrait before too long. No painting ever arrived and Lancaster 
made thousands of dollars before being caught. Night club operators and 
bootleggers also scammed troops, selling watered down beer or dosing real beer 
with a chemical agent that made the men pass out. After the soldiers were 
helpless, the operator “rolled them for every penny.”236 
 Corruption and graft boomed on the home front with both military and 
civilian authorities taking part. Civilian police occasionally worked with hotel 
detectives, engaging in a “shakedown” routine of traveling troops. The hotel 
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detective would claim that a visiting servicemen had been seen entering his room 
with a woman not registered to the hotel, a grave offense. Civilian police would 
then arrive, forcibly arrest the lone servicemen, and while in transit to the police 
station, suddenly declare that the man could be freed for $15. Naval officers also 
abused their power to profit off the growing income of civilians. At worker 
recreation halls in Pearl Harbor, a group of ten naval officers ran “a little Tijuana 
gambling syndicate,” where civilian employees reportedly wagered $50,000 to 
$175,000 every night in poker and dice games. Each day, they pocketed 
thousands of dollars taken as protection money. Few, however, surpassed the 
brazen corruption of Provost Marshal Captain Guy Taylor. Taylor, as head of 
military policing in Tampa Bay, flagrantly abused his office throughout the war. 
He routinely accepted bribes from local bars and dance halls to avoid being 
placed on the out of bounds list. Establishments in his debt provided him with 
scotch, women, and a regular spot to hold parties. Taylor also asked a bar owner 
for $250 to pay for abortions for two women with whom he had affairs. When the 
owner refused, Taylor began sending Military Police to harass the bar. GIs who 
wished to avoid being sent abroad also sometimes paid Taylor $1000 to $1200 
and be kept as a rear echelon soldier. The Army made some attempts to stamp 
out scams likes these, but struggled with the formidable volume of wartime 
graft.237 
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 Before the riots, crime, corruption, and graft, civilian authorities anticipated 
that the war would likely bring a high level of lawbreaking and disorder to 
American cities. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, one of New York’s District Attorneys 
announced that the city should expect a possible crime wave related to the onset 
of war. J. Edgar Hoover publically expressed concern when the first quarter of 
1942 saw a 3.3% nationwide increase in the crime rate, with rape increasing by 
8%. Early on, urban officials consistently looked to London as a potential model 
for what might happen in liberty ports. Los Angeles’ district attorney John F. 
Dockweiler wrote to Mayor La Guardia in 1941, explaining that their cities would 
need to brace for the kind of crime wave that visited wartime London. He noted 
that war had brought a flood of criminality to London and other urban hubs, and 
that “our large cities cannot escape the same woeful conditions.” Dockweiler 
established an anti-crime committee and proclaimed that “our task is not only to 
remove the rotten apple from the barrel, but to keep that one apple from 
becoming rotten.”238 
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In tackling the challenges and disruptions that thousands of troops might 
cause, urban officials usually chose to focus on the apparent threat of civilian 
juvenile delinquency, a concern that soon became coupled to the problem of 
troops in cities and boom towns. In Dockweiler’s letter to La Guardia he suggests 
that available municipal resources be directed towards diverting “the misplaced 
energies of young offenders into useful channels.” Citing headlines from London 
like “London Youth Crime Grows” and “London Swept by Crime Wave,” 
Dockweiler lobbied La Guardia to use Office of Civilian Defense resources to 
prevent a similar fate on the American home front. Other civil authorities 
acknowledged that mobilization could spark a rise in criminality and affirmed in 
warlike tones that “now is the time to formulate the grand strategy for the 
campaign against wartime delinquency.” With fathers and mothers leaving for 
military service or defense jobs, more and more youths would lack supervision 
and the fundamental steadying structure of the family, becoming increasingly 
likely to engage in “juvenile and sex delinquency.” When New York proposed 
eliminating the police department’s Juvenile Aid Bureau, the Women’s City 
Club—originally a progressive suffragette organization—protested and cautioned 
that similar cuts had fueled “the wave of juvenile lawlessness” in Britain. The 
Department of Labor’s Children’s Bureau seemed to confirm the fears, claiming 
that juvenile delinquency cases spiked by 52% from 1940 to 1943 in large cities 
across the country. Did this reported rise in juvenile delinquency cases result 




over potential wartime disruptions simply cause police and courts to focus more 
resources on youth policing? Urban officials and groups like the Juvenile 
Protective Association believed that by failing to combat the supposed flood of 
juvenile delinquency, “the home front is losing its own war.” Sociologists and 
historians remain more circumspect, suggesting that a peripheral concern was 
exaggerated into a great moral panic.239 
Though no official or politician directly criticized the Armed Forces for 
juvenile delinquency, the battle against the crime and misbehavior of girls and 
teenagers could be seen as a kind of proxy battle or indirect protest against the 
disruptions created by servicemen. Both experts and the youth themselves 
began citing the growing presence of soldiers in nearby towns and cities as a 
primary cause of youth crime and promiscuity. Reporters saw the unchecked 
growth of boom towns and the vice trade as factors in the rise of delinquency as 
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well. A Department of Labor report backed this assessment by blaming the 
growth of businesses targeted towards servicemen, explaining that “employment 
of younger boys and girls in places where liquor is sold, in dance halls, ‘honky 
tonks,’ ‘juke joints,’ on the streets, and so forth, often brings them into 
undesirable surroundings or into association with persons who contribute to their 
becoming delinquent.” When these teenagers left their jobs at night, the report 
noted that they would be “tired and unprotected” and would face difficulty 
refusing “temptations.”240 
Capitalizing on concerns over delinquency and public morality, La Guardia 
cleverly used the press and public events to subtly push against unsavory 
military behavior. After the millionth servicemen entered the National Catholic 
Community Center in New York, La Guardia greeted the sailor with several 
prizes, cash, and a photography crew. In his speech at the event, he remarked 
that “recreation is not inconsistent with wholesomeness,” and sourly noted that 
                                                     
240 For reporters blaming boom-towns and vice see Sanford Bates, “Johnny—14 Years Old, and a 
Challenge: ‘Juvenile Delinquency,’” NYT, November 8, 1942, SM10; For Department of Labor 
report see "National Go-To-School Drive" Handbook, U.S. Department of Labor, Federal Security 
Agency, 1944. Page 17, Folder 5, Box 31, Defense Council Records, OSA; "A Community 
Program for Prevention and Control of Juvenile Delinquency in Wartime" Report, U.S. 
Department of Labor, Sept. 1943. Page 5, Folder 1, Box 28, Defense Council Records, OSA., 
taken from http://sos.oregon.gov/archives/exhibits/ww2/Pages/life-juveniles.aspx. Troops 
certainly contributed to the possible growth in delinquency and changes in how it was policed. 
Early in the war, officials and reformers mostly called for delinquents to be educated and uplifted 
by superior schooling, recreation, and religious instruction. By war’s end, a harsher form of 
policing and punishment took hold as the dominant regimen. Reflecting on the emerging postwar 
society, Hoover put out sensational warnings that the country faced “a potential army of six million 
criminals,” while Newark’s police chief denounced the “mollycoddling” that allowed this threat to 
grow. For Hoover and Newark chief quotes see William Glover, “Some Cities Visit Sin of Child on 
Parents,” TWP, September 1, 1946, B1. For an overview of the gradual shift to harsher policing of 




he had yet to convince enough people of that message. Even here though, La 
Guardia avoided direct condemnation of servicemen criminality and worked 
within wartime limitations on what could be condemned.241 
 Direct and open protest of servicemen’s criminal behavior remained a 
rare, but important action that politicians and civilian groups could use to 
pressure the military. As seen in previous chapters, some individual women and 
male civilians protested to military authorities or used major newspapers to 
condemn the unrestrained pleasure-seeking in cities. These civilians could use 
the anonymity of telegrams, letters to editor, or simply rely on the fact they were 
not public figures to avoid accusations of not being patriotic enough. City officials 
and organizations lacked those protections, and so any public criticism of the 
military would have to be carefully stated. Criticizing drinking and the corruption 
of “our boys” proved a somewhat acceptable method of denouncing the larger 
problems plaguing liberty ports and boom towns. 
Prohibition groups and allied politicians employed this strategy in their 
fight to make all areas surrounding camps and bases “dry zones.” This fight to 
prevent draftees from readily accessing liquor started in prewar Oklahoma. When 
Oklahoma became a state, it wrote prohibition into its state constitution and 
remained dry even in 1941. As the draft expanded and recruits began arriving at 
Fort Sill in the southwestern corner of the state, Army officers started shipping in 
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liquor from wet states. Oklahoma’s Governor Leon C. Phillips (D) demanded they 
immediately cease violating state laws, but Army officers replied that the Fort 
was actually “not a part of Oklahoma and, therefore, not subject to the State’s 
prohibitory laws.” The governor responded by threatening to use highway patrol 
officers to essentially blockade the Fort and confiscate any incoming contraband. 
Federal and state prosecutors conferred and with the assistance of the local 
Army commandant, agreed to cease any more shipments. A subsequent federal 
statute made importing alcohol a felony offense, though bootlegged drink could 
still be found.242 
Oklahoma’s Senator Joshua Lee (D) rekindled this conflict when he 
attempted to attach his “dry amendment” to a bill that extended the draft to 18 
and 19-year-olds. The amendment would ban alcohol sales at camps, bases, 
and adjacent towns. Lee seized on the notion that “boys of 18 and 19” would 
require “some protection against liquor and vice.” Prohibition groups had long 
campaigned for such a bill, and members of Congress claimed that they faced an 
unprecedented deluge of letters and telegrams supporting the measure. Civilian 
organizations like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union mobilized in 
support of Lee’s efforts, pointing out that men in uniform during World War I were 
barred from drinking. Groups opposed to prohibition made wild claims that the 
measure was the product of “the Goebbels secret prohibition propaganda.” 
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Secretary of War Stimson denounced the measure, arguing it would incentivize 
bootlegging and “seriously undermine morale.” Illinois’ Senator Scott W. Lucas 
(D) pointed out that the Army and Navy already used large Chicago hotels near 
the Loop, making it effectively impossible to enforce the ban. Though the 
amendment failed to pass, military authorities took it as a serious threat—a 
potential portent of future criticism. When Chief of Staff Marshall learned of the 
growing problems of “soldier drinking” and the subsequent “mounting wave of 
criticism and resentment” on the part of civilians, he wrote that “this situation” 
could have resulted in the “the passage of the Lee amendment in the Senate.” 
Marshall demanded that something be done prevent any similar protests.243 
 Challenges to drinking, however, continued to surface throughout the war. 
Judges and prisoner advocacy groups both linked alcoholism to criminality, and 
attacking alcohol abuse became a somewhat acceptable way for civilians to 
criticize soldier behavior. Even so, most politicians wrapped any disapproval of 
troops in concern for their welfare. La Guardia toed this line when he denounced 
“debauchery and reckless drinking” spreading through the nation’s cities in 1942. 
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The Times reported that La Guardia suggested the booze and vice were 
“impairing the health of the men in the armed services and those on the home 
front were tending to increase crime.” In Los Angeles, “several hundred civic and 
religious leaders of Hollywood” barged into a Police Commission hearing to a 
launch a “barrage of complaints” against “amusement enterprises and night 
spots” that catered to the unwholesome desires of servicemen. In each of these 
cases, civilian leaders condemned the conditions that enabled poor troop 
behavior, effectively suggesting that men could not control their desires.244 
 Other civilian groups were far more direct and less willing to tolerate the 
actions of military men. The Los Angeles chapter of the Women’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU) stands out for its forthright censure of military 
misbehavior. In a letter to the district commandant, the WCTU directly urged the 
military to honor their own policies and stop military men from frequenting 
“disorderly premises that are gathering places for prostitutes and sex-perverts.” 
Though certainly more direct in tone, this type of criticism was still within the 
bounds of protecting the welfare of “our boys.” The WCTU, however, proceeded 
to angrily protest that servicemen’s incessant drinking and harassment were 
turning Hill Street and Grand Central Market—located near Bunker Hill’s two-
story Victorians and a middle-class shopping zone—into a “veritable ‘skid row.’” 
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Women claimed they were unable to move through the area without being 
annoyed, accosted, or insulted by a “horde of obnoxious drunken bums.” As the 
WCTU president Ida B. Wise Smith put it on another occasion, “a soldier plus 
alcohol plus sex equals trouble—and always will.”245 
 More rarely, civilian legal authorities took a stand against the military’s 
failure to properly police their men. In Olympia, Washington, both the local police 
chief and the district attorney assured commanders at nearby Fort Lewis that 
they would cooperate and turn over soldiers in the majority of legal situations. 
The district attorney politely explained, however, that “Mr. Huntamer, who is 
sheriff, feels differently about the matter.” Sheriff Huntamer originally cooperated 
with Army authorities, turning over GIs accused of crimes. But he soon noticed 
that the Army did nothing to these men, crime went unchecked, and no MPs 
policed the dances where soldiers congregated. So the sheriff started refusing to 
turn over troops and prosecuted them instead in state court, leading to a 
reduction in the crime rate. The district attorney hoped that “we may be able to 
change his mind and get him to turn these violators over to you,” but also noted 
the sheriff would only change his mind if “men will be properly disciplined.” 
Huntamer’s protest succeeded for one critical reason: Pearl Harbor had yet to 
occur, meaning the Army’s need for manpower was not as dire. The Army did not 
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need to be as aggressive in asserting its legal privilege to uphold adequate 
troops levels, and could not yet utilize the wartime emergency situation to compel 
civilian cooperation.246 
 Communities also sometimes banded together to resist and protest the 
disruptions and dangers created by servicemen. In North Stelton, New Jersey, a 
small town south of Newark, women formed a committee to lobby their Senator, 
H. Alexander Smith (R), to intervene on their behalf after soldiers from nearby 
Camp Kilmer began to bother locals. In a telegram that Senator Smith forwarded 
to military authorities, the women of the North Stelton Committee described the 
grim situation: “North Stelton, adjoining Camp Kilmer, has been repeatedly 
terrorized by acts of violence including house-breaking, burglary, molestation of 
women and children, rape of seven year old girl in broad daylight, brutal rape of 
young mother by four soldiers after repeated demands to Camp and Local 
authorities for protection.” The women believed their only recourse would be to 
“deputize the few men remaining in a Community consisting mainly of women 
and children.” Their demands were simple: The Provost Marshal should 
immediately provide enough Military Police to control the situation, and then the 
Army should install “a manproof fence and floodlights for the boundaries between 
Camp Kilmer and North Stelton.” The three women leading the committee bitterly 
concluded the telegram by stating, “An infuriated community demands prompt 
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action.” A military investigation denied initial suspicions that this complaint might 
be racially motivated, noting “the racial question was in no way involved in 
subject incidents.” Investigators, however, blamed the sexual assaults and other 
crimes on the history of the area, which they claimed was originally founded “as a 
Trotskyite settlement” that “practiced the theory of free love” and that the whole 
area suffered from low moral values. Nevertheless, the commanding officer 
agreed to declare the town out of bounds, build an iron mesh fence and 
floodlights, increase the number of MPs, and establish better checks on men 
slipping through the current fence. The Provost Marshal General wrote back to 
Senator Smith and promised to resolve the situation. The town though, still 
deputized ten residents as special patrolmen and remained on edge.247 
 The most consistent and fearless criticism came from a group of 
Americans who were both civilians and members of the military simultaneously: 
chaplains. Chaplains occupied a fascinating space within the military—they were 
part of a secular organization, but also religious figures. They lacked the authority 
of a commanding officer, but wielded the moral authority that came with their 
vestments. When a civilian wrote to Chief of Staff Marshall objecting to 
intoxication by soldiers on leave at night or on the weekends as well as the 
mistreatment of “young ladies” by “military men whom liquor has robbed of 
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natural inhibitions,” the civilian was pointed to the chaplains as force that could 
combat these evils. As members of the military charged with shepherding the 
moral and religious lives of the Armed Services, they carved out a space for open 
and even fierce condemnation of sinful behavior. Some chaplains focused on the 
omnipresent issue of liquor and its effects on men, agitating for the military to 
better control alcohol abuse. Chief of Chaplains William R. Arnold contested the 
military’s lax policies on drunkenness and asserted that the armed forces were 
caving into the interests of the liquor trade, which, as one of his junior chaplains 
said, amounted to “sabotage to the American people and a disgrace to the US 
government.” Quoting Chief of Staff Marshall, one chaplain protested that “when 
the soldier leaves camp, our troubles begin.” Given the rampant “gambling, 
profanity, and sexual sins” even senior chaplains seemed to believe that “the 
world is imperiled today by sin. It is the supreme tragedy of the world. The whole 
earth is groaning under its curse.” Another chaplain with experience in the US 
and the UK noted that the most troubling behavior occurred when “our 
thoughtless soldiers” decided to “molest nice girls on the streets who are 
strangers and give the soldier no reason to get familiar with them.” The chaplain 
seethed that the MPs did nothing, even though “many of these incidents borders 




courage to openly challenge command remains noteworthy in a period defined 
by accommodation and cowardice to authority.248 
All of these civilian groups and officials that engaged in direct and open 
protest of the military were scattered voices, lacking a central, coordinated 
movement. Few could sustain consistent criticism in a country that militarized 
both the city and civilian. By the end of the war though, some civilian leaders 
could no longer contain their acrimony or disgust with the failures of policing. City 
councilmen in Los Angeles passed a unanimous resolution calling for the War 
Department to immediately release the more than 400 policemen who had been 
drafted. Other cities asked for similar releases to bolster the depleted police 
department ranks. Council members bitterly complained that crime and unrest 
had been allowed to run rampant, with assaults against women going unchecked 
as the city became “infested with criminals.” Councilman Meade McClanahan 
remarked, “Something is radically wrong with the Police Department from the 
heads down.”249 
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The most explosive and visible civil-military policing conflict occurred on 
Staten Island in 1945, where Richmond County’s district attorney Farrell M. Kane 
railed against “a crime wave” caused by soldiers on the east shore. After months 
of robberies, thefts, and assaults, he threatened to usurp the military’s legal 
authority in the district: “It is primarily a military matter and I wish to give the 
military authorities the opportunity to handle it. However, if they fail to correct the 
condition, steps will be taken by civil authorities.” Kane’s proclamation was a 
remarkable challenge to wartime governance and law enforcement norms, but it 
was prompted by what citizens claimed was a wave of “stick-ups, muggings, 
assaults, store robberies, and the molesting of women and young girls, 
committed by uniformed soldiers.” Tensions deepened after a civilian was set 
upon and stabbed by six GIs, while a policemen attempting a rescue was shot at 
with his own pistol. DA Kane demanded the Army put “an end to the reign of 
terror” and local businesses suggested they might begin closing before dusk. 
Civilian complaints to city and federal officials—as well as petitions to Secretary 
Stimson and New York Governor Thomas Dewey to close the local cantonment 
that housed over 3000 soldiers—led to an armed guard, 200 men strong 
patrolling the area throughout the night. Robberies and assaults persisted 
though, and few women dared to walk in the dark. La Guardia requested greater 
cooperation from the Army, but admitted “the situation has not been good for 
several days.” A grand jury investigated the disturbances and pinpointed the 




better security, an end to “Army laxity” in policing, and improved recreational 
facilities.250  
Why did Kane and the citizens of Staten Island become so willing to 
denounce soldiers and the Army when other communities experiencing similar 
incidents remained mostly silent? While wartime dictates prevented most city 
officials from openly criticizing the military or its men, the factor of race 
compromised this stricture. Indeed, the local GIs on Staten Island were 
predominantly black troops working as stevedores and longshoremen. Given 
their race, black troops lacked the same legal privileges bestowed on white 
troops, and so their crimes, real, exaggerated, or fabricated, became acceptable 
targets of civilian protest. It is ultimately impossible to determine whether the 
black troops on Staten Island committed these crimes, or whether their crime 
rates significantly differed from white servicemen. The descriptions of the crimes 
are remarkably similar to accounts of crimes committed by white troops. At the 
same time, inconsistencies in eyewitness testimonies and the fact of rampant 
racism undercut the reliability of the evidence. The Chicago Defender considered 
the whole affair a “wide-spread smear campaign against Negroes” that 
predictably culminated with “the charge of rape lodged by a white woman.” They 
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blamed the Times and the New York Post for provoking a “rape hysteria” with 
little basis in fact. Whether a genuine crime wave or a mostly imagined racial 
panic, military authorities responded by transferring 1,000 black soldiers to other 
parts of the country, rendering a rare victory for civilian officials and local 
citizens.251 
The military rarely assented to civilian attempts to regulate their men, but 
when War Mobilization Director James F. Byrnes issued a midnight curfew for all 
major American cities in February 1945, military authorities agreed to enforce the 
order. Byrnes sold his order as a move to reduce coal consumption amongst 
night clubs, bars, and other places of entertainment, though he admitted “it will 
also be helpful in the fields of transportation, manpower, and in other ways.” 
Congress launched an inquiry to determine the true motives for the curfew, 
asking whether Byrnes and the military intended the order as a check on vice. 
One congressman described Byrnes as “power drunk” and suggested the curfew 
was an act of “dictatorship,” dismissing the “alleged coal saving.” No smoking 
gun exists, but the Byrnes order appears to have been intended to curtail 
drinking and disorder in liberty ports. The order notably allowed some 
establishments to stay open past midnight if they stopped serving alcohol, 
undercutting Byrnes’ ostensible desire to cut back on coal usage. The military 
also chose to enforce the order, suggesting they hoped it might quell some of the 
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outstanding issues created by men on leave. Though La Guardia attempted to 
overrule Byrnes and set New York’s curfew at 1 a.m., both the Army and Navy 
sent squads of MPs and SPs charging into midtown bars in New York to eject 
troops violating the midnight order. Commanders cleared Scollay Square at 
midnight, as well, a rare show of determined military policing. Earlier in the war, 
the Army imposed an ordinance preventing liquor sales after midnight in San 
Francisco, and so the Byrnes order functioned as an extension of that rule. 
Though some entertainers and supper clubs believed the order would shutter 
their businesses, other establishments agreed that speakeasies would replace 
the closed spots and that most clubs would simply open an hour earlier to cover 
the loss of late-night revenue. Nevertheless, the military’s compliance with the 
order signals that High Command may have begun to think that concessions 
should be made to better control the roiling situation in stateside ports.252 
Other protests occurred in everyday civil-military clashes, especially on 
trains where civilians and soldiers were brought into close proximity with booze 
and boredom. Because the military required a significant amount of railcars for 
troop and freight transportation, civilians faced chronic delays. Given the 
endlessly interrupted service, overcrowded cars, and number of trains 
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transporting both civilians and servicemen simultaneously, conflict proved 
inevitable. In one example, a MP and a civilian began hurling insults over a 
delay, with each side soon reaching for their hips and drawing pistols before 
cooler heads prevailed. Delays frequently provoked similar incidents as antsy 
soldiers on interminable train journeys got increasingly drunk. Train bathrooms 
were regularly ruined when intoxicated men vomited in the sink and toilet, leaving 
the facilities unusable for the remaining journey. Other civilians complained about 
the singing, loud banter, and the Chief of the Military Police Security and Intel 
Division argued that officers on trains commonly failed “to exercise proper 
control,” leading to “misconduct and other incidents in civilian communities which 
reflect unfavorably on the military establishment.” He also reiterated that troops 
should not detrain, unless “under proper supervision.” Riots occurred when the 
Army attempted to send too many men through on overstuffed, boiling hot trains, 
causing further delays with the whole railroad system threatening to buckle. 
Civilians resented the preferential boarding given to soldiers, often finding no 
available seats. Trains thus became another place where civilians were exposed 
to the risks and hardships that came with mobilization.253 
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Young, male civilians classified as 4-Fs—essentially a registrant who 
cannot be accepted for military service due to physical, mental, or moral 
limitations—suffered the ridicule of both society and military men, though also 
engaged in their own protests. 4-Fs generally suffered from a physical ailment 
that would prevent service, but lamented that they were given “the same rating 
as imbeciles and criminals.” Seen as cowardly, effeminate, and worthless, many 
experienced the war as an endless succession of humiliations where civilians 
suspiciously questioned why they were not in uniform, or soldiers mocked their 
inability to serve. GIs particularly targeted 4-Fs to demonstrate their own 
masculinity and confront obvious sexual rivals, leading one factory owner who 
relied on these essential war workers to plead for the Army to recognize their 
value. “Four-effer” became its own epithet, wielded by military men, but also by 
“young girls who make a boast that they wouldn’t date a ‘Four-effer.’” In Schiff’s 
Scollay Square, male civilians are mocked for being “jealous because the girls 
won’t give you a tumble without a uniform.” Radio programs piled on, routinely 
making 4-Fs the butt of jokes. The Chicago Daily Tribune admonished readers 
that though many 4-Fs may be young and lack “the appearance of a cripple,” 
many had legitimate medical reasons for rejection and that “most of them would 
mortgage their lives for the privilege of wearing a United States battle uniform.” 
                                                     
1945, 510 General, Administrative Division: Mail and Records Branch, Classified Decimal File, 





Emily Post offered a similar reprimand, telling soldiers to stop shouting “slacker” 
at 4-Fs.254 
Occasionally, civilian men confronted the soldiers that tormented them, 
with one notable 4-F beating up four soldiers who had taunted him. “I’ve been 
taking that kind of guff from soldiers too long,” he said. 4-Fs were also seen as 
men who “hate uniforms” and pick fights with them. Others protested by 
appropriating the coveted military uniform, leading to civil-military conflict. One 4-
F in LA posed as an Army captain, before being caught by suspicious MPs. 
Conflicts over who was allowed to wear a uniform could become violent. In a 
night club, MPs confronted a male civilian wearing a military jacket. The civilian 
explained it was a purchased “reject” jacket and an argument ensued. A brawl 
between the MPs and the jacketed civilian and his friends soon turned into a 
shootout, wounding the participants and bystanders.255 
When victory arrived, civilians celebrated, but also dreaded what would 
happen when troops fully returned to their communities. During the war, fears 
proliferated that “when GI Joes lay down their guns for Uncle Sam, many will pick 
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up new ones and run amuck.” The prominent businessman Harvey S. Firestone 
Jr. predicted an unparalleled postwar crime wave brought on by “soldiers, 
schooled in the use of lethal weapons and accustomed to living intimately with 
death.” Criminologists at the Harvard Law School joined this chorus of warnings, 
arguing that both delinquency and criminality would rise due to the “wartime 
experiences of soldiers and civilians.” Hoover admitted similar concerns, 
suggesting that troops might fall into “protest and perhaps violence.” Some of 
these fears derived from the memory of World War I’s returning veterans, some 
of whom had been implicated in highly publicized, shocking crimes. Reports of 
American troops looting and committing rape in contemporary Europe, along with 
firsthand experience with troop disorder in stateside hubs in the immediate 
preceding years, exacerbated these concerns. To quell the growing 
apprehension over demobilization, commanders routinely issued statements to 
the papers, assuring the public that there was no cause for worry, because the 
military had instilled a rigorous self-discipline in each man, which would curtail 
any surge in criminal behavior. Still, lurid stories made the front-pages, 
reinforcing civilian anxieties. In one report, the separated wife of a GI told a New 
York court how her husband promised to “put a knife in you and twist it. The 
Army taught me that.”256 
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 Military authorities certainly believed that the misbehavior of returning 
servicemen might endanger the image of the Armed Forces, as well as their 
efforts to institutionalize universal military service in postwar America. This 
became a particularly strong concern as soldiers began to grumble about the 
extremely slow rate at which they were discharged. As boredom and leave time 
increased, chaplains reported that morale plummeted and misbehavior 
flourished. Even before the end of the war, the Provost Marshal General had 
been preparing for the potential disruptions that might visit postwar America. He 
suspected that the effort to police returning GIs would prove as difficult as it had 
been in wartime, and that it was also “probable that serious criticism of the War 
Department will arise as a result of the conduct of many of these servicemen.” 
Civilians, he thought, would particularly object to soldiers using their uniforms to 
obtain “tacit exemption from minor ordinances applicable to civilians.” If the War 
Department permitted the uniform to be “debased” by unchecked misconduct, he 
admonished, civilians would react by rejecting postwar universal military 
training.257 
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 As the nation returned to peace, the military consolidated its accumulated 
power. Some scattered voices rejected the militarization of the city, civilian, and 
nation. Writing in January 1946, Boston Globe writer Charles A. Merrill argued 
that Americans were loath to “continue in our wartime roles as puppets of the 
state.” Wartime necessarily induced “the military and naval establishments, even 
in a democracy like ours” to be “invested with vast authority” and “be tempted to 
usurp and perpetuate their powers.” Merrill suggested that no American “be 
compelled to serve in the Army” moving forward and that the military reduce its 
growing footprint. Abroad, and also at home though, the augmentation of military 
power continued. Civilians had been made part of a “warfare state” through the 
use of extensive propaganda, economic contributions, and personal sacrifice. But 
the militarization of American life also took place in the daily interactions and 
conflicts between civilians and servicemen in urban centers. In the postwar era, 
the military maintained its imprint on American cities, continuing to influence lives 
of the civilians in liberty ports.258 
  
                                                     
258 For Merrill column see Charles A. Merrill, “Why Hysteria Sweeps Nation: Servicemen, 
Management, Labor—All of Us—Are Reluctant to Continue in Wartime Roles as Puppets of the 




Epilogue: Postwar Invasions and Occupations 
After the chronic misbehavior, absenteeism, and insubordination that had 
plagued the U.S. military during World War II, generals and other top brass 
became determined to remake the postwar Army as a disciplined, technologically 
adept, and professional fighting force. They offered an array of incentives for 
skilled technicians, engineers, and craftsmen to enlist including half-pay for life 
following two decades of service. The Army would become more mobile, 
efficient, and intelligent. The infantryman was to be “tomorrow’s armored 
Pegasus”—a warrior ready to fly into battle with “pilotless aircraft, guided 
missiles, with atomic warheads, [and] super-sonic planes.” Talk of abandoning 
traditional fronts abounded, with planners imagining highly trained soldiers 
launching airborne assaults even 1,000 miles into an enemy’s territory. The Army 
expanded its elite Ranger program—which specialized in commando tactics—
especially after their early successes in Korea. One Lieutenant General argued 
that a better training system might eliminate the military’s caste system, heralding 
an end to “Chickenshit” while bringing in enthusiastic, talented young men.259 
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Command also understood that the regular, uncontrolled weekend 
benders had only worsened the prewar view of the Army as a place for Navy and 
Marine rejects. The force’s poor image was further cemented when GIs across 
the globe rioted and mutinied against the laborious and sluggish pace of 
demobilization. Widespread boozing and epidemics of venereal disease even 
after 1945 also seemed to confirm the Army’s perpetual lack of discipline. Major 
Louis Altshuler, Chief of the VD control division, argued, “one of the greatest 
criticisms of the Army by the parents is that the Army encourages and condones 
immorality, drinking, and gambling….If we are to get the skilled technicians 
required in a modern Army, we must show that the Army is a character building 
organization and not one that breeds immorality.” Command took small steps to 
disincentivize misbehavior on liberty like urging NCOs to get married and bring 
their families to live near base.260  
 Remaking the Old Army with its tradition, discipline, and unabashed love 
of a military world cordoned off from and starkly contrasted to civilian life would 
be impossible in a new international order that required permanent and sizeable 
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Armed Forces. Planners therefore envisioned a new training program that might 
bring in more skilled recruits while also abandoning the rough, aggressive 
barracks culture that defined wartime training. This new GI would be skilled and 
morally sober. Training would utilize more carrots than sticks, and focus on 
technical education as much as hikes and target practice.261 
The “Umtees” (short for UMT Demonstration Unit) epitomized the new 
approach. In 1947, the Army brought a battalion of 17 year-old recruits to Fort 
Knox and showcased them as a potential model for the postwar Army. 
Abandoning the old model of “beat ‘em down, cuss ‘em out, and keep ‘em 
squirming,” these trainees received demerits instead of a “dressing down.” Liquor 
was strictly prohibited, officers organized educational trips to sites like Mammoth 
Cave and Lincoln’s birthplace, and the Fort offered courses on subjects like 
rocket launching. Barracks were now built up and practically luxurious by WWII 
standards. Boys were even given their own lockers, plugs for radios, a reading 
area, and an entire room devoted to listening to classical music. Dances were 
offered several times a week, with local female chaperones in charge, no MPs 
required. The Army highlighted its coordination with a board of prominent citizens 
in Louisville to “foster better relations between the civilian community and the 
Army” so that “the boys feel at home on liberty hours.” The Times promised that 
the Army would keep each “beardless wonder” out of trouble by “hovering over 
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him like an anxious parent.” The commanding general even pledged to cut back 
on swearing, a key element of the World War II GI’s vernacular. “We don’t intend 
to stop anyone from using a healthy ‘damn,’” he explained, “but this stream of 
obscene, vulgar stuff, it’s too much.” The Umtees were given the power to run 
court-martials for each other, delegating legal responsibility to peers rather than 
commanders and the legal branch. The officer corps even solicited the Umtees 
for advice and feedback on their training.262 
 After several months, the Army pronounced the pilot program a success, 
specifically citing the low levels of drunkenness, VD, and AWOL, as well as the 
higher rates of church attendance as evidence of more skilled, well-adjusted 
recruits ready to form the core of the modern Army. The service, at least 
publically, seemed to be on its way towards a more effective and better behaved 
force.263 
Old Army regulars remained more skeptical. They saw the Umtee boys as 
the “Lace Pantie Brigade,” “senior boy scouts,” or “male Wacs,” arguing that their 
unit was little more than a cute experiment or publicity stunt for Congress. One 
veteran sergeant cautioned, “In the old days the Army either made men or broke 
them; this way doesn’t do either.” The still poor education levels among many of 
the Army recruits only added to the misgivings of the regulars. The young recruits 
of 1946 and 1947, often labeled GI Joe Jr., offered little cause for optimism for 
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Army planners gunning for technically skilled and tactically sharp units. The 
average man entering training recorded lower scores on the Army’s general 
aptitude test compared to recruits in World War II, and few brought a university 
education or trade or engineering skills. Many could not read, remained 
undisciplined, or engaged in misbehavior. Studies of camps and forts revealed 
that instructors also lacked education and ability, leaving most men to struggle 
through training described in an Army investigation as “poorly planned, 
insufficiently executed, and hopelessly obsolete.”264  
 The Army’s first forays in Korea revealed that the training reforms failed to 
produce a more effective combat soldier. The grandiose plans for bright, morally 
upright GIs floundered when the brass chose to slash the training period from 
seventeen weeks to eight to solve yet another manpower shortage. Troops 
arrived not knowing to use their rifles, mortars, or artillery. Most dangerously, 
very few understood how to use their radios, leaving units cut off and 
uncoordinated. One veteran officer explained to the Times that the U.S. was 
fielding “a cream-puff Army, not an Army of soldiers.” The main problem, he 
argued, was that the Umtee system of more democratic and less harsh training 
had resulted in “damned coddling and babying of troops.” “Let the Army make 
soldiers,” he implored, “We’ve got to teach ‘em how to fight, get rid of the 
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nonessentials, and get down to tough, hard bed-rock training.” Mean, tough GIs 
would be needed to “meet successfully the hordes of Asia or armies of 
barbarians.” General Mark Clark, Commander of Army Field Forces, already 
made the move to turn away from producing the “G.I. gentleman” in favor of what 
Major General Lewis B. Hershey called “young ‘killers’ ready for grim war.” The 
virile, aggressive soldier was quickly back, as was the rough approach to basic 
training that so often spilled over into violent carousing on liberty.265 
 Ending or limiting the effects of a hyper-aggressive, martial masculinity 
proved impossible for the military. For civilian and cities, too, the war’s legacy 
loomed large, and in the postwar United States the culture of wolfish carousing 
both lingered and evolved in subtle ways. 
Invasions 
Before making their assault on the building, they made plans. They waited 
for the cover of night, and while the sun set, the leaders of a 250 man “Army” 
drew up coordinated lines of attack. A little before 12:45 a.m., the leaders 
ordered four “squads” of scouts to move ahead and enter the building via a 
heating plant tunnel. There they found a power switch and quickly cut the main 
telephone cable and lights. With the building now darkened and no access to 
external communication, a spearhead force donned masks and moved to their 
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designated attack points. The scouts crept through the tunnels leading into 
building and silently unlocked the front door, “admitting the main assault force.” 
Quickly and quietly, the men charged through the doors and began their raid.266 
 Though acting like an organized military unit—and consistently described 
in those terms by newspapers—this was no Army assault on a hostile 
encampment. This was the first panty raid, a hallmark of postwar campuses 
beginning with this incident in 1949. Before entering the women’s dormitory, the 
male undergraduates of Augustana College in Rock Island, Illinois dispatched a 
sortie to lock the housemother in her room. The “masked prowlers” then ran 
through the unlit hallways, barging into each woman’s room. The Chicago Daily 
Tribune reported that “pajama clad girls were tossed to the floor as beds were 
tipped over.” The invaders splashed sleeping girls with water and threw others 
into the showers. For ten minutes, “feminine screams came from all quarters of 
the building.” The “night prowling squadron” targeted dresser drawers, emptying 
or breaking furniture in pursuit of women’s panties, bras, and other lingerie. The 
women later told The Washington Post that the men had “wrecked the place,” 
leaving some struggling to find more clothing. The police soon arrived, prompting 
“a leader of the raiders” to sound “retreat on a trumpet,” causing the men to 
scatter into the night. Given that the police report recorded that the station had 
been notified of the raid six minutes before it began, a rumor flourished that 
“there had been a ‘leak’ in the invading forces.” The reaction of the women to the 
                                                     




raid was mixed. Some responded by grabbing whatever makeshift weapons they 
could, with one co-ed smashing one of the men on the head with a chair and 
others wildly swinging their fists at interlopers. The women also grabbed water 
buckets, waiting to drench the invaders, while those who heard the commotion 
attempted to lock their doors and hold out for the cops. Others though could be 
heard yelling, “Help! Police! Isn’t this wonderful?” One senior woman claimed “it 
was really more fun than anything else” and then coyly said that “we had an 
inkling they were coming.” Once the cops had ejected the men, the women 
began picking up their clothing and restoring their rooms. The dormitory 
remained abuzz throughout the night, with some girls reported to be “hysterical.” 
The college’s president later disputed much of the reporting, noted that the men 
had apologized, and downplayed the raid as little more than a “thoughtless, 10 
minute aberration” and a “serenade.”267  
 Throughout the fifties and sixties, panty raids marked some of the first 
stirrings of teenage rebellion, sexual experimentation, and a rejection of 
authority. In one sense, these volatile campus disturbances stand as a harbinger 
of more revolutionary changes to come in the late sixties. But in many ways, they 
were a connection not to the future, but to the past. Indeed, pantry raids 
mimicked much of the behavior seen in liberty ports and boom towns during the 
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war. College men moved, acted, and explained their exploits in the same terms 
as GIs had. Their planning and execution of these raids, and their ultimate prize 
of a co-ed or her underwear, matched the rough, coercive heterosexuality that 
soldiers performed in wartime. Like troops, undergrads resisted and fought with 
police attempting to contain or stop these incidents. And the women who were 
the subject of these invasions often mirrored the mixed reactions that wartime 
women exhibited to the advances of servicemen. Pantry raids, then, raise 
questions about how the World War II culture of carousing on liberty may have 
directly influenced postwar youth sexuality and masculinity.268 
 Similar incidents preceded Augustana’s raid, for example when Harvard 
men charged into Radcliffe dorms in 1947, where “they grabbed protesting, 
kicking, squealing girls” and then “heaved them ungently into the waiting and 
expectant arms of Harvard men.” A year later, Colorado’s Women’s College 
banned the men of the School of Mines after 300 “invaded” the dorms “garbed 
only in towel loincloths and hairy chests,” and then absconded with several 
women. Following the 1949 incident at Augustana College, however, these 
invasions became more violent, organized, and focused on capturing 
undergarments. These panty raids were explicitly identified as military-like 
operations conducted by draft-age men and some veterans on the GI Bill. In 
1950, for example, 2,000 Harvard men took advantage of a blackout in 
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Cambridge. Assembling outside their dorms, the men, “armed with flashlights,” 
exclaimed, “On to Radcliffe,” and began a march that created a traffic jam seizing 
Harvard Square. The Globe maintained that “the imminent threat of an invasion 
by the Harvards did not throw fear into the hearts of the Radcliffe girls who 
quickly mustered their forces.” As the Harvard men surged through the doors and 
windows of Cabot and Moor halls, overturning furniture, the women threw water 
bombs in an attempt to repel the attackers. Police and the fire brigade soon 
arrived to help expel “the hordes of Attila.” Several officers reported getting into 
scuffles with the students who ran or resisted arrest. Reports routinely utilized 
military language to understand these raids. Papers referred to “surprise sorties” 
or “undie sorties,” and described women’s dormitories as “under siege.” Besides 
mimicking small unit tactics, Army command structures, and the press’ explicit 
use of martial descriptions, the undergrads invoked other symbols of military 
service. Bugle calls, for example, drove men to besiege the women’s dorms at 
the University of Wisconsin. Rioters sometimes attached panties or skirts to 
sticks, creating makeshift battle flags just as riotous troops had done on V-J Day. 
And as the Korean War became mired in stalemate in 1952, these mock 
invasions spread throughout the country.269 
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 Raids reached a fever pitch during the first half of the 1950s, both in terms 
of frequency and levels of violence against women and police forces. At UC 
Berkeley, 3000 men invaded a dozen or so sorority houses as part of a “panty 
raiding party.” The Daily Californian, the student newspaper, described how the 
female undergrads had been “knocked around, assaulted, carried outside in 
pajamas or nude.” At the University of Missouri, over 2,500 male students raided 
several dorms and sororities, stealing cash, jewelry, and lingerie. The riotous 
group formed after the leaders left notices on bulletin boards urging men to 
assemble at 10 p.m. They began by marching on Stephens College, which 
housed girls aged 14 to 19. Reports indicated “they stormed into several of these 
dormitories, splintering doors, and roamed thru corridors, forcing their way into 
girls’ bedrooms.” There they sought panties, dresses, hose, or any other trophy. 
A Columbia Tribune reporter luridly described “a screaming girl stripped of her 
panties.” Similar assaults occurred at the University of Kansas where six male 
students ripped robes from three women. Women also fought back, with co-eds 
biting an assailant who attempted to grab them from their hiding spot. One 
female University of Missouri employee held off several raiders with a blackjack. 
The Governor eventually mobilized a field artillery company in an effort to put 
down the riot after police failed to disperse the men who resisted the officers.270 
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 Like the furloughed GI taking over a liberty port, raiding undergraduate 
men often took to the streets to carouse, riot, and directly challenge the authority 
of police. Just as troops on liberty seemed to almost parade in their uniforms—
preferably with a girl at their side—undergraduates displayed captured panties as 
a token of their virility. With “sexy souvenirs” in hand, men routinely tore out into 
the street, the raiders turned rioters, smashing police cruisers, ripping up street 
signs and parking meters, and flooding streets after cracking open fire hydrants. 
Not wishing to harm what was generally a white, middle to upper class 
population, police typically followed an incremental response, starting with calls 
to disperse or attempts to block entrances to the threatened dorms. When those 
tactics failed officers sometimes engaged the panty raiders directly. Resulting 
melees lasted hours and involved hundreds of police and students. Sometimes 
riot squads were even dispatched. Battling against a hail of rocks thrown by the 
undergrads, they resorted to tear gas or water hoses to drive away the mob.271 
 As the raids continued, however, police forces increasingly favored 
passive responses, allowing the raiders to have at it. One police sergeant 
explained that “officers have been instructed to stand by. The great number of 
them are afraid to make any arrests for fear of starting a riot.” This may have 
been a prudent tactic in some circumstances given the disparity in numbers 
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between local police units and the multitude of undergrads. In one instance, an 
officer who attempted to block a surge of invaders was knocked over and 
stripped of his clothes. At Northwestern University, a co-ed remembered panty 
raiders simply picking up a sergeant and carrying him into the dorm where “they 
stole just about every piece of underwear in sight.” The Globe tersely explained 
that “police were powerless.” At other times though, policemen’s passive 
response gave male students free reign to pillage women’s dormitories. Cops 
responding to the University of Kansas raid advised women “to leave the doors 
open and not to resist.” They also argued that officers should avoid the scene 
because the raiders’ aggression would only be inflamed by the sight of the police. 
Cops regularly stood by and watched as students broke windows, set up ladders 
to make second floor forays, and even used huge battering rams to break down 
locked doors. Though the police were more willing and able to arrest panty 
raiders compared to soldiers, cops still regularly adopted the attitude of letting the 
boys have their fun at the expense of women’s welfare.272 
 Like women in wartime port cities, female undergrads engaged in active 
resistance to these assaults on their residences, property, and bodies. At almost 
every raid, women rained water bombs and eggs down on the approaching 
attackers, though this could be a sign of both genuine resistance and 
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playfulness. When men managed to break into the dormitories, women grabbed 
fire hoses and turned them on the raiders. Others favored baseball bats and 
makeshift blunt weapons as an often necessary defense against men who 
physically attacked and sexually assaulted women.273  
 But even at raids where women were assaulted, reporters consistently 
found female conspirators who encouraged and abetted the invaders. Tulane’s 
raid captured this complex dynamic when some women at one dorm conspired to 
let a raiding group in, while others desperately locked their doors. Co-eds 
regularly taunted the men assembled outside their buildings, shouting, “come on 
in fellows.” Whether to entice or placate the approaching invaders, some decided 
to simply toss lingerie out the window to howling men below. Women also 
regularly rejected the aid of police and university officials, booing them, calling 
them “party poopers,” or demanding the cops step aside and “let ‘em in!” In rarer 
instances, female students attacked police officers who had arrested particularly 
belligerent raiders. At Missouri’s violent raid where women were assaulted and 
forcibly stripped, a group of co-eds nevertheless fought with a policeman who 
had arrested three men, eventually freeing them. Some raiders found themselves 
actually cornered by women, who tore the man’s trousers off. Co-eds even 
began undertaking “reverse panty-raids,” storming into the men’s dorms while 
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chanting “we want short shorts” and ransacking dressers for the men’s 
underwear. In these instances, women seemed to be accepting, even mimicking, 
the forceful, wolfish masculinity that had flourished during World War II.274 
Panty raids appear to have reached their zenith just as the Korean War 
ground to a deadlock, with the war at times seeming more like the trench warfare 
of Verdun and Ypres than the mobile tactics that defined the Battle of the Bulge 
or the German advance through the Ardennes. Though college men seemed to 
be aping military tactics and the rough, aggressive behavior that defined liberty in 
wartime cities, GIs stuck in rat-infested trenches had little sympathy for the 
raiders. After Stars and Stripes published an article about the “spring fever” 
spreading throughout campuses, a soldier wrote in to the civilian papers with 
utter disdain. Angrily attacking college men who appeared to “have nothing else 
to do besides going around collecting panties and bras,” one “Disgusted G.I.” 
suggested they be drafted immediately. Representing the men at the Central 
Front, he bitterly explained that “we, too, have ‘spring fever,’ but our kind is a little 
different than theirs. It makes me boil inside when I read about such trash going 
on.” A civilian concurred asking why these young men were allowed to avoid 
service only to end up “swiping girls’ underwear.” Senators demanded the boys 
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be drafted, while one judge argued the undergrads were sabotaging morale in 
Korea.275 
To soldiers in Korea, the pantry raiders likely seemed little more than boys 
playing soldier. Their obsession with taking underwear—and not the women the 
lingerie belonged to—suggested an almost adolescent and undeveloped 
sexuality, rather than the swaggering masculinity of a GI, leatherneck, or sailor. It 
seems probable that criticism of the college men was partially driven by jealousy 
and antipathy towards civilians. Stuck in a dirty trench, alternating between 
freezing conditions and sunburn, and lacking any clear objective, soldiers 
understandably despised the civilian boys who seemed to be getting the girls 
while shirking duty. Others likely objected to the undergraduates who seemed to 
be claiming the markers of military identity and the spoils of war without any of 
the sacrifices. Nevertheless, a militarized sexuality took hold at America’s 
universities, even while the actual troops toiled away in “The Forgotten War.” 
Occupations 
 The legacy of liberty in wartime also endured in the geography of vice 
imprinted onto postwar cities. Though never reaching the same levels of 
debauchery and danger, postwar hubs retained and expanded the militarized 
districts that had catered to the man passing through port, or to the shiploads of 
sailors arriving for fleet week. The war made fun zones like Scollay Square a 
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more menacing, sordid area less welcoming to civilians. In the postwar era, 
Scollay’s reputation continued to decline, even as the military man’s nostalgia for 
the block grew. Scollay’s now infamous reputation as “Boston’s Barbary Coast” 
drew the attention of concerned civilians and politicians looking to revitalize 
Boston’s downtown. The Square had become so notorious for wartime excesses 
that an ultimately failed movement commenced in 1945 to rename the district 
“Eisenhower Square.” In 1951, a Boston Judge claimed that the military was still 
failing to control its personnel in downtown Boston, demanding that certain areas 
“be classified as a combat zone” and out of bounds. When the Old Howard 
Theater closed down in 1953 due to the resurgent efforts of vice squads, the last 
vestiges of the old Scollay Square seemed to go with it. Boston’s upper class 
increasingly hoped the Square might be “purified.” Just as Robert Moses seized 
his chance to tear up Coney Island’s parks in the late 40s and 50s, the Brahmins 
and urban renewal proponents sought an end to what the papers called Scollay’s 
“honky-tonk reputation for evil.”276 
In 1962, Old Boston got its wish when the city declared that Scollay would 
be destroyed to make way for Government Center, an area positively sterile in 
both name and appearance. “Proper Boston is standing death watch over an 
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aged and roguish black sheep relative,” declared the Chicago Tribune, “Brazen 
Scollay Square, long the stamping ground of millions of seamen and service men 
is breathing its last raspy breaths as a rowdy oasis in the midst of Puritan virtue.” 
As if Boston’s officials hoped to build the direct opposite of Scollay’s sleazy, 
hodgepodge mix of burlesque, sailor bars, hot-dog stands, fleshpots, and tattoo 
parlors, they chose a massive, brutalist City Hall and stark plaza defined by the 
coldness, uniformity, and order of brick and concrete. With offices soon to 
populate the area, the Globe predicted that “only the ghosts of the crews ashore 
for a night on the town will loiter.” Crews and trucks soon arrived, ejecting the 
Square’s denizens and carrying the old buildings—and the dodgy reputation, 
officials hoped—away from the center of Boston. With the Square razed, Boston 
might move beyond the vice and mayhem that had accompanied men when they 
hit port. Like Army Command, urban officials hoped the vestiges of the war might 
be erased in a modern, technocratic redesign.277 
Boston’s elite could destroy Scollay, but they could not prevent what 
caused the Square to become what it was. Robert Levey—eventually the Globe’s 
restaurant critic—understood this when he explained that the city had merely 
displaced the desires and suppliers of militarized vice. “Scollay Square was 
called a bad thing by lots of people,” Levey wrote, “but like television, it was as it 
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was because there were many people who wanted it to be that way.” For the 
moment though, urban renewal evangelists and proper Bostonians hailed the 
end of Scollay and its worldwide reputation as the “place where a sailor, weary of 
the sea, could catch up on shore sins in jig time.” For Navy ensigns and other 
troops passing though, Boston remained a key liberty destination. With the 
destruction of Scollay they simply sought out new hangouts, and they did not 
need to look far.278 
The reconstituted military zone for carousing became appropriately known 
as “The Combat Zone,” demonstrating the degree to which liberty in World War II 
changed cities for decades to come. Spread over four blocks along Washington, 
Stuart, Boylston, and Tremont streets, the reestablished center for sin featured 
some of Scollay’s key hallmarks—sailor bars, hot dog stands, movie houses, 
strip clubs—but it ditched the old-style burlesque and charm for a hard-edged 
jungle of prostitution, pornography, and crime. The Combat Zone built upon the 
sinister and dangerous turn Scollay took during the war, embracing a vision of 
vice that conjured Taxi Driver’s Times Square. In contrast to the broad boulevard 
of Scollay, the Combat Zone featured tighter, darker streets packed with 
wandering sailors, streetwalkers, and a jarring mix of curious interlopers, drunks, 
and social outcasts. Darkness defined the zone—only the flickering neon 
afforded a brief, hazy glimpse. The area similarly existed in a kind of legal 
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darkness. City cops and the police vice squad with their paddy wagons lingered 
on the outskirts. But once inside the heart of the Combat Zone, sailors were 
largely left to “blow off steam.” The Globe acknowledged that most police took 
the view that visitors were committing only crimes against themselves. “If he 
wants to be a chicken,” some officials thought, “he will be plucked.” The BPD 
opted to merely contain the crime to the zone, forming a perimeter to keep the 
drinking, fighting, and vice separated from Boston’s respectable neighborhoods 
and businesses. Officials admitted that even attempting to enforce the law would 
require a hugely expanded police force working around the clock for months just 
to make the arrests. And as they learned with Scollay, shutting down a red-light 
district only pushed servicemen to seek out their desires elsewhere.279 
The Combat Zone exemplified the dirty, dangerous hubs of vice and 
delight often found in American cities that attracted troops, such as Times 
Square and Hollywood Boulevard. The sensory experience and rhythms of The 
Combat Zone capture the degree to which these hubs were born out of the 
militarization of red-light districts during World War II. Like Scollay, The Combat 
Zone seemed almost abandoned and decaying in daylight. Without the 
chiaroscuro effect of neon light, the crumbling exteriors of buildings became 
readily apparent. The billboards promising strip dancers fared worse in 
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brightness: “Half plucked fowls, with thigh fat,” wrote one journalist. Bookshops 
peddled price-jacked nudie magazines tightly wrapped in cellophane to prevent 
casual peaks from the punters. Others pushed expensive books wrapped in 
brown paper, suggesting its contents were not fit to be seen publically. Quite 
often though, the purchaser soon discovered they had just bought an edition of 
The Great Gatsby. The B-girl also survived World War II, continuing to ply her 
trade in the sailor bars that dominated Washington Street. The smells remained 
the same too. Vomit, piss, smoke, and rye whiskey suffused the area, making the 
whole area seem sticky and permanently filthy. “White Hunters,” men cruising the 
area for pickups, blocked up the streets and made easy marks for muggers and 
con-women. Young male civilians and troops frequently brawled, with groups of 
roaming Bluejackets clashing with civilian motorcycle gangs. “The usual fights 
are between men who feel their masculinity is in question, over a girl,” the Globe 
explained, “and between girls, one of whose professional standing is in question.” 
With its heady mix of boozing, whoring, and fighting, The Combat Zone 
continued the traditions of wartime Scollay and really all liberty ports. “Yeah, this 
is the Combat Zone all right,” explained a bartender, “When they tore down 
Scollay Square, everybody moved down here. The joints, the sailors, the 
hustlers, everybody. It even smells the same.” 280 
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Admitting defeat, Boston chose to make The Combat Zone an official 
“adult entertainment district” in 1974. Attempting to contain the misbehavior and 
crime of the furloughed sailor proved simpler than directly challenging it. It was 
the same conclusion military authorities and politicians had come to during World 
War II.281 
It's easy to understand why Americans remain hesitant to imagine “the 
greatest generation” leaving a legacy of sexual coercion, drunken violence, and 
seedy vice districts. Few periods of American history still offer the kind of “victory 
culture” that that this moment continues to evoke. The standard story of World 
War II tells a tale of triumph, justice, and the ascension of American power, all of 
it built on the actions and sacrifices of soldiers and sailors fighting outside the 
United States. The move from the tragedy of Pearl Harbor to the hard won 
victories at Normandy and Iwo Jima creates a satisfying narrative arc even for 
those who only use “the good war” idea ironically. But rethinking the history of the 
American “home front,” recovering the central role of troops to that story, reveals 
a strange and unsettling world where military goals prevailed over the welfare 
and security of American civilians just as it had over foreign populations. 
Witnessing the transformations of cities and civilian life captures the precise 
ways that growing federal and military power impacted American society. The 
stories of people who populated American liberty ports are worth recovering, 
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from the lives of women running the GI gauntlet to troops snatching hard-earned 
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